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This thesis extends the understanding of the constellations of logics in Japanese 
management practices in Asia and the West. By adopting comparative 
ethnographic case studies, this thesis explores the cultural meanings attributed 
to different institutional logics, including family, corporation, market and religion 
in each subsidiary site: Thailand, Taiwan, Belgium and the US. It contributes to 
the institutional logic approach in four distinct ways. First, the finding that logics 
themselves are culturally interpreted advances a relationship between logics 
and cultures. Second, the finding that Japanese ‘family’ logics and Theravada 
Buddhism strengthen each other elaborates the concept of logic compatibility. 
Third, the finding that the constellations of logics are ongoing and continuously 
formed in relation to geographical locations strongly supports the notion of 
contextual embeddedness proposed in cross national studies. Fourth, the 
finding that the boundaries of the organisational communities are not 
‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but constructed through actors’ profiles 
raises the importance of actors’ profiles. 
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What we expected to hear from you is problem identification and 
solutions: what are the root causes at JapanCo group and their 
subsidiaries, and what we should do to resolve these …  
 
A middle manager in a Japanese multinational, known here with the alias 
JapanCo, approached me in the middle of dinner after I presented my research 
summary in a management seminar at JapanCo in March, 2015. I explained to 
him that I was conducting academic research, not a consulting project. He 
ignored this, leaving me feeling embarrassed. I had not intended to be there as a 
management consultant but nobody at the event that night seemed to be 
convinced of my identity as an academic researcher. This was not my first 
experience of this: during my research I often felt embarrassed when 
communicating with many informants who viewed me as a Japanese 
management consultant in JapanCo group I was sometimes asked to deliver 
advice on strategy and structure at JapanCo’s subsidiaries. In fact, I delivered 
recommendations to the Japanese MD in JapanCo Thailand (JTHAI) in order to 
resolve tension between different divisions. I suggested that he form 
cross-functional teams to discuss these issues. Furthermore, in JapanCo USA 




(JUSA), I advised the Japanese vice president (VP) to utilise local resources, 
rather than those of the headquarters of JapanCo (JHQ) because of the different 
standards in the US. Recognising me as an academic researcher, an American 
president expressed a passionate interest in my PhD thesis and wanted to read 
it once it was completed. In these interactions, my identity tended to swing 
between being viewed as a Japanese management consultant, an academic 
researcher at a British institution, and simply as Japanese.  
 The idea of this thesis emerged through my previous professional and 
personal experiences. It originally dates back to my late teens in a high school in 
the late 1980’s when ‘Japanisation’ was happening (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 
1992). My father was a management consultant and educational instructor to 
Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) who were entering, or had entered, 
the US market. At my home in Japan, he had often shared his consulting stories 
about how the Japanese way of management was resisted in the US because of 
cultural differences. In order to manage American employees, he emphasised 
the significance of teamwork to explain what Japanese management should be 
like. He asserted that Japanese management is based on the ‘family’ norm, 
although I did not really understand what that meant at that time. All the stories, 
as far as I remember, illustrated a vivid contrast of cultural differences: 
individualism and collectivism; professionalism and paternalism; direct and 
indirect communication; personal spaces in communication, etc. These all 
sounded very intellectually interesting to me and posed a question as to what 
causes these differences. After graduating from university, I worked in both 
Japanese and American corporations. Later, I started to work as an independent 




management consultant dealing with intercultural issues in organisational 
development, and this motivated me to return again to this question, which I 
realised still remained unanswered. Since then, I decided to pursue this interest 
further in order to understand the differences between Japanese and Western 
management more fully.  
This thesis now deals with those unanswered questions which I had in 
my mind. It extends the understanding of the constellations of logics in Japanese 
management practices in Asia and the West (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; 
Thornton et al., 2012). By adopting comparative ethnographic case studies, it 
explores the cultural meanings of ‘family’, corporation, market and religion in 
each site of the subsidiaries of JapanCo: Thailand, Taiwan, Belgium and the US. 
In so doing, the thesis addresses new ‘cultural space’ in an institutional logic 
approach (Thornton et al., 2012) in the sense that the constellations of logics in 
Asia are to some extent different to those in the West.  
 
1.2 Audience of the thesis 
There are three main groups of audiences. The first audience is institutionalists 
who theorise and examine institutional logics. These include Elizabeth Goodrick 
and Trish Reay, who developed constellations of logics (Goodrick and Reay, 
2011; Waldorff, Reay, and Goodrick, 2013); Patricia H Thornton and her 
colleagues, who presented institutional logic perspectives (Thornton et al., 
2012); Marya L. Besharov and Wendy K. Smith, who proposed a compatibility 
and centrality framework (Besharov and Smith, 2014); Sara Värlander and her 
colleagues, who examined constellations of logics across different countries 




(Värlander et al., 2016); Royston Greenwood and his colleagues, who raised 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; 2011); Friedland and 
colleagues, who coined and continued to develop institutional logics (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991; Friedland et al., 2014); and Rick Delbridge and Tim Edwards, 
who proposed relational analysis (Delbridge and Edwards, 2007; 2013). The 
second audience is Japanese management scholars who investigate Japanese 
management practices. They are Nick Oliver and Barry Wilkinson, who 
elaborated Japanisation (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 1992); Tony Elger and 
Chris Smith, who criticised Japanisation (Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005); Dorinne 
K. Kondo, who elaborate ‘company as family’ in a small Japanese firm in Japan 
(Kondo, 1990); Anita D. Bhappu, who proposed the existence of the ‘family’ logic 
in Japanese MNCs (Bhappu, 2000); and Abo (2015), who summarised and 
examined his past empirical research across different regions. The third 
audience is business managers who work with Japanese MNCs. These may be 
either Japanese or non-Japanese managers.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 aims to identify gaps in current research, and specify the research 
questions these pose, by reviewing the existing literature on ‘Japanese 
management practices’. The practices reviewed are primarily manufacturing 
practices and other practices identified with Japan. These are Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and Quality Control Circle (QC Circle), Just In Time (JIT), 
and a lifetime employment, and seniority based wages (Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1988; 1992; Ackroyd et al., 1988). Here, the initial argument was whether 




manufacturing practices can be transferred to Western regions as ‘best practice’. 
Later, this universal model of best practice began to attract heavy criticism 
centred on a lack consideration for different geographical contexts such as social 
and economic conditions (Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005). A series of 
unsuccessful transfers of manufacturing practices leads to ‘hybrids’ of Japanese 
and non-Japanese management practices (Elger and Smith, 2005). Furthermore, 
other existing approaches and evidence are reviewed. 
 Nonetheless, this strong emphasis on transferring manufacturing 
practices overlooked another important aspect of non-manufacturing practice 
embodying cultural meanings such as the ‘company as family’ and employees 
as ‘family’ members (Kondo, 1990). In respect to the concept of the ‘company as 
family’, workers in Japanese MNCs are considered to be reciprocal ‘family’ 
members who share collective responsibility and identities. In this way, 
organisational harmony, a striving for consensus, seniority and slow promotion in 
exchange for a lifetime’s employment are prioritised (e.g., Keys and Miller, 1984; 
Hatvany and Pucik, 1981). In light of this review, four research gaps within 
Japanese MNCs subsidiaries have been identified:  
 
 Less emphasis has been placed on non-manufacturing practices 
 Few in-depth comparative case studies have been conducted 
within a Japanese MNC spanning Asia and the West  
 Little attention has been paid to the cultural meanings attributed to 
practices  
 The manner in which Japanese expatriates and local employees 




are organised has had little scrutiny  
.  
 Hence, drawing on these research gaps, three research 
questions have been defined regarding Japanese MNC sales 
subsidiaries: 
 
Does the focus on the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC help to 
illuminate  
 
 How non-manufacturing practices are being conducted across Asia 
and the West? 
 How different cultural meanings are being attributed to 
non-manufacturing practices across Asia and the West? 
 How Japanese expatriates and local employees are being 
organised? 
 
Japanese MNCs across borders are expected to generate hybrids (Elger and 
Smith, 2005; Endo et al., 2015). These hybrids and changes can only be 
interpreted through attributing meanings in practices across Asia and the West. 
Drawing on Abo (2015), Asia is defined as primarily South East Asian countries 
and East Asian such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China, while the West means 
Western European and North American countries such as the UK, Belgium, and 
the US. The institutional logic approach offers a way of focussing on the variety 
of meanings attributed by such practices, in order to illuminate how meanings 




are culturally and institutionally attached to Japanese management practices 
across Asia and the West. 
 Chapter 3 aims to formulate a conceptual framework in order to analyse 
practices across the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC. It builds on the current 
literature on institutional logic (Thornton et al., 2012) and constellations of logics 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Värlander et al., 2016) with a compatibility and 
centrality framework (Besharov and Smith, 2014), and applies the insights to 
different geographical contexts in which the Japanese MNC’s subsidiaries 
operate. Constellations of logics are composed of cooperative as well as 
competitive relationships among logics, possibly illuminating the complicated 
processes involved in a Japanese MNC. Furthermore, given the constellations of 
logics, the ‘family’, corporation, market, and religion are identified and elaborated. 
In particular, non-market logics such as ‘family’ and religion are identified as 
areas of focus. ‘Family’ logic is rooted in Japanese society where Japanese 
management practices are born and inculcated. ‘Family’ logic in Japanese 
management does not depend upon whether or not a company is owned by a 
family. Rather, it operates among the interpersonal relationships between 
management and employees as Japanese reciprocal relationship based on ko 
and on (returning favours to one’s parents) within a firm, characterising 
‘company as family’ (Kondo, 1990). Lifetime employment, teamwork, and 
consensus-orientation are closely associated with the ‘family’ logic. Other 
religion, market and corporation logics are also examined. These logics are 
targeted to characterise and interpret practices in a Japanese MNC. They are 
deeply rooted in geographical communities in the subsidiaries of Japanese 




MNCs. Their relationships can be quite different in Asia and the West. 
 Chapter 4 aims to identify the research design and justify the research 
methods in order to answer the research questions. ‘Practice theory’ (Giddens, 
1984) is combined with an institutional logic approach, subsuming all the levels 
of analysis, such as individuals, organisations and society (Friedland and Alford, 
1991) into a comprehensive concept of ‘practices’ as an “ongoing series of 
practical activities” (Giddens, 1976, p81). The purpose of the research is to 
understand the cultural meanings of practices through constellations of logics. 
Comparative ethnographic case study is selected as the main type of research. 
It is comparative across not only Asia but also the West, where constellations of 
logics were originally identified and theorised. It is ethnographic since ‘at home 
ethnography’ is adopted. It is quite important to have ‘natural access’ to the 
research target, a Japanese MNC, rather than as ‘a professional stranger’. 
Furthermore, Besharov and Smith’s (2014) compatibility and centrality 
framework is fully adopted. Through my natural settings, JapanCo is selected as 
a case. I have long known the Japanese MNC as my father’s client. Some of the 
interviewees have known me since I was young, although I did not necessarily 
remember them. Data collection and analysis are organised based on ‘at home 
ethnography’ (Alvesson, 2009). Thus, the interpretation of data starts from the 
beginning of data collection and only finishes at the end of the writing-up process. 
Through the iterative process of interpretation, self-reflexivity is promoted and 
utilised. I examined and interacted with the meanings of the topic not as ‘a 
neutral data collector’ but as an ‘active and reflective’ agent (Mason, 2002).  
 Chapter 5 provides relevant background for interpreting the remaining 




empirical chapters. With the alliance partner, AmericaCo, JapanCo is 
characterised as a unique and atypical Japanese corporation, possibly causing 
complex cultural meanings in practices through varied constellations of logics. 
Here, two major elements influencing the cultural interpretations of each 
subsidiary in terms of collective identities are provided: the main type of 
customers locally and the dependence on JHQ. Identified as ‘a typical Japanese 
company’, JTHAI seems to be quite associated with Japanese management 
practices with a large Japanese customer base. It is also quite dependent on 
JHQ in terms of their products and services. By contrast, JUSA and JEU have a 
strong influence from AmericaCo and their local customers, thereby being 
identified as ‘an American company’ and a mixture of a Japanese and a 
European company’ by their local employees. JTAIW is facing a change in its 
customer base from Japanese to non-Japanese, such as Taiwanese and 
Chinese yet being identified as ‘a Japanese company’. Furthermore, an 
examination was also made of the dependence on the resources of JHQ where 
research and development functions are concentrated. In particular, JUSA is 
relatively independent from JHQ because of their manufacturing and R&D 
functions, while the others, such as JTHAI, JTAIW, and JEU, are quite reliant on 
manufacturing and R&D resources in JHQ. These subsidiaries have to 
communicate frequently with JHQ in order to enquire about and negotiate prices, 
delivery and the qualities of the products.  
 Chapter 6 aims to understand how aligned practices in customer 
development are conducted and culturally interpreted through cooperative 
relationships between logics. Targeted practices are study groups, on-the-job 




training, and sales follow-up. There are two main findings that are identified in 
this chapter. First, the Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism logics 
are culturally interpreted according to their national cultures. The Japanese 
‘family’ is governed by reciprocal ‘ko’ and ‘on’ relationships, rather than the 
‘unconditional loyalty’ which legitimates the Western ‘family’ (Thornton et al., 
2012). ‘Oyabun Kobun’ and ‘Senpai’ are expressed as a burden of Japanese 
‘family’ members: ‘Ongaeshi’, repayment to those whom one owes a debt to, 
especially in the context of a child or subordinate who is obligated to return the 
favour to its parents or seniors for the nurturing they offered. Furthermore, the 
Thai Theravada Buddhism logic is also culturally interpreted and differently 
enacted. Both Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism once again 
highlight the limitations of the current Western institutional logics perspective, 
eventually implying that these perspectives cannot be universally applied. 
Second, culturally enacted logics can be amplified in a cooperative manner. This 
finding directly elaborates on the compatibility of logics (Besharov and Smith, 
2014) and the presupposition of amplification itself (Greenwood et al., 2010; 
2011). 
 Chapter 7 aims to understand how contested practices in work and 
employment are conducted and interpreted through contextually competitive 
relationships among logics which may coexist and in turn conflict. Targeted 
practices are job delegation, performance appraisal and socialisation. The main 
finding that the constellations of logics are ongoing and continuously formed in 
relation to geographical locations demonstrates the ‘contextual embeddedness’ 
of national and organisational contexts (e.g., Giorgi et al., 2015; McPherson and 




Sauder, 2013; Värlander et al., 2016; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Smets and 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). This is because contextually enacted logics do not 
necessarily ‘win’ or ‘lose’ for lengthy periods of time in practice. Although there 
are means to deal with and finally resolve the competitive relationships, e.g. 
‘actors’ active collaboration’ (Reay and Hinnings, 2005; 2009), 
‘compartmentalisation’ (Greenwood et al., 2011), these are not adopted here to 
mediate the competitive relationship. Rather, negotiation and conflict continue to 
be constantly played out by actors on an ongoing basis. This further negates the 
concept of one-off ‘segmenting’ which aims to separate the impacts of logics on 
different actors, geographical communities and organisations once and for all, in 
order to solve the conflicts caused by competitive relationships (Goodrick and 
Reay, 2011). Furthermore, the constellations of logics are, to some extent, 
different in Asia and the West. This elaborates the geographical communities in 
which specific logics are rooted (Värlander et al., 2016; Marquis and Lounsbury, 
2007; Lounsbury, 2007). In Asia, the ‘family’ logic is enacted through the 
practices of employment. By contrast, in the West, the market logic is strongly 
enacted by performance appraisal and socialisation (see 7.3.1.2). As Abo (2015), 
Lounsbury (2007) and Värlander et al. (2016) point out, geographical location 
matters. This does not, however, mean that the geographical locations in Asia 
and the West automatically determine the competitive relationships between 
logics.  
 Chapter 8 aims to understand how estranged practices in work 
organisations are interpreted through ceremonial aspects and how actors in turn 
are organised. It also corresponds primarily, but not exclusively, to the third 




research question of how Japanese and locals are organised. Targeted practices 
are communication with JHQ about the performance evaluation of Japanese 
expatriates, business results, and locals’ complaints. The main finding of this 
chapter is that the boundaries of organisational communities are not ‘segmented’ 
to Japanese expatriates but constructed through actors’ profiles. The finding 
further elaborates on the receptivity of ‘intraorganisational communities’, which 
is supposed to greatly affect the given meaning of logics in the subsidiaries. 
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that receptivity may be strongly affected by ‘the 
thickness of ties’ of organisational communities to their organisational fields. At 
first sight, this seems to support Japanese organisational communities. 
Japanese expatriates are structured as the dominant organisational community, 
manifesting uchi, the inside group of the ethnocentric ‘family’ (Kondo, 1990). The 
boundaries of these organisational communities are not prefixed, however, but 
contested and dynamically redrawn in relation to actors’ personal profiles. Here, 
the boundaries are occasionally contested by examining who becomes a ‘family’ 
member through their ‘active participation’. Moreover, the receptivity of 
Japanese organisational communities is greatly affected by actors’ profiles, as is 
strongly implied by Suddaby et al. (2012) and Battilana and Dorado (2010). This 
indicates that the organisational communities are constructed through actors’ 
‘life history’ in terms of logics, as Battilana and Dorado (2010) implies, rather 
than by the organisational field structures (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
 Chapter 9 summarises the key findings, their significance, the 
implications for managers, and limitations and future questions. The four main 
findings and their contributions are located in the constellations of logics. First, 




the finding that logics themselves are culturally interpreted advances a 
relationship between logics and cultures (e.g., Värlander et al., 2016; Thornton 
et al., 2012; Giorgi et al., 2015). Second, the finding that the Japanese ‘family’ 
logics and Theravada Buddhism strengthen each other elaborates the concept 
of the compatibility in multiple logics (e.g., Besharov and Smith, 2014; Goodrick 
and Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2010; 2011). Third, the finding that the 
constellations of logics are ongoing and continuously formed in relation to 
geographical locations strongly supports the notion of contextual embeddedness 
proposed in other cross national studies (e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; 
Värlander et al., 2016; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 
2013). Fourth, the finding that the boundaries of the organisational communities 
are not ‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but constructed through actors’ 
profiles raises the importance of actors’ profiles (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2012; 
McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). 
  




Recent Development of ‘Japanese management practices’  Chapter 2:
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the research gaps and their accompanying 
questions by reviewing the existing literature on ‘Japanese management 
practices’, meaning the practices identified with Japan. It is divided into six 
sections. First, the manufacturing practices at Japanese manufacturing plants 
are reviewed. Second, non-manufacturing practices are examined through their 
embodied cultural meanings. Third, the cultural meaning of ‘company as family’ 
is elaborated. Fourth, the cultural meanings for practices are considered to be 
different between Asian and Western regions. Fifth, other existing approaches 
and evidence are reviewed. Finally, a concluding section attempts to summarise 
the research gaps on the basis of the existing literature and ultimately to 
determine the research questions to be answered.  
 
2.2 Japanisation as a diffusion of manufacturing practices  
First, the historical development of Japanisation is discussed. The concept of 
Japanisation emerged with the growing interest in competitive Japanese 
corporations (e.g., Pascal and Athos, 1982; Schonberger, 1982). From the 
1970s, Japan’s economic success led management scholars to examine the 
practices of major corporations; an increasing interest in Japanese firms and 
Japan stems from its economic growth until the 1980s. The study of Japanese 
firms was clearly a hot topic at that time, when Vogel (1979) identified Japan as 
the ‘Number One’ economy in the world, and as a lesson for Americans. In this 




era, the situation in Japan was an exciting topic, and the manufacturing practices 
identified with Japan were seen as ‘best practice’ as well as a source of a firm’s 
competitive advantage (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 1992). After the economic 
bubble burst in the 1990s, however, these practices were seriously questioned 
and criticised.  
 
2.2.1 Japanisation with the success of the Japanese economy during 
the 1980s 
With a strong emphasis on manufacturing practices, Peter Turnbull (1986) 
analysed how a Western company in the UK, the components’ supplier ‘Lucas 
Electrical’, adopted the manufacturing methods used by large Japanese 
companies, these being methods such as Just In Time (JIT) and Quality Control 
Circle (QC Circle). Using a case study method, he chronologically analysed the 
whole process, from the introduction of these production techniques to the 
organisational arrangement for developing these methods. Following this, Oliver 
and Wilkinson (1988; 1992) published ‘The Japanisation of British industry’, 
identifying and measuring the diffusion of Japanese management practices and 
culture in Western countries. Here, they defined Japanisation as:  
 
An umbrella term to refer to the process by which some aspects of UK 
industry appeared to be converging towards a Japanese-style model 
of management practice. This process encompassed two strands – 
emulation of Japanese manufacturing methods by Western 
manufacturers and also the increasing volume of Japanese direct 




manufacturing investment in Western economies. (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1988, p1) 
 
Both practices of convergence and direct investment went hand-in-hand in the 
UK, in the sense that both of them could be causes and effects. This extended 
the concept of Japanisation in relation to personnel practices and business 
policy in social and economic contexts. In addition to carrying out a survey, they 
adopted case studies of Japanese and British manufacturers in the UK focusing 
primarily on production techniques, in particular Just-In-Time (JIT), and 
secondarily on personnel practices, labour policy and even work organisation. 
The motivation for adopting these practices was to acquire the same competitive 
advantage achieved by Japanese MNCs. 
Oliver and Wilkinson (1988) demonstrated the interdependencies 
between each practice and the external environment. Manufacturing practices 
such as JIT and TQM demand teamwork and cooperation, with a commitment 
from employees in exchange for seniority and lifetime employment (where their 
jobs are secured until retirement age). Moreover, these interdependencies went 
hand-in-hand with cooperative relations between buyers and suppliers, with 
finance institutions, trade unions and workers. Thus, the manufacturing practices 
are not stand-alone but dependent on other practices and particular social, 
economic and political conditions, these being similar to those of Japanese 
society. These supportive conditions, for example, could be a labour surplus of 
young workers, a new manufacturing site welcoming recent practices, stable 
industrial relations, cooperative workers and trade unions, all supporting a set of 




‘Japanese style industrial organisation’. This study therefore brilliantly 
succeeded in presenting a snapshot of what was happening in the 
manufacturing plants in the UK. 
Making a comparison with the data presented in the first edition of their 
book in 1988 with their second edition, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) indicated the 
relatively unsuccessful results of adopting Japanese manufacturing practices in 
1991. This demonstrates the ‘obstacles to Japanisation’ in the UK, indicating that 
this approach could be ‘culturally embedded’ in Japan. One obstacle is, for 
example, “the paternalism of the personnel practices”, entailing “the dilution of 
occupation-specific expertise and the salience of internal promotion” (p328), 
thereby denying individual rights and the mobility of the workers. Another 
obstacle is the long-term relationship between buyers and suppliers which 
eventually leads to large corporations passing on ‘the cost of holding inventories’ 
to the suppliers. They also exert control over the trade unions inside the supply 
companies, thereby reducing the autonomy of the suppliers. A further example of 
an obstacle is that of a collaborative, single, strike-free, enterprise trade union 
which coexists with company advisory boards. This consists of union and 
non-union members, thereby contradicting the adversarial role of a trade union 
based on industry and occupations. In addition, Japanese banks which provide 
‘low-interest’ and ‘long-term loans’, contrast with British banks which are oriented 
to ‘a short term profit mentality’ based on the stock market in the UK. 
Notwithstanding this, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) concluded that these 
obstacles could be overcome by establishing ‘functional equivalents’ to the 
conditions found in Japan. For example, workers could be trained to be familiar 




with paternalism and trade unions could be managed by setting up a company 
advisory board.  
Ackroyd et al. (1988) in ‘The Japanisation of British industry?’ also 
observed these interdependencies among manufacturing practices, as well as 
their external conditions but reached a different conclusion. This study offered a 
critique of the term ‘Japanisation’ as a homogenous phenomenon, by comparing 
and contrasting the different socio-economic systems of Britain and Japan. 
Bearing in mind the societal and economic environment, they examined the 
concept of Japanisation from shop-floor practices to institutional contexts, 
examining areas such as the employment system, the labour market, finance, 
and investment policy. They also pointed out how social and economic 
conditions in Britain are distinctively different from those of Japan. This is 
because these conditions in Britain involve a ‘lack of integration’ between 
finance institutions and manufacturers, have ‘highly fragmented’ capital in the 
global economy, are not manufacturers, and there is no state intervention to 
manage demand or orchestrate industrial development (Ackroyd et al., 1988). 
Thus, they concluded that the success of Japanisation was embedded within a 
society in which a set of social and economic relations supports its preferable 
conditions; this underlines the dangers inherent in transferring Japanese 
management practices.  
 
2.2.2 Critiques of Japanisation after the bubble economy in the early 
1990s 
At the beginning of the 1990s when the Japanese bubble economy burst, the 




Japanese economy started to decline and had minimal growth (Keizer, 2012). In 
line with this economic stagnation, Elger and Smith (1994) published a book 
entitled ‘Global Japanization?’, which seriously questioned the optimistic 
assumptions of Oliver and Wilkinson (1988; 1992) that Japanese management 
practices could be transferable as best practice across different geographical 
contexts. Their work provides a series of unsuccessful cases where the 
manufacturing practices of Japanese and non-Japanese corporations were 
transferred in North America, Europe and Latin America. As regards 
‘Subaru-Isuzu Automotive’ (SIA) in the US, Graham (1994) described the 
American workers’ resistance to Japanese corporation rituals such as ‘morning 
exercises, team meetings, department meetings and company celebrations’. 
Here, collective and individual forms of resistance to the rituals emerged in 
various forms: a refusal to do exercise, anonymous letters, conflict over shift 
rotations and leaving a moving assembly line.  
In terms of the Canadian Automotive Manufacturing Inc. (CAMI), ‘a 
unionized joint venture automobile assembly plant’ in Canada, Rinehart et al. 
(1994) found that Canadian workers were barely motivated to participate in 
Japanese manufacturing practices, such as continuous improvement and the 
suggestion programmes, eventually characterising them as ‘a polite way to get 
more out of us’. Given these unsuccessful cases in a concrete setting, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Elger and Smith (1994) raised serious doubts about 
the transferability of Japanese management practices as innovative best 
practices. In their study, they identified a Japanese corporation as a ‘transplant’; 
a mechanism in which Japanese management practices, (primarily 




manufacturing practices but also personnel) could be transferred to different 
geographical locations, except in Japan.  
 Later on, Elger and Smith (2005) published a study entitled ‘Assembly 
work’, characterising the practices in Japanese MNCs as ‘hybrids’, thereby 
reflecting societal effects in both the home and host countries, such as ‘different 
national institutions, cultures, and histories’ (p58). Conducting five case studies 
of Japanese MNCs in the UK, Elger and Smith (2005) examined how Japanese 
MNC plants in the UK operate differently in terms of the policies and practices 
surrounding a manufacturing function. These can be seen in: ‘Nemawashi’ 
(consensus orientation), ‘Ho Ren So’ (information sharing), lifetime or long-term 
employment, seniority and ‘on-the-job’ training. However, these practices may 
be applied differently because a manufacturing plant can be “a strong mediator 
of both home and host countries effects” (p365). This makes it possible to view 
these effects differently according to each plant, each in a different company 
network of suppliers, customers, and with their own headquarters. On the one 
hand, a large plant may draw on best practice within its parent company and 
sister plant; while on the other hand, a small plant may have a limited sized 
network and thus experience greater influence from its customers. In this way, 
the effects of home and host countries on manufacturing practices are mediated 
by each plant in a given location, their relationship to other subsidiaries and their 
parent companies.  
 Nonetheless, the concept of the ‘hybrids’ has only been analysed in 
comparative case studies of Japanese manufacturing plants primarily in the UK. 
Here, there is space to examine how non-manufacturing practices are 




conducted and interpreted across different cultural contexts. Thus, the next sub 
section discusses non-manufacturing practices and their attributed meanings.  
 
2.3 Examining non-manufacturing practices through their cultural meanings  
This section aims to review the non-manufacturing practices identified with 
Japan within the subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs. ‘Japanese management 
practices’ consist not only of manufacturing but also non-manufacturing 
practices; the latter, however, have been explored less thoroughly by Japanese 
management scholars (e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 1992, Elger and Smith, 
1994; 2005). Considerable attention is devoted to the cultural meanings 
embodied through non-manufacturing practices although very little literature 
talks to non-manufacturing practices only. These practices are expected to 
embody the cultural meanings of Japanese paternalism in an explicit or tacit 
manner: these can constitute a group consciousness, a father-and-son 
relationship and an intimate relationship, loyalty to a company, and reciprocity 
and obligation (e.g., Kondo, 1990; Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 
1981). Such ‘family’ norms are more likely to be culturally embodied in the 
non-manufacturing practices than in the manufacturing practices: Japanese and 
local customer development, corporate philosophy, personnel practices, such as 
long-term employment, seniority, sharing information, performance, and the job 
itself. Here, the actual categories of non-manufacturing practices are identified 
through the empirical data analysis of this thesis, as shown in the titles of the 
later empirical chapters: chapter 6 on customer development; chapter 7 on work 
and employment; chapter 8 on work organisation. 





2.3.1 Customer development: the Japanese ‘family’ norm  
Customer development is discussed through the practices of on-the-job training, 
study groups, and sales follow-up (See chapter 6). To date, customer 
development by Japanese MNCs has been put aside as a mere background to 
case studies. This depends on how an overseas plant operates within a 
Japanese MNC. A further enquiry could determine who the customers are at a 
given subsidiary. Elger and Smith (2005), for example, define overseas 
Japanese plants without sales and marketing functions as ‘branch plant[s]’, the 
role of which is located within a wider corporate structure and thereby 
‘orchestrated from the centre’. Such a ‘branch plant’ is therefore expected to 
carry out manufacturing rather than sales and marketing since internal sales and 
marketing departments are responsible for the role of sales generation. Hence, 
there are two types of Japanese MNC plant empirical studies: plants with local 
sales and marketing functions and those without. Nonetheless, relatively little 
attention has been given to this distinction, given the strong emphasis on the 
manufacturing methods of Japanese MNCs.  
Elger and Smith (2005), while focusing on manufacturing methods, 
signify that ‘the role of site’ within a Japanese MNC group may colour the 
relationship between Japanese and local managers within its subsidiary. Here, 
the role of the plant and its corporate group was central to Japanese and British 
managers. One of the Japanese comparative cases in the UK concerned the 
regional manufacturing plant ‘Copy-Co’, which has only a production function 
and no sales and marketing because it is managed by one plant in the European 




regional organisation. Its immediate customers are actually marketing 
organisations and therefore any change in one market cannot be directly 
influential, but is mediated through its regional internal structures and strategy 
policies. This has resulted in less focus on quality than with other independent 
Japanese plants with sales and marketing sales functions in the UK. Thus, the 
role of the subsidiary site within its corporate group is likely to affect the 
relationships between Japanese expatriates and local employees. 
Here, the customer development practice of Japanese MNCs is partially 
elaborated and analysed as a Firm Specific Advantage (FSA) of the Japanese 
MNCs. Collinson and Rugman (2008) argue that ‘customer-led new product 
development’ is strongly associated with the existing Japanese corporate 
customers rather than local customers in a host country. Citing the comparative 
case studies of Nippon Steel, they indicate that their long-term relationship with 
the existing Japanese customer enables ‘customer-led new product 
development’ to be one of the sources of Japanese MNC competitiveness. 
Nippon Steel and its major Japanese customers, such as Toyota, have even 
established joint steel research and development (R&D) organisations. This 
long-term customer relationship enables Japanese MNCs to develop new 
products, and may include Keiretsu corporations (a group of corporations) as 
customers.  
In terms of corporate customer development, Keiretsu relations may be 
relevant to understand how practices can be conducted through Japanese 
customers. Bhappu (2000) argues that Keiretsu and groups of corporations are 
derived from merchant ‘family’ businesses in the era of feudalism during the Edo 




period of the 17th to 19th centuries. She states: 
 
Among the ie of the lower classes, the merchant ie were the structural 
precursors of modern Japanese corporations. Merchant households 
frequently established bunke (branch) ie beside the honke (main) ie. 
This enabled them to expand their distribution channels 
geographically. It also provided a way for the "corporate" merchant ie 
to perpetuate itself as an entity from one generation to another. 
(Bhappu, 2000, p411) 
 
Here, ‘ie’ in Japanese is a household in English. This ‘honke’ and ‘bunke’ 
arrangement refers to ‘douzoku’ in the period of feudalism; in other words the 
so-called ‘keiretsu’ in the modern world, ‘the hierarchically organized set of 
bunke ie around the central axis of the honke ie within a family’ (Bhappu, 2000, 
p411). Initially, this group was awarded rank and status due to ‘its genealogical 
distance from the ‘honke ie’. In a later generation, these can change according 
to economic environments. Some original ‘bunke ie’ may become ‘honke’ to a 
newer household. Similarly, some ‘honke ie’ may begin new businesses on their 
own.  
 Furthermore, Kondo (1990) argues that this concept of ‘family’ as a 
Japanese corporate network became evident in the Meiji Civil Code (‘Minpo’) in 
the Meiji Era (1868-1912). In contrast to the previous ‘bunke ie’ which did not 
necessarily have a blood relationship with ‘honke ie’, the Meiji Civil Code limits 




the successor of ‘honke ie’ to “all households of sons or brothers regardless of 
the economic arrangement made by the parental household” (Kondo, 1990, 
p169). Then, as ‘bekke’ declined, “employees were outsiders treated like ‘family’ 
in cases where the employer wished to demonstrate benevolence” (Kondo, 1990, 
p172). Eventually, this triggered ‘the so-called fictive kinship and enterprise 
familialism’ in Japanese corporations in the modern world. Later, before World 
War II, this familial concept was further developed as “the theory of kokutai: the 
state as a household with the emperor as its head”, being enshrined in the 
Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (Kondo, 1990, p173). The ‘family’ norm 
was therefore historically manifested not only in the household but also in 
corporations and the state. This notion of Japanese ‘family’ is expected to be 
reinforced and supported by Japanese corporate customers.  
Indeed, the FSA of Japanese MNCs is strongly associated with Asian 
regions where there are many Japanese customers, rather than Western 
regions (see 6.2). Here, Asia means primarily South East Asian countries and 
East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China, while the West 
means Western European and North American countries such as the UK, 
Belgium and the US. Collinson and Rugman (2008) conclude that this 
relationship with Japanese customers also constitutes ‘relational embeddedness’ 
where Japanese MNCs are deeply involved with Japanese customers. This 
‘relational embeddedness’ eventually comes to limit their expansion in Asia 
because their Japanese customers are largely located in the Asia region. For 
instance, Nippon Steel was not able to transfer R&D organisations to Europe 
and North America because of local incumbent suppliers. This is also because 




Asian societies are culturally close to Japan. Japanese kinship and interpersonal 
relationships are recognised in some Asian countries according to Collinson and 
Rugman (2008). Hofstede et al. (2010) have also proved a close cultural 
distance between Japan and other Asian countries in terms of the preferences 
for collectivism. Japanese MNCs tend to be located in a home region of Asia 
where Japanese management practices are more culturally accepted. 
 Unlike Japanese customers, however, non-Japanese customers have 
not been discussed a great deal locally. Conducting a longitude study of 
Japanese major trading corporates, Goerzen and Makino (2007) explore the 
initial international expansion of Japanese MNCs. They explain that the “early 
development of Japanese trading companies' international expansion through 
FDI is best characterised as ‘follow-the-customer behaviour’ exploiting the 
existing ties with Japanese manufacturers in foreign countries, rather than 
searching for new customers abroad” (Goerzen and Makino, 2007, p1161). This 
high dependency on domestic Japanese customers is in fact applicable to 
Japanese MNCs not only in the manufacturing industry (Chang, 1995) but also 
in the finance industry (Whitely et al., 2003) and the service industry (Goerzen 
and Makino, 2007).  
The international development stage at a Japanese MNC may be 
associated with Japanese customers therefore. Goerzen and Makino (2007) 
indicate how Japanese expatriates tend to monitor local employees rather than 
become involved themselves in the development of non-Japanese customers. In 
short, the initial internationalisation of Japanese MNCs tends to be highly 
dependent on their own Japanese customers going abroad. This strong 




Japanese customer relationship is also discussed as part of ‘Keiretsu’, with 
groups of corporates forming an external network of Japanese MNCs (Bhappu, 
2000; Kondo, 1990). With Japanese corporate customers, the ‘family’ norm is 
expected to exist to some extent and may influence our understanding of how 
Japanese and local employees conduct their practice. Thus, the distinction 
between Japanese and non-Japanese customers may influence customer 
development practices.  
 Notwithstanding the intimate relationship between Japanese MNCs and 
Japanese customers, Japanese MNCs’ sales subsidiaries have not been able to 
shed light on their relationships with their customers locally in a given 
geographical location. This clearly echoes the strong tendency of Japanese 
management to elaborate manufacturing methods, rather than, for example, the 
sales and marketing functions of Japanese MNCs. In addition, it is considered 
that customer development practices are greatly influenced by the types of 
customers, whether Japanese or local. Thus, customer development practices 
can be conducted and interpreted very differently across Asian and Western 
regions.  
 
2.3.2 Work and employment: Collective responsibility for the ‘family’ 
Work and employment in subsidiaries are discussed through units of practices, 
such as job delegation, performance appraisal, and socialisation (see chapter 7). 
All these practices may be strongly associated with and reinforced by a 
collective responsibility for the ‘company as family’. In other words, these can be 
characterised as ‘teamwork’, ‘team orientation’, ‘group consciousness’, and 




‘collectivism’. Nonetheless, these expressions may simply be interpreted as 
‘family’ norms and relationships by ‘Western’ researchers who have studied 
Japanese management with reference to Japanese society. 
As a manifestation of ‘family’, the corporate philosophy that Japanese 
MNCs normally articulate is where a corporation is ‘the family’ sharing ‘a 
common destiny’ (Kondo, 1990), and ‘collective responsibility’ (Keys and Miller, 
1984) (see 7.2). Hatvany and Pucik (1981, p471) further elaborates the detailed 
meanings of the ‘family’ behind team orientation and personnel practices.  
 
The “family” is a social group into which one is selectively admitted 
but which one is not supposed to leave, even if one becomes 
dissatisfied with this or that aspect of “family” life. The cultivation of a 
sense of uniqueness can provide an ideological justification of the 
limited possibilities for interfirm mobility. Reciprocally, the commitment 
of the “family” to the employee is expressed in company policies of 
avoiding lay-offs and providing the employee with a wide range of 
supplementary benefits. Without reasonable employment security, the 
fostering of team spirit and cooperation would be a nearly impossible 
task (Williamson & Ouchi, 1980). The ideal is to reconcile two 
objectives: pursuit of profits and perpetuation of the company as a 
group. 
 
These underlying meanings are strongly implicated and embodied in all the 




managing employee practices, such as team orientation, personnel practices, 
and socialization. The ‘family’ life, albeit superficially similar to teamwork in 
English is based on ‘wa’ in Japanese, ‘harmony’ in English. Hatvany and Pucik 
(1981, p471) further argued:  
 
Among the norms of family life, wa (harmony) is the component most 
often emphasized in company philosophies. The concept of wa 
expresses a "quality of relationship ... teamwork comes to mind as a 
suitable approximation". Wa is the watchword for developing the 
group consciousness of the employees and enhancing cooperation 
(Hatvany and Pucik, 1981, p471). 
 
This ‘family’, articulated in the corporate philosophies of many Japanese MNCs, 
is based on Japanese society where harmony is enhanced among employees, 
unions, customers and suppliers. That the English word ‘teamwork’ is actually 
mentioned characterises this harmony, but may not be accurate. Instead, 
collective responsibility for a common destiny underpins the practices requiring 
cooperation and teamwork (Keys and Miller, 1984). In these studies, the ‘family’ 
as a social group provides employment security and fosters teamwork and group 
consciousness in return. 
 The meaning of the ‘family’ is culturally interpreted with a strong sense of 
collectivism, such as collective identities (Kondo, 1990) and collective 
responsibility (Keys and Miller, 1984). Here, Kondo (1990) argues for a culturally 




interpreted meaning of the ‘company as family’, examining the crafting of 
individuals through the construction of collective identities. This examines “how 
people envision their belonging - or lack thereof - to encompassing entities like 
‘company’ and ‘family’” (p44). Collective identities are constructed on the 
assumption that the concept of the ‘company as family’ often allows actors to 
share responsibility and authority. Keys and Miller (1984) echo this emphasis on 
collectivism and further explain that it is one of underlying factors resulting in 
many Japanese management practices. In addition to a ‘Long run planning 
horizon’ and a ‘Commitment to lifetime employment’, they define ‘Collective 
responsibility’ as one of ‘fundamental factors’ that underlies practices. This 
highlights ‘the soft S’s of staff, skills and style’, ‘company unions rather than craft 
unions’, ‘emphasis on teamwork and cooperation’, ‘consensus decision-making’, 
‘participative management’, ‘trust and interdependence and quality circles’ (Keys 
and Miller, 1984, p349).  
 In line with the ‘family’ norm and with the emphasis on collective 
responsibility and reciprocal relationships among its members, a person who 
joins a Japanese MNC intends to be adopted as a ‘family’ member, and then 
“becomes linked to its destiny until the very end” (Elger and Smith, 1994, p94). 
This is not a mere contract which an employer and an employee make as 
normally observed in the West (Ferner, 1997). This is why many practices 
identified with Japan, such as lifetime employment, seniority, QC Circle 
“reinforce the family feeling, for [a] Japanese company [which] is a community of 
people who share a common destiny” (Kondo, 1990, p161). This ‘family’ concept 
further enhances group orientation and cooperation, thereby leading to the 




sharing of information, performance and jobs through particular practices.  
The QC Circle, for example, may be utilised in sales and marketing 
functions as a sharing concept, such as sharing information, performance and 
jobs. This originally concerns a small group working on the shop floor which 
discusses and solve issues. According to Oliver and Wilkinson (1992), a small 
group normally consists of five to ten people who attempt to improve quality and 
productivity in a voluntary manner. This originally comes from the quality circle 
movement in 1962 which was triggered by Genba-To-QC (Quality Control for the 
Foremen). In the QC Circle, the meeting was voluntarily initiated as part of 
self-development and mutual development, utilising a quality control technique. 
QC members used the ‘seven statistical tools’, a set of statistical tools and 
techniques to solve a problem: “Pareto analysis, cause and effect (fishbone 
diagrams), stratification, tally cards, histograms, scatter diagrams and Shewart 
control charts” (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p23). As a result, the QC Circle 
functions as a “‘participative mechanism’ which increases job satisfaction and 
commitment, good management and employer relations,’ and which ‘improves 
morale and opportunities for self-actualization’” (Yap, 1984; Ishikawa 1984) 
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p24). These concepts of participation, cooperation, 
and group orientation are all underpinned by a collective responsibility and 
reciprocal relationships in the ‘family’.  
 Similarly, the set of personnel practices which Japanese multinationals 
adopt strongly assumes that there are ‘family’ relationships among 
organisational members (see 7.3, 7.4). These constitute seniority-based 
promotion and the lifetime/long-term employment, both of which are seen as 




Japanese management practices that have existed since the 1980s (e.g., 
Anderson and Hill 1983; Lincoln et al., 1978). Both lifetime employment and the 
recognition of seniority are a set of practices which support high commitment 
and loyalty among employees. Nonetheless, some of these practices seem to be 
changing into practices adopted in the West, such as with performance-based 
pay. Performance-based promotion and pay are now a hot topic in Japanese 
personnel practices, not only for their competitive advantages, but also for the 
universality of performance-based evaluation (Bae et al., 2003; 2011). Sumihara 
(1999) assert that the significance of the egalitarian norm make Japanese 
expatriates in the US evaluate many American employees highly without any 
differentiation in this evaluation (see 7.3). In the same way, intensive 
socialisation is identified not only through corporate training for the newly hired 
but also through social events, dinners and lunches, company events, and even 
golf (Hatvany and Pucik, 1981) (see 7.4). This may still occur occasionally 
between a manager and his subordinates; Japanese managers tend to spend 
time talking to their subordinates in order to understand their personal attributes 
and personalities. 
Moreover, personnel practices previously identified with Japan may no 
longer be Japanese management practices owing to the changes after the 
bubble economy burst in the early 1990s. Lifetime employment, for instance, is 
still supported by some Japanese corporations, while seniority is no longer 
adopted by others (Keizer et al., 2012). At the same time, performance-based 
pay, as opposed to a seniority-based wage, may be adopted by some Japanese 
corporations (ibid). Similarly, with comparative Japanese corporation studies in 




Japan, Morris et al. (2006) have investigated how Human Resource 
Management (HRM) practices have changed within Japanese corporations. 
They argue that organisations are becoming flatter and have less hierarchical 
structures. They also maintain that the idea of lifetime employment still remains 
but the seniority-based pay system is diminishing. This confirms the point of 
Watanabe (2000) that ‘the seniority system is being sacrificed’ in order to keep 
lifetime employment, raising the possibility that there is a change in Japanese 
management practices. 
Behind these practices, all the ‘family’ members are assumed to ‘share a 
common destiny’ with an emphasis on collectivism. They tend to cooperate and 
collaborate under the notion of the ‘company as family’, prioritising 
organisational goals over individuals, although this is contested (Kondo, 1990). 
At first, this led to arguments that Japanese management practices were no 
more intrinsic to Japanese societal and cultural consequences than to efficient 
economic activities (e.g., Keys and Miller, 1984). In a sense, practices can be 
transferred but attributed meanings may be variously appropriated according to 
the locations and actors. Manufacturing practices may appear to be transferred 
‘as they are’ but the actors in a given location may attribute different meanings to 
them, possibly leading to different interpretations of the practices, such as 
sharing information, jobs and performance.  
In Asia, the norm of the family and its collectivistic character may well be 
accepted. For example, Japanese MNCs in Thailand tend to transfer Japanese 
personnel practices, such as that of lifetime employment, seniority and intensive 
socialisation. Atmiyanandana and Lawler (2003) describe this as an 




‘acculturation’ process of hiring fresh graduates, socializing them into corporate 
values, and promoting them from within. Moreover, this process does not appear 
to be rejected because:  
 
Thai workers were seen to be more familiar and comfortable with the 
collectivist orientation of Japanese managers. And Thai workers felt 
that their jobs were more secure in Japanese companies, despite 
generally lower pay than in subsidiaries of Western MNCs (p238).  
 
This reflects a close cultural distance between Japan and Thailand, or more 
generally with Asian countries, as Hofstede (2010) argues. In particular, Asian 
countries, including Japan, tend to have a high score on collectivism in 
managerial behaviour. This means that the Japanese ‘family’ norm, with 
emphasis on collective responsibility may well be accepted in Asian regions. The 
work of Abo (2015) echoes this acceptance of collectivism in Asian regions 
examining how Japanese MNCs transfer the manufacturing and personnel 
practices better into Asian regions than into the Western ones due to the high 
level of group consciousness and collectivism in Asia.  
 This Asian collectivistic behaviour may lead Japanese MNCs to adopt 
Japanese management practices more easily. Referring to the work of Yuen and 
Hui (1993) when comparing Japanese and US subsidiaries in Singapore, Ferner 
(1997) describes the Japanese way of managing labour as “a human capital 
model, based on multidimensional employment relations, social as well as 




economic aspects, the predominance of internal labour markets, and a 
consequent concern with recruitment, selection, training and development” 
(Ferner, 1997, p30). This interrelates with high commitment from workers, 
because the employees tend to view their lifetime careers as being linked to their 
corporate performance (Yuen and Hui, 1993). Sharing a common destiny tends 
to enable workers to share collective responsibility for their corporations, thereby 
allowing them to share a job, information and performance.  
In the West, however, this seems to be the opposite way round. In 
particular, transferring Japanese personnel practices to the finance industry in 
the US can be almost impossible. Beechler and Yang (1994) indicate the 
difficulties of applying lifetime employment, group orientation and egalitarian 
views to the US. Adopting comparative case studies of Japanese service and 
manufacturing companies, they asserted that Japanese service companies in 
the finance industry in New York are pursuing an Americanisation of personnel 
practices, such as the practices of “hiring more specialists, introducing job titles, 
de-emphasizing internal training, utilizing formal performance appraisal 
programs, and adopting merit-based compensation systems” (Beechler and 
Yang, 1994, p475). Nonetheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to 
transfer a series of Japanese practices to any industry. They argue that, in 
Tennessee in the US where there are relatively low turnover rates and workers 
have long-term employment and job security, Japanese personnel practices can 
be possible.  
 Here, however, the ‘family’ norm with its emphasis on collective 
responsibility and, in particular, Japanese ‘family’ rituals and practices seems to 




be rejected. Graham (1994) described how American workers at Japanese 
plants resist Japanese collectivistic practices, with company rituals such as 
‘morning exercises, team meetings, department meetings, and company 
celebrations’. One form of collective resistance was workers leaving a moving 
assembly line without following the company rule of “taking away a five minute 
clean-up period at the end of day” (Graham, 1994, p142). This period was set up 
in order to ‘clean up and put away the tools’ after work, but was actually ignored 
as a form of protest. One American worker remarked: “this place is getting too 
Japanese around here; pretty soon you will be asking us to donate our 
Saturdays” (ibid). Graham (1994) described this further: “From that day on, 
whenever the line ran up to quitting time, everyone on the team dropped 
whatever they were doing and immediately walked out, leaving the team leader 
to lock up the tools and clean the area” (Graham, 1994, p142). This clean-up 
was expected to show that they saw themselves as ‘family’ members sharing a 
common destiny, as in Japan. Although this does not show the conflicted 
meanings of ‘family’, it implies that collective responsibility within the ‘family’ 
norm is not accepted. Ferner (1997, p30) described the US way of managing 
labour as “an ‘economic-contractual’ model of hiring and firing, 
market-determined wages, and high labour mobility”. This is based on ‘the 
ideology of free enterprise: workers are hired and fired depending on the needs 
of the employing organisation while wage level is related to labour 
supply/demand and general economic conditions’. Hofstede (2010) supports this 
wide cultural distance, demonstrating the individualistic feature of the US as 
opposed to the collectivistic Japanese.  





2.3.3 Work organisation: Boundaries of the ‘family’ norm 
Work organisation is discussed through the practices of communication with the 
headquarters about the performance evaluation of Japanese expatriates, 
business results, and locals’ complaints (see chapter 8). The ‘family’ norm 
previously reviewed may be restricted to a certain group of Japanese expatriates. 
Here, the work organisation within the sales subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs is 
expected to be divided between Japanese expatriates and local employees 
when communicating with external organisations, such as with the headquarters 
and customers locally. Initially, Westney (1987; 1999) indicated the importance 
of Japanese expatriates when operating Japanese MNC subsidiaries, this being 
based on the need to communicate with headquarters. In particular, Japanese 
expatriates were expected to play a central role in transferring and controlling 
manufacturing methods from the headquarters in Japan. Kopp (1999), for 
example, described how the decision-making process is dominated by Japanese 
expatriates, and not local employees or management. A study concerning the 
subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs in Europe and the US showed that local 
managers were involved in less than half the decisions concerning local 
business, according to Beechler et al. (1996). These decisions were only made 
by Japanese expatriates or at the headquarters in Japan. 
The dominance of Japanese expatriates has had a considerable 
influence in generating an ethnocentric Japanese culture in the subsidiaries of 
Japanese MNCs (see 8.2). The typical work organisation at Japanese plants is 
one where a Japanese expatriate is assigned as an ‘advisor’ in the margin of an 




organisational chart (Elger and Smith, 2005). A Japanese expatriate manager is 
then expected to support and advise a line manager by closely working with its 
workers. Westney (1999, p26) summarised this as follows: “since the very 
earliest stages of internationalization, Japanese MNCs have been criticised for 
their heavy reliance on expatriate middle-level managers to act as the key 
cross-border integrators”. This dominance was also investigated in comparison 
with Western MNCs focusing on the formal control of their subsidiaries. Ferner 
(1997) offers a vivid account of the unique features of Japanese expatriates. He 
describes the Japanese approach as “strong but informal centralised 
co-ordination of foreign operations, highly reliant on establishing an international 
network of Japanese expatriate managers” (Ferner, 1997, p21–22). This case 
certainly seems to be true in some Japanese MNCs (Elger and Smith, 2005), 
perhaps generating ceremonial aspects within the work organisation.  
 Compared with American MNCs, this ethnocentric centralised 
organisational structure is peculiar to Japanese MNCs. Ferner (1995) asserts 
that it is highly reliant on a network of Japanese expatriates for an informally 
centralised coordination of foreign subsidiaries as opposed to American MNCs 
who formalise and centralise HRM practices. Perhaps this ethnocentricity can be 
further explained through the cultural meaning of ‘family’ which restricts its 
‘family’ members. Kondo (1990) describes how the Japanese ‘family’ has a 
strong sense of ‘uchi’ and ‘soto’, these being ‘inside’ an ‘outside’ in English. She 
asserts 
 
Soto can mean everything outside the physical structure of the house. 




In symbolic terms, soto means the public world, while uchi is the world 
of informality, casual behaviour, and relaxation… Crossing the 
boundaries from uchi to soto can involve a complete readjustment of 
behaviour: posture becomes more proper and disciplined, language 
levels are potentially raised (depending on the status of the 
addressee), and dress is expected to be more proper, less casual. 
(Kondo, 1990, p141)  
 
This sense of an inner and outer group is likely to influence the ethnocentric 
structure by connecting a group of Japanese expatriates as with the ‘family’ in 
Japan. She adds that, for Japanese, “the underlying principle seems to be that 
human behavior is not seen in a vacuum, as atomistic action. People’s actions 
instead link them to their uchi and to other groups” (Kondo, 1990, p146).  
 Their uchi, however, is not automatically given to any members in ie. 
Rather, they are to be acquired through the active participation of ‘family’ 
members and “soto and uchi are thus contextually defined” (Kondo, 1990, p152). 
She further states that:  
 
belonging or choosing to belong to an uchi involves a whole package 
of decisions about language, behaviour, and social interaction. 
Belonging means active participation, not passive membership. One 
must prove in action one’s loyalty to the ie (p152) 
 




This makes it possible to speculate how the cultural meanings of ‘family’ in 
Japanese MNCs may be confined to groups of Japanese expatriates, given the 
dominance of Japanese expatriates. These are contextually contested according 
to different geographical locations, however. Nonetheless, once the boundaries 
of the ‘family’ are established, they make it possible to consider all the members 
as a whole. This is a part of “a ‘traditional Japan’ when properly familial attitudes 
were held by owners and managers, who would think not of their career 
advancement or their profits but of the good of the whole” (Kondo, 1990, p205).  
This strong sense of uchi may be closely associated with the dominance 
of Japanese expatriates, possibly creating a divide between Japanese 
expatriates and local employees. Here, the extent of the division may depend on 
the demand to communicate with customers locally. Elger and Smith (2005) 
point out the importance of ‘dependency on a dominant customer’ at Japanese 
subsidiaries. This involves how long a subsidiary has operated in a host country. 
Since Japanese MNCs have operated for the long term in a given location, they 
in turn have more local customers, local management and local employees. 
Elger and Smith (2005, p178) characterise this as a ‘dependency on a dominant 
customer’, ‘the longevity of the establishments’, and ‘phases of expansion (or 
contraction)’ of its subsidiary. Nonetheless, these structures at Japanese MNCs 
are not well-elaborated, given the fact that few studies focus on the sales and 
marketing functions of Japanese MNCs. To express this differently, the longer 
Japanese MNC plants operate, the more localised customers and employees 
will be. As a result, the number of Japanese expatriates will tend to decrease 
(Elger and Smith, 2005) and then the boundary of the ‘family’ may possibly 




contract or disappear altogether.  
As a result of communicating with the headquarters, a divide between 
Japanese expatriates and local employees has arisen in work organisation. Here, 
Elger and Smith (2005) touched upon two management structures of Japanese 
and locals. Although they did not elaborate on this structural divide or attribute 
the meanings of the ‘family’, their interview data is consistent with this division 
between Japanese and locals. In their comparative case studies of Japanese 
plants in the UK, two management structures were identified: one is a Japanese 
management structure while the other is British management structure. The 
Japanese management structure promotes teamwork and a high commitment 
from workers, while the British have a more direct approach to the local work 
force, using command and control. The Japanese believed that British managers 
did not make enough effort to implement Japanese management practices. On 
the other hand, British managers were sceptical about the effects of these 
practices, and considered that the Japanese did not share enough information, 
given the fact that they were limited in participating in the decision-making 
process. This divide clearly indicates that the cultural meanings of ‘family’ may 
be confined to the groups of Japanese expatriates, leading them to treat British 
managers as outsiders.  
In contrast, Kopp (1999, p122) described two management structures as 
a ‘vicious circle of lack of trust’. Utilising a survey and a case study, she 
attributes this type of divide between the Japanese and Americans to the 
Japanese language barrier, indirect communication, consensus-oriented 
decision-making, slow promotion, and lifetime employment. Here, possible 




divisions emerge between Japanese and Americans: Japanese managers may 
state “we don’t want to give too much information and responsibility to locally 
hired employees right away, because they might job-hop to another company” 
(ibid). When this occurs, local employees may feel excluded from the 
decision-making process and conclude that their future with the firm is limited, 
and then leave to join another firm. At this point, Japanese managers may say: 
“Ah, it’s just what we thought, non-Japanese aren’t loyal to their companies. 
They didn’t stick around enough for us to get to trust them!” (p122). Given these 
cases, she concludes that this ‘vicious circle of lack of trust’ represents the 
exportation of the two-tier HRM system in Japan between seishain and 
non-seishain, core and peripheral Japanese employees. In Japan, core 
employees in a permanent contract are expected to receive long term benefits, 
such as lifetime and long term employment, seniority based compensation, and 
high investment in training. By contrast, peripheral employees on temporary 
contracts gain little benefits. This is expected to occur in practice, and 
consequently there are two different management structures for Japanese and 
locals. 
Given these two structures within the subsidiaries, the cultural meanings 
of the ‘family’ might be restricted and contested within Japanese communities or 
across certain groups or units, although group orientation may not be the correct 
term for expressing a feature of the Japanese ‘family’. Kondo (1990) points out 
that there is no sense of individualism in the Japanese ‘family’ because “[b]y 
speaking, one inevitably speaks as a person embedded within a particular uchi. 
One is never an isolated individual” (Kondo, 1990, p147). In a sense, this cultural 




boundary of the ‘family’ is considered to be very different between Asian and the 
Western regions, as well as in the ways the subsidiaries communicate with 
headquarters. In Asia, the cultural meanings of the ‘family’ might be accepted 
and interpreted, even outside Japanese expatriate groups. In the West, however, 
they may be restricted only to Japanese expatriate groups. Alternatively, it might 
not exist at all anymore due to the recent changes in Japanese management 
practices (Keizer, 2012). In the next sub section, the cultural meaning of ‘family’ 
in Japanese society is examined.  
 
2.4  ‘Company as family’ in Japanese management practices 
Japanese management practices do not stand alone in Japanese society and 
culture (e.g., Turnbull, 1986): they need to be considered with regard to their 
characteristics through ‘area knowledge’ of its culture and language (Elger and 
Smith, 2005). In fact, some scholars have touched upon the strong association 
of Japanese management practices with the ‘family’ norm in Japanese society 
(e.g., Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981). Japanese paternalism is 
expected to exist behind Japanese management practices in the same way as 
organisational members treat corporations as a ‘family’ or community, sharing ‘a 
common destiny’. This kinship relationship is apparent in the practices of JIT, 
TQM, and QC circles; enabling organisational members to work as a team, and 
ultimately a ‘family’ with a particular job security, such as lifetime employment. 
This is also likely to be the case in groups of corporations, such as Keiretsu. 
 




2.4.1 Interpreting the meaning of a ‘company as family’ culturally 
The term ‘company as family’ was used to characterise Japanese MNCs (e.g., 
Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981). Here, the meaning of ‘family’ 
in Japanese MNC has been historically embedded in Japanese society. In the 
feudal era of the Tokugawa regime from the 17th to 19th centuries, Bhappu 
(2000) sees Japanese paternalism behind inter-organisational practices, such 
as with Keiretsu, which she argues were close to the structure of ranking in the 
previous era in Japan. She also asserts that merchants, such as those in feudal 
households in the Tokugawa regime, also resembled current Japanese 
corporations:  
 
Merchant households frequently established bunke (branch) ie beside 
the honke (main) ie. This enabled them to expand their distribution 
channels geographically. It also provided a way for the “corporate” 
merchant ie to perpetuate itself as an entity from one generation to 
another. (p411) 
 
Assuming ‘company as family’, group orientation, cooperation, and Wa 
(harmony) are enhanced and can be institutionally embedded into Japanese 
management practices. TQM and JIT are not purely a set of economic activities 
to boost productivity, but strongly embody these cultural meanings of a ‘family’ 
among workers. It therefore follows that without the norm of ‘family’, these 
practices are unlikely to be adopted and accepted by local workers, as Abo 




(2015) strongly indicates.  
 Kondo (1990) explores the contested meanings of a ‘company as family’ 
in greater detail. By adopting an ethnographic approach as an active participant 
in a small Japanese family firm factory in Japan - the Sato company - she 
reveals how the concepts of company and family are inseparable and 
intertwined. She claims that the economic ties in the small firm are far beyond 
the contractual obligations interpreted in the West, “entailing intense involvement 
in group outings, ritual obligations, and strong bonds of loyalty, gratitude, and 
commitment” (p198) among its family and organisational members. Furthermore, 
she argues for the contested meanings of a ‘company as family’ which are 
interpreted according to the actors in their contexts. ‘Ie’ in Japanese, household 
in English is understood not only as physical building for the ‘family’ on the basis 
of blood relations but also as “‘hearth’, signifying people who belong to the same 
domestic group” (p121). She asserts that ‘ie’ in Japan should not be treated just 
as kinship based on biological blood relations, but is “best understood as 
corporate groups that hold property (for example, land, a reputation, and an art 
or ‘cultural capital’) in perpetuity” (p122). It serves as a unit of production, of 
consumption, and as a religious function such as ‘ancestor worship’ and forms of 
social welfare. Here, the notion of ‘family’ is very cultural in the same way that an 
American ‘family’ is limited to biological relationships and conjugal ties (Kondo, 
1990).  
This notion of ‘ie’ and ‘family’ can also be scrutinised through the 
Japanese language. ‘Uchi no kaisha’ in Japanese, literally means ‘my company’ 
in English, and is interpreted, contested, and appropriated by actors in a 




particular context. For employees, it often means ‘company as family’ by caring 
‘family’ members and reminding those members of the obligation of loyalty. For 
their managers, however, this can be manipulated for economic benefits; Kondo 
(1990, p213) describes the owners’ ‘family’ of the Sato “awarding low wages, 
berating them unjustly, conducting sporadic surveillance of shop-floor activities”. 
In particular, the workers may start to criticise the owner who is ‘inadequately 
familial’ if the owner emphasises the economic rationality of the company by 
pursing economic efficiency which is not right for ‘company as family’. In terms of 
an artisan’s identity, the workers may criticise their company on the one hand 
while on the other hand often being proud of being members of that company. 
She demonstrates how the meanings of a ‘company as family’ can never be 
coherent or consistent, and has complexities with “contradictions, nuances, and 
multiplicities engendered by any act or appropriation of meanings” (p218). These 
nuanced cultural meanings of ‘family’ have also been identified in large 
Japanese MNCs (e.g., Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981) 
although they are not fully elaborated on as in the work of Kondo (1990).  
 Such notions of ‘family’, while often contested and appropriated, loosely 
underpin Japanese management practices, such as TQM and JIT, which require 
the workers’ participation and long hours on the shop floor as ‘family’ members 
(Keys and Millar, 1984). This is a cultural meaning of ‘family’ specific to Japan, 
because the prosperity of families is more significant than individuals. Keys and 
Miller (1984, p347-8) explain that for the Japanese this means that “the company 
becomes a surrogate for the family, work takes on the same ethos as a 
contribution to the family - loyalty, sincerity… the company's (family's) prosperity 




becomes more important than individual prosperity, and work for the company - 
not leisure - becomes the essence of life”. This cultural meaning of ‘family’ 
constitutes Japanese management practices, and there is an assumption that all 
the members are obliged to contribute to ‘family’ prosperity, with this expectation 
taking precedence over individual needs. This cultural meaning of ‘family’ 
explains why shop-floor workers are expected to work long hours and be 
non-resistant in Japan, as Williams et al. (1994, p86) point out, since “Japanese 
management in the press shop is technically superior but in many ways socially 
inferior to Western practices”.  
 
2.4.2 Resistance to the cultural meanings of ‘family’? 
After due consideration, the contested meanings of ‘company as family’ can be 
considered as an obstacle to the smooth transference of Japanese management 
practices to the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs. Graham (1994), for 
instance, demonstrated the resistance of American local workers at a Japanese 
MNC plant, thereby presenting a critique of the simple articulation of 
Japanisation. Adopting an ethnographic approach on the shop floor of 
‘Subaru-Isuzu Automotive’ (SIA) in the US, and as an employee there, he 
observed direct confrontation in the form of collective resistance and veiled 
protest in the form of individual resistance. Here, direct confrontation concerned 
‘leaving a moving line’ and a ‘refusal to work’, while a veiled protest involved 
‘anonymous letters’, a ‘refusal to exercise’ and to practice company’s rituals, 
such as ‘morning exercises, team meetings, department meetings, and 
company celebrations’. Although Graham (1994) did not touch upon the cultural 




meanings of such forms of resistance, the acts of resistance constitute a refusal 
to attribute Japanese cultural meanings, paternalism and ‘family’ to the practices. 
Such rituals are profoundly connected to paternalism in Japanese society and 
culture, where workers are cooperative and loyal to their corporation through the 
expression of ‘family’. This collective effort was expected to be resisted by 
American workers who prioritised individuals over organisations. This cultural 
conflict, albeit not elaborating cultural meanings in depth, meant that that SIA did 
not successfully acquire the Japanese egalitarian culture with the norm of 
cooperation, as other scholars argued in the era of the coined ‘Japanisation’ 
(e.g., Elger and Smith, 1994).  
In a similar fashion, Delbridge (1998) conducted an ethnographic study 
at Japanese manufacturing sites in the UK by working as a shop-floor worker. As 
a participant observer, he revealed single-skilled workers and a lack of 
commitment in contrast to the full commitment from multi-skilled workers 
discussed in a series of Japanisation literature. Here, he found that there was 
little commitment or loyalty to organisations from workers, but instead, there was 
“the persistence of conflicts between management and labour” (p151). As with 
other scholars, he was interested in how Japanese management practices are 
conducted and resisted in order to examine the transplants of Japanese MNCs, 
and, as such, cultural meanings were not his main focus. In fact, in-depth 
ethnographic research on Japanese MNCs has rarely been conducted, let alone 
a nuanced consideration of the cultural meanings of practices.  
 A whole swathe of the literature aims to examine the transferability of 
management practices in the subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs, but unlike other 




studies focusing on the transferability of management practices, the work of 
Kondo (1990) is quite unique in the sense that she, as a Japanese American 
ethnographer, gains and utilises ‘area knowledge’ (Elger and Smith, 2005) in 
Japan, such as with Japanese culture and language in depth. The focus on 
cultural meanings should be transferred to the foreign subsidiaries of 
contemporary Japanese MNCs in the light of the burst bubble economy and 
economic stagnation of Japan, the so-called ‘lost decade’ since the 1990s 
(Keizer, 2012). Here, from the point of view of the cultural meanings of the 
‘family’, there are likely to be conflicts and contradictions among the attributed 
meanings in the practices, these possibly obstructing the transference of the 
practices and causing further resistance from local workers. This means that 
there is the possibility that the same practice may embody different cultural 
meanings for different actors in different locations. In next sub section, the 
relationality of transferring these practices between Asia and the West is 
scrutinised.  
 
2.5 The relationality of transferring practices between Asia and the West 
The success of transferring Japanese management practices may rest not only 
on the social and economic conditions of a home country, but also on the culture, 
values and practices shaped by the conditions of the host country. Abo (2015) 
argues for differences between regions when transferring practices at Japanese 
MNCs. His work strongly implies the relationality in which the success of 
transferring Japanese management practices is contingent to the host country 
where they are conducted. While transferring Japanese practices within Asia is 




highly likely to be successful, transferring them to the West is likely to be more 
problematic. 
 
2.5.1 Problems with transferring practices across different 
geographical locations 
Originally, when considering the concept of Japanisation, Turnbull (1986) posed 
a question about the feasibility of transferring practices into a different 
geographical location. These practices were built and maintained with ‘high-trust’ 
management in Japan, these being developed by coercive elements of 
Japanese society, but it was possible that they might not really work elsewhere. 
He indicates how 
 the introduction of ‘high-trust’ management techniques into 
essentially ‘low-trust’ environments, where management has 
traditionally attempted to reduce employee autonomy, discretion and 
influence through ‘Taylorist’ techniques, is unlikely to foster employee 
commitment towards managerial objectives. (p203-4) 
 
This raises the question of whether practices can be transferred to different 
contexts. In fact, this relationality where social and economic contexts in a host 
country affect transferring practices was later picked up on by Japanese 
management scholars (e.g., Ackroyd et al., 1988). Here, the idea of relationality 
is strongly conveyed in the sense that, when a geographical context, such as the 
‘high trust’ between managers and those being managed, supports the 




implementation of practices, the practices can be easily accepted. When there is 
‘low trust’, however, it becomes harder to transfer the practices.  
More recently, Abo (2015) indicated the relationality of transferring 
Japanese management practices between Asia and the West. Based on his 
research since the 1980s into the implementation of Japanese management 
methods across six continents, Abo (2015) asserts that Japanese management 
methods are influenced by the host society and its culture in each region. 
Although he does not examine culturally embodied meanings in the 
management practices, he points out that a ‘group consciousness’ such as 
collectivism and cooperation in a geographical location does matter in terms of 
transferring the practices. In Abo’s research, a high group consciousness 
identified with Asian countries correlates to the success of management practice 
implementation in Asia. 
Clearly, therefore, the different geographical locations are significant 
when transferring manufacturing methods and practices. Abo’s (2015) methods 
were based on the degree to which Japanese manufacturing techniques can be 
transferred from the headquarters to subsidiaries, as is the case in Japan. Here, 
he adopted a quantitative method, a ‘five-point grading system’ to measure how 
practices are transferred as with Japan. He set up an analytical model of 
application and adaptation, showing either that Japanese manufacturing 
practices were simply applied to a local context or that they were adapted. The 
model consisted of a ‘6-goup 23 item hybrid-evaluation’. Here, the six groups 
constituted the work organisation and administration; production control, 
procurement, group consciousness, labour relations, and parent-subsidiary 




relations. According to Abo (2015), these local contexts behind the practices 
were influenced by each region. Hence, this societal effect varies depending on 
the region and the geographical location where Japanese MNCs operate.  
 
2.5.2 Cultural and geographic contexts in Asia and the West 
There are two important regions in which the relationality of transferring 
Japanese management practices has been examined: Asia and the West. Here, 
Asia means primarily South East and East Asian countries, such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China, while the West means Western European and North 
American countries such as the UK, Belgium and the US. In the Asian region, 
Abo (2015) considers that Japanese MNCs are highly likely to ‘apply’ Japanese 
management practices to each country as an ‘Asian Standard’. In particular, 
‘group consciousness’ or a group orientation over individuals is relatively higher 
in Korea and Taiwan than in European countries. Here, it is thought that these 
practices may have been attributed by the participants to cultural meanings, yet 
the meanings were not his main focus. Although this geographical effect is not 
straightforward, it tends to be distinctive according to region, as with Asia and 
non-Asia. Additionally, Collinson and Rugman (2008) connect this to the 
‘relational embeddedness’ of Japanese management practices in Asian regions 
as well as in Japan, but not in Western regions. This embeddedness comes 
about partly because there is a large customer base for industrial Japanese 
manufactured goods in the Asian region. This reflects many Japanese MNCs 
which have moved their production to the Asian region to benefit from plentiful 
labour with low wages (Keizer, 2012). This embeddedness also partly arises 




because there are cultural similarities in Asia, such as with the importance of 
kinship and collectivism. In Thailand, for example, Japanese personnel practices, 
such as the ‘collective orientation’ of the Japanese and job security, seem to 
appeal more than Western MNCs (Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003). This 
further confirms a close ‘cultural distance’ between Japan and other Asian 
countries in terms of a common collectivism (Hofstede, 2010).  
In contrast, in Western regions, mainly in North America and Western 
Europe, Abo (2015) assumes that Japanese MNCs are relatively unlikely to 
‘apply’ Japanese management practices to each country as they do in the Asian 
region. Here, when analysing three Japanese as well as one form of European 
‘press shop performance’, Williams et al. (1994) reviewed the necessary 
conditions for ‘Japanisation’ to be possible for Western corporations while 
questioning how far [the West is] from Japan. A high level of employee 
commitment is associated with the social and institutional context in Japan. Thus, 
it was concluded that the social and institutional context of Western 
management is ‘very far from Japan’, bringing about difficulties when applying 
Japanese management practices to the Western context. In a sense, Japanese 
management practices are deeply supported and connected by their 
surrounding operations. These are manifested in aspects such as group 
consciousness, collectivism, seniority and lifetime or long-term employment. 
Williams et al. (1994) characterised the high level of commitment as well as the 
workers’ ‘consent and conformity’ on the Japanese shop floor as being rewarded 
with lifetime employment. This reflects a wide ‘cultural distance’ between Japan 
and Western countries in terms of the preferred collectivism in Japan as 




opposed to the individualism of the West (Hofstede, 2010). 
Given societal and cultural influences on practices, Williams et al. (1994, 
p86) declared that ‘Japanese management in the press shop is technically 
superior but in many ways socially inferior to Western practices’. This is because 
shop floor workers are expected to work long hours and be compliant in Japan. 
In addition, Elger and Smith (2005) illustrate how Japanese production methods 
in the UK have not been adopted by shop-floor workers particularly well because 
of low pay. Similarly, in Germany, Brannen and Salk (2000) bring out how 
German managers have been frustrated by the consensus orientation of 
Japanese management, expressing a feeling of powerlessness. This is because 
in Japanese corporate culture, flexible job roles and group orientation are 
prioritised, while in Germany there is a well-defined job-role and individual 
orientation. These cultural conflicts with Japanese management practices may 
well support the low transferability of Japanese management practices to 
Western regions.  
The current literature reviewed above, therefore, raises the possibility 
that Japanese management practices can be conducted and even interpreted 
very differently according to different societies and cultures across geographical 
locations, especially in Asian and Western regions. Many studies have analysed 
the degree of productivity between Japanese and local firms, concluding that 
there is either high or low transferability (e.g., see Oliver and Wilkinson, 1998; 
1992). Abo (2015) indicates, however, that the significance of relationality should 
again be seriously scrutinised when transferring practices to Asia and Western 
regions. This also raises another possibility, namely that the different cultural 




meanings regarding the same practices, and this relationality, are better 
explored across different subsidiaries of a single Japanese MNC in Asian and 
Western regions.  
 
2.6 Review of existing approaches and evidence 
2.6.1 Varieties of capitalism 
The relationality of transferring practices across different national contexts, as 
reviewed in the previous section, is expected to be influential in the meanings 
actors attribute to the practices. This means that certain practices, such as 
teamwork, are more likely to be accepted in Asia because of high ‘group 
consciousness’ (Abo, 2015) than in the West. Some existing approaches help 
partially to explain these different contexts in Asia and the West in terms of 
different national political economies. For example, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
published an edited book titled ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ which offers a macro 
analysis suggesting that institutional variations in each country have a significant 
effect on corporations’ activities and largely condition the type of business 
practices which they conduct. In this regard, corporations are supposed to 
develop their capabilities in terms of ‘capacities for developing, producing, and 
distributing goods and services profitably’ (p7, Hall and Soskice, 2001). The 
success of corporations, therefore, depends on the ability to coordinate 
economic activities with actors, such as their ‘employees’, ‘suppliers, clients, 
collaborators, stakeholders, trade unions, business associations, and 
governments’ (p7, Hall and Soskice, 2001). This type of coordination is defined 
as ‘institutional complementarities’, which lead ‘nations with a particular type of 




co-ordination in one sphere of the economy to develop complementary practices 
in other spheres as well’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p18). Lifetime and long-term 
employment, for example, can be rejected, especially where the current 
profitability of corporations is determined by their financial system, while 
vocational trainings and new product standards in a given industry are likely to 
be set in an efficient manner where there is a dense network of business 
associations. Thus, they came to conclude that the institutional arrangements in 
each country where the MNC operates ultimately determine its practices. 
Hall and Soskice (2001) further claim that national political economies 
are mainly divided into two types: Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). In LMEs, corporations ‘coordinate their 
activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements‘. Here, 
a free market based relationship is built and maintained in the exchange of 
goods and services ‘in a context of competition and formal contracting’. Markets 
can be positioned as a means for coordinating all economic activities. Many 
Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, are 
classified as LMEs. In contrast, in CMEs, corporations ‘depend more heavily on 
non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours with other actors and to 
construct their core competencies’. Here, these ‘non-market modes of 
coordination’ enhance collaboration among corporations, in preference to the 
competition seen in LMEs, with the various actors building core competencies 
through private information exchange in their network. Japan as well as 
Germany and Belgium are classified as coordinated market economics. The 
balanced economies are perceived as ‘the result of strategic interaction’ among 




corporations and other actors.  
According to the work of Hall and Soskice (2001), in each market, there 
are five spheres in which corporations may face coordination issues when 
developing relationships with other actors. First, industrial relations concern how 
to ‘coordinate bargaining over wages and productivity levels’. Second, 
vocational training and education concerns how to secure a ‘workforce with 
suitable skills’. Third, corporate governance refers to how corporations ‘turn for 
access to finance’ and how they assure of investors of ‘returns on their 
investment’. Fourth, inter-firm relations refers to the relationships the firm forms 
with other actors, such as its suppliers or clients, ‘with a view to securing a stable 
demand for its products, appropriate supplies of inputs, and access to 
technology’. Finally, relations with their employees require that ‘employees have 
the requisite competencies and cooperate well with others to advance the 
objectives of the corporations’.  
In their book, Hall and Soskice contrasted and compared the institutional 
complementarities in both market types by elaborating each sphere through 
actual examples: the American case as an LME and the German case as an 
CME. This contrast and comparison is quite informative for how the Japanese 
case (as also an CME), can be conducted and interpreted. In terms of industrial 
relations, unlike the American case which relies more on ‘the market relationship 
between individual worker and employer’ than trade unions, the German case 
entails a significant relationship between ‘trade unions and employer 
associations’. The trade unions are so powerful that they can negotiate with their 
employers’ associations for feasible pay ‘in return for the deep commitment’ of 




their worker. In terms of vocational training and education, the German case 
provides industry and company specific skills while the American case makes 
formal institutions offering general skills in ‘highly fluid labour markets’. In terms 
of corporate governance, unlike the American case, which is solely reliant on 
public financial data, the German case provides corporations with non-public 
capital from other actors, such as suppliers and collaborators. This can be done 
by information sharing through a dense network between corporations and 
managers. In terms of technology diffusion with inter-firm relations, whereas the 
American case relies heavily on engineering personnel within the case firm for 
radical innovation, the German case provides incremental diffusion of 
technology with long term employment and contracts through ‘inter-company 
relations’ of industry associations and ‘public officials’. In terms of relations with 
their employees, unlike the American case which provides unilateral decisions 
from top managers, the German case provides for consensus-oriented decisions 
by its top managers. Major agreements tend to involve other stakeholders, such 
as ‘supervisory boards’, ‘employee representatives’, ‘major shareholders’, other 
managers, suppliers, and customers. This demonstrates how the institutional 
complementarities are achieved and maintained across the spheres. In the 
German case, for instance, job security sits easily with a stable financial system 
and low labour mobility is matched with a workforce with the autonomy to share 
information for continuous improvement in which trade unions are active.  
Indeed the features of the German case can help partially to explain how 
Japanese management practices can be conducted: life time and long term 
employment, enterprise unions, seniority in terms of wages, a sense of family, 




consensus oriented decision making, and incremental innovation. In the book, 
the close relationship between business organisations and the Japanese 
economy is pointed out by a variety of authors in the volume: Tate (2001) argued 
for the important role of Japanese; Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) explored intensive 
company training and job security and a government role in business; Thelen 
(2001) touched upon cooperative trade unions. This macro analysis, however, 
does not directly help to explain how individual actors attribute meanings to 
practices in Japanese MNCs in Asia and the West, thereby neglecting actors’ 
agency. This series of institutional environment analyses therefore provides a 
deterministic view on the assumption that all the individual actors in certain 
national contexts tend to interpret practices in a similar manner. It is expected 
that the practices embody ‘company as family’ very differently according to a 
country and actor.  
 
2.6.2 National business systems  
Whitley (1991; 1999; 2003) proposed another concept regarding the national 
political economies in which corporations operate; that of ‘national business 
systems’.  The concept of national business systems approach Whitley (1991; 
1999) is distinctive in the way that it focuses on organisations as the central unit 
of analysis rather than overall processes of structuring economy and politics as 
in the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and others. It is 
also distinctive in the way that Whitley (1991; 1999) was not bound by the 
Eurocentric approach of Hall and Soskice (2001), analysing East Asian and 
Eastern European institutions and organisations. Whitley (1991) asserts that not 




only do national business systems in East Asia, such as Japan, Korea and China, 
vary within themselves, but they also differ fundamentally from Western 
businesses. He argues for three broad headings: “(a) the system of authoritative 
coordination and control, (b) enterprise domain and development, and (c) the 
nature of enterprise co-ordination and market organization”. Under the three 
headings, there are eight dimensions: personal authority and owner domination; 
significance of formal co-ordination and control procedures; managerial style; 
employee commitment; business specialisation; evolutionary strategies; 
relational contracting; and long-term inter sector co-ordination. Within these 
dimensions, he analysed three key national economic organisations: the 
Japanese ‘Kaisha’; Korean ‘Chaebol’; and Chinese family business. Although 
these three organisations differ from one another, they are all founded in the 
Confucian culture, and are thus distinct from the Christian-based notions of 
‘family’ identities and structures in Western society. 
 Furthermore, Whitley (1991) proposed the institutional contexts which 
condition East Asian business systems: authority relations; trust, reciprocity and 
loyalty; along with the political and financial systems. In authority relations 
between superiors and subordinates, loyalties are built as ‘a series of mutual 
commitments’ but maintained in a different manner between Japan, Korea, and 
China. In contrast to Korea and China, which limit reciprocal relations only to 
kinship, Japanese institutions tie their members’ ‘obedience and subordination’ 
to non-kinship groups. This stems from the ideal father in Japan, unlike that of 
China and Korea, who tends to ‘share his responsibilities with others and admit 
uncertainty’ (p13). This is associated in Korea and China with the importance of 




collective loyalty to the organisation rather than direct personal relationships. In 
respect to trust, reciprocity and loyalty, cultural homogeneity is greater among 
East Asian countries than in the West, so ‘reputational and ascriptive means of 
developing trust’, rather than ‘the formal institutional means’ common in the 
West, are effective. In particular, in Japan, generating trust between strangers is 
possible, although trust can be generated only with ascriptive ties in Korea and 
China, such as a common birthplace, school and university. This also informs 
loyalties to corporations in Japan. In terms of the political and financial systems, 
in East Asia, the state plays a central role in promoting industrialisation, in 
contrast to the market oriented approach in the USA. In particular, Japan 
intervenes less in its corporate decisions than Korea and China do. In Japan, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) guides economic 
development yet does not directly influence corporate actions due to its privately 
owned banking system and focus on economic growth driven by private firms, 
such as automotive and electronic manufacturers. Although all three East Asian 
countries depend on bank credit rather than capital markets, as in the USA, 
Japan, especially, has developed a close group of corporations, ‘keiretsu’ in 
Japanese.  
 Later on, focusing on authority sharing and careers within organisations, 
Whitley (2003) claimed that the institutional contexts, not national contexts, are 
keys to understand organisational capabilities, thus further elaborating the 
relationship between organisations and their institutional contexts. Although 
units of analysis are more specific to authority sharing and organisational 
careers within organisations, he argued for the close relationships between four 




distinct types of authority sharing and organisational careers, and institutional 
features. The four types are ‘high delegation and professional team careers’; 
considerable delegation to managers with managerial careers; considerable 
delegation to skilled staff and functionally specialised careers; considerable 
delegation to skilled staff and generalist organisational careers. These types 
may sit comfortably with institutional features. For example, in a state which 
strongly coordinates business activities through collaboration of corporations, 
managers tend to share more authority in order to avoid opportunistic 
behaviours and to build skilled staff for the long term. Another example can be 
that, in capital markets which provide stock options as incentives, skilled staff 
tend to work cooperatively to achieve specific objectives, possibly being hired 
externally for a short term goal. Here, it is difficult to tie skilled staff to the long 
term goals. This concept of types of authority and careers, and the relationship 
with institutional features is quite similar to Whitley’s previous work about East 
Asian business systems (Whitley, 1991).  
 In the context of MNCs, which may transfer their practices from one 
country to another, the effects of national business systems are also discussed 
as the home country and host country effects (Ferner, 1997; 2000). Certainly, 
MNCs transpose their own home country’s institutional effect through their 
practices, which may be constrained by the law and regulations, supplier 
relationships and trade unions in their host countries. In the economic activities 
of MNCs, national business systems may, therefore, be internationalised 
because “institutions in the home country inform the behaviour of firms at the 
international level, and the way this may be modified to fit the institutional 




context of various host countries” (Almond et al., 2005, p277). The effects of 
national business systems in terms of transferring practices, however, depend 
on institutional environments. 
 
2.6.3 Other empirical research into Japanese management practices 
in Europe  
In addition to Japanisation studies in the UK (e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 
1992; Eger and Smith, 1994), there are other empirical studies into Japanese 
management practices in other European countries. Ybema and Byun (2012), 
for example, reveal a sharp contrast in the management practices of Japanese 
and Dutch companies in the Netherlands. By comparing the subsidiaries of 
Japanese corporations in the Netherlands with those of Dutch companies in 
Japan, they demonstrate four distinctions in the subsidiaries: work ethos, 
communication, the superior and subordinate relationship, and decision making. 
Although their focus is not on Japanese management practice itself, cultural 
differences between the Japanese and the Dutch are manifested in collectivism 
and individualism; indirect and direct communication; high and low hierarchies; 
consensus and authority oriented decision making (see also, e.g., Keys and 
Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981)..  
One of findings which Ybema and Byun (2012) provide is that, although 
both Japanese and Dutch expatriates in their host countries are relatively 
satisfied with their local subordinates, their local subordinates, both in Japan and 
the Netherlands, are quite frustrated. In the Dutch firms in Japan, there are 
Dutch expatriate managers while, in Japanese firms in the Netherlands, there 




are Japanese expatriate managers. Both Japanese and Dutch subordinates, for 
example, appear quite frustrated with the styles of their bosses’ decision making, 
with the Dutch managers making ‘top down’ decisions, from the point of view of 
their Japanese subordinates, while Japanese managers, from the perspective of 
Dutch subordinates also take top-down decisions through a hierarchical culture, 
with consensus simply being a veneer. This is also depicted by the fact that, 
while both claim that the other culture is hierarchical or top down oriented, 
Japanese and Dutch participants characterise their own cultures as consensus 
oriented and egalitarian. This stems from the different interpretations of cultural 
characteristics of hierarchy and consensus.  
 Moreover, Sedgwick (2007) conducts an ethnographic study of a 
subsidiary plant of a Japanese MNC in France, which he calls YamaMax, 
successfully positioning his study in the context of globalisation. He treats 
globalisation as ‘a process organised through social relations’, illuminating that 
Japanese management practices, such as consensus decision making, 
information sharing, and knowledge creation, are practised, re-examined, and 
interpreted through employees’ interactions, experiences and networks at 
YamaMax. His rich ethnographic data shows how Japanese expatriate 
managers continue to possess strategic decision-making authority, drawing an 
interesting parallel with Japanese management studies in the US and Europe 
(Kopp, 1999; Ybema and Byun, 2012). He also describes organisational 
pressures on French middle managers to adapt Japanese management 
practices, as directed by their Japanese superiors, to the shop floor environment 
maintained by French workers. This forces the French middle managers to 




become ‘cultural brokers’ between the Japanese and the French workers, who 
otherwise to avoid direct interaction with the Japanese. This pressure 
demonstrates a sharp contrast to the work of Graham (1994) and Elger and 
Smith (2005) depicting the resistance to Japanese management practices which 
local employees in the UK and Canada displayed.  
 Furthermore, Japanese and local employees can also be divided as 
elaborated in the work of Elger and Smith (2005), who argued for two 
management structures in Japanese factors in the UK. In YamaMax, 
communication in meetings between the Japanese and the French is very 
difficult because of language inefficiency on the part of both groups of 
employees. They communicate in English at YamaMax since none of French 
and Japanese speak other’s language at anything other than a basic level. On 
the other hand, they also do not speak English well so either or both languages 
are spoken at the meetings. Sedgwick (2007) finds that, despite inefficient 
communication, French workers tend to simply listen without questioning 
Japanese superiors. At a later stage of his studies, an American manager from 
the corporation’s sister plants replaced the Japanese plant manager at 
YamaMax, because of inefficient financial performance, completely restructuring 
it, with the American rather than Japanese being brought to work with the French 
workers. Some French managers were fired and the new American manager 
openly debated with French subordinates who tended to be reserved. In the end, 
neither the American nor the Japanese successfully turned around the plant in 
France, YamaMax. Given the analysis and facts, Sedgwick came to conclude 
that this Japanese management practice in the shop floor might not fit in France 




by commenting that YamaMax “reproduced the atomization of labor and strong 
centralization of decision-making authority - the ‘Fordism’ - that the company had 
learned to avoid in postwar industrialization in Japan” (Sedgwick, 2007, p. 176).  
 Japanese management studies in Europe, therefore, specifically in the 
Netherlands and France, show a broadly similar picture as that in the US and UK 
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 1992; Eger and Smith, 1994; 2005; Kopp, 1999).  
 
2.7 Conclusion: Research gaps and questions 
This chapter aimed to identify research gaps and questions by reviewing the 
existing literature on ‘Japanese management practices’ and the practices 
identified with Japan. Japanisation was originally treated as a homogeneous 
phenomenon (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992) but is now seen as hybrids of 
Japanese and local management practices in given geographic contexts (Elger 
and Smith, 2005). Furthermore, Abo’s (2015) comparative study on the 
‘application’ and ‘adaptation’ of Japanese management practices raises the 
possibility that cultural meanings can be attached to practices very differently. 
Japanese management practices are embedded in Japanese society and 
culture but are now expected to be adapted to the society and culture where they 
are conducted.  
There are several existing approaches which partially interpret the 
meanings of ‘Japanese management practices’ through a macro analysis. 
Varieties of capitalism and national business systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Whitley, 1991; 1999; 2003) theories help to explain how Japanese management 
practices have been embedded in specific institutional environments. These 




practices, such as life time and long term employment, seniority based wages, 
teamwork, consensus oriented decision making, and corporate harmony, are 
evident in the Japanese coordinated market economy in which ‘non-market 
relationships’ are important. These approaches, however, are a one-size fits all 
approach in which the macro environment of society, economy and institutions is 
expected to determine how actors conduct practices. This thesis, however, will 
show that such approaches cannot satisfactorily elaborate the precise meanings 
embodied in Japanese management practices.  
In the light of this review, four research gaps within Japanese MNCs 
subsidiaries have been identified:  
 
 Less emphasis has been placed on non-manufacturing practices 
 Few in-depth comparative case studies have been conducted 
within a Japanese MNC spanning Asia and the West  
 Little attention has been paid to the cultural meanings attributed to 
the practices  
 The manner in which Japanese expatriates and local employees 
are organised has been the subject of little scrutiny  
 
Firstly, as stated above, less emphasis has been placed on non-manufacturing 
practices (see 2.2; 2.3). The current literature tends to focus on the 
manufacturing practices of Japanese manufacturing plants. Here, sales and 
marketing functions are merely part of the background of case studies. The 
chronological development of Japanisation shows that there is too heavy an 




emphasis on the manufacturing methods of Japanese manufacturing plants in 
the host country, despite a few exceptions such as Asakawa et al.’s (2013) 
elaboration of the internationalisation of the service industry in Japan. 
Non-manufacturing practices, particularly in sales and marketing functions, have 
rarely been illuminated in respect to either Japanisation or Japanese 
management practices.  
 Secondly, few in-depth comparative case studies have been conducted 
within a Japanese MNC spanning Asia and the West (see 2.5). Many studies 
compare and contrast cases, in the same location, either between Japanese and 
local corporations or among Japanese corporations (e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1988; 1992; Elger and Smith, 2005). This is because Japanese manufacturing 
plants have tended to be examined in order to prove the high productivity of their 
practices in comparison to other local plants. Thus, the units of comparison and 
contrast tend to be different local plants in the same geographic context. This 
suggests that in-depth comparative case studies within a single Japanese MNC 
are required. Nonetheless, in summarising the adoption of manufacturing 
practices at Japanese MNCs across six continents, the recent review of Abo 
(2015) demonstrates that there can be a variety of cultural interpretations of 
transferred manufacturing practices in Asia and the Western regions. In Korea 
and Taiwan, where there is a relatively high group consciousness among 
workers, the practices tend to be conducted as they would be in Japan, while in 
North America and Europe, where there is a low group consciousness among 
workers, the practices are not well adopted. This indicates that there are 
distinctive cultural as well as societal differences between Asia and the West.  




 Thirdly, the cultural meanings of the ‘company as family’ attributed to 
practices are rarely discussed (see 2.4). This may possibly explain why a set of 
transferred Japanese management practices were not easily achieved in the 
West, as discussed in Japanisation (e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; 1992; 
Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005). These primarily focus on the transferability of the 
material practices without much attention being given to their cultural meanings. 
In contrast, Kondo (1990) strongly emphasises the embodied cultural meanings 
through practices and the ‘company as family’, which possibly underpins the 
features of the manufacturing practices: group orientation, harmony, and 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the cultural meanings of the ‘family’ have been 
focused on less frequently in the literature. Overall the current literature 
suggests that the manufacturing practices at plants have long been the main 
units of analysis, but that these are distanced from the cultural meanings 
ascribed to those practices across different geographical locations.  
This is quite understandable since many Japanese management 
scholars, with the exception of Kondo (1990), a Japanese American, are 
‘non-Japanese speaking industrial sociologists’, and therefore are fundamentally 
lacking an ‘area knowledge of Japan’; this refers to society, national institutions, 
cultural practices and languages in Japan (Elger and Smith, 2005). Focusing on 
area knowledge makes it possible to further understand another aspect in the 
transfer of practices, namely embodied cultural meanings. 
Fourthly, very little of the literature examines the extent to which 
Japanese expatriates and local employees are divided into two groups (see 
2.3.3). This might be due to cultural differences, as Kopp (1999) discusses, or to 




some other structural support from the headquarters. Here, she touches on the 
dominant position of Japanese expatriates assigned by the headquarters. The 
cultural differences between Japanese, Americans and Europeans makes it 
possible to isolate Japanese from local employees, but she does not mention in 
depth what really constitutes the management structures across Asian and 
Western regions. Elger and Smith (2005) simply share the interviewee’s 
comment that there seem to be two management structures between Japanese 
expatriates and British employees, but do not elaborate on what divide these 
structures.  
These research gaps are consistent with the tendency for Japanese 
management practices to be researched as macro level studies with quantitative 
methods, focusing on the material aspects of transferring practices, rather than 
their meanings. A considerable amount of the literature, with some exemptions 
(e.g., Delbridge, 1998), use quantitative methods because interviews in English 
are considered not to be well understood by Japanese expatriates (Kopp, 1999). 
Due to the diversity and complexity of practices in Japanese MNCs with different 
social, institutional and cultural effects, the practices, even if exactly applied as 
in Japan, may be interpreted very differently with different cultural meanings. 
Hence, drawing on these research gaps, three research questions have been 
defined regarding Japanese MNC sales subsidiaries: 
 
Does the focus on the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC help to 
illuminate:  
 




 How non-manufacturing practices are being conducted across Asia 
and the West? 
 How cultural meanings are being attributed differently to 
non-manufacturing practices across Asia and the West? 
 How Japanese expatriates and local employees are being 
organised? 
 
Japanese MNCs across borders are expected to generate hybrids (Elger and 
Smith, 2005; Endo et al., 2015). These hybrids and changes can only be 
interpreted through attributed meanings in practices across different geographic 
contexts. A variety of meanings attributed by such practices can be focused on 
by adopting the recently developed institutional logic approach in order to 
illuminate how meanings are culturally and institutionally attached to Japanese 
management practices across borders. In the next chapter, the institutional logic 
approach is introduced and discussed as a conceptual framework in order to 
further explore this question.      




 An Institutional Logic Approach and Constellations of Chapter 3:
Logics 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to formulate a conceptual framework in order to analyse 
practices across the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC. The chapter is divided 
into four sections. First, the recent development of institutional logics is reviewed. 
Second, other important institutional concepts are reviewed and a useful 
framework introduced. Third, agency, culture, and practice are reviewed and 
framed with compatibility and centrality. In the concluding section, the 
conceptual framework is summarised. The constellations of logics are adopted 
with the emphasis on the geographical locations in which practices are 
conducted. This is also expected to show another ‘cultural space’ where logics 
can be in play differently from those that are argued by institutionalists (Thornton 
et al., 2012). This means that logics defined through analyses focused on 
Western society may not work well in other regions.  
 
3.2 Recent development of an institutional logic approach 
This section aims to review and evaluate recent developments in the study of 
institutional logic and constellations of logics. It is divided into three sub-sections. 
First, an institutional logic approach is introduced. Next, constellations of logics 
are discussed. Finally, the relationality of the constellations of logics is 
elaborated.  
 




3.2.1 The institutional logic approach as a macro analysis 
Institutional logic was originally coined in the seminal work of Friedland and 
Alford (1991). They describe Western society as ‘the inter-institutional system’ 
comprising social sectors, such as ‘Capitalism, Family, Bureaucratic State, 
Democracy, and Christianity’. They define the institutional logic as “a set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions - which constitute its organizing 
principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate” 
(p248). Each sector has ‘a central logic’: Capitalism as ‘accumulation and the 
commodification of human activity’; Family as ‘community and the motivation of 
human activity’; Bureaucratic State as ‘rationalization and the regulation of 
human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies’; Democracy as 
‘participation and the extension of popular control over human activity’ and 
Christianity as ‘truth, whether mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic 
construction of reality within which all human activity take place’.  
 The institutional logic approach is coined as an explicit critique of the 
institutional isomorphism that fails to take complexity into consideration. In 
institutional theory, a concept of institutional isomorphism had been dominant. It 
was proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p147) as “a result of processes 
that make organizations similar without necessarily making them more efficient”. 
They argue that organisations tend to adopt the same organisational forms and 
structures, resulting in them becoming increasingly similar. This is caused not by 
efficient adaptation to competitive forces from external or technical environments, 
but by ritual adaptation to a social construction in environments. In a sharp 
contrast to this isomorphism, Friedland and Alford (1991) suggest institutional 




logics at the societal level which possibly cause conflicts at the organisation and 
individual levels in a complex manner. These institutional logics can be identified 
across three units of analysis: society, organisations and individuals.  
 
When institutions are in conflict, people may mobilize to defend the 
symbols and practices of one institution from the implications of 
changes in others. Or they may attempt to export the symbols and 
practices of one institution in order to transform another (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991, p255). 
 
The symbols and practices are not simply given as the societal effects but also 
are transformed and even manipulated by individual actors at the organisational 
level.  
Although Friedland and Alford (1991) based these institutional logics at 
the societal level, Thornton and her colleagues have sought to renew the 
institutional logic approach. Initially, Thornton (2004) extended the taxonomies of 
the inter-institutional system, ‘institutional logics of societal sectors’ to Markets, 
Corporations, Profession, States, Families and Christian Religions. She 
furthermore adds ‘key characteristics’, elements of each logic which are the 
economic system, symbolic analogy, sources of legitimacy/authority/identity, as 
the basis of norms/attention and strategy. Furthermore, she replaces Democracy 
logic, defined by Friedland and Alford (1991), with Corporation logic by claiming 
that democracy can be a variable to the corporations, which aim to have a 




democratic management style with organisational hierarchies.  
Recently, Thornton et al. (2012) have proposed a comprehensive matrix 
of the inter-institutional system comprising two axes: a Y-Axis of elements of 
logics and an X-Axis of logics of institutional orders. In this matrix, they define 
seven logics as Family, Religion, State, Market, Profession, Corporation, and the 
newly added Community. With reference to the recent studies of community 
(Marquis et al. 2007; Marquis and Battilana, 2009), they identify the institutional 
effects of community, refining this inter-institutional system. Although the original 
work of Friedland and Alford (1991) aimed to tease out a nuanced notion of 
institutional logics, distinctive from isomorphism, a series of work by Thornton 
and colleagues tends to revert the notion of institutional logics to once again be 
closer to the notion of institutional isomorphism: i.e. a deterministic structure and 
a summary of macro analyses where a social structure determines individual 
actors’ behaviours by isomorphic pressures.  
Furthermore, without giving clear reasons, they drop ‘Christian’ from 
‘Christian religions’ (2004) and assert the ‘religion’ logic instead, seemingly 
characterizing other religions as having the same elements as Christianity. 
Nonetheless, this renewal may have gone too far since it makes assumptions 
about other religions, such as contemporary Islam or Buddhism, that may not be 
valid. They point out that the ‘cultural space’ of modern Islam, for example, can 
be in conflict with market principles while Christian religion would transform 
saving and investment into the sign of salvation (Weber, 2010). Moreover, this 
series of refinements assumes that the inter-institutional system of logics 
gradually becomes universal, even though it was originally specifically defined 




as a basis of Western society.  
 These institutional logics at the societal level have been largely applied 
to institutional change at the organisational level, where one dominant logic is 
replaced by another among organisations. Thornton and Ocasio (1999), for 
instance, identified a shift of institutional logics at the organisation level in the 
publishing industry in the US from an editorial logic to a market logic. Attributes 
of editorial logic were replaced by those of market logic: personal capitalism was 
replaced by market capitalism; personal reputation by market position; increased 
sales by an increase in profits. Similarly, an historical analysis of accounting 
firms in Canada by Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) illustrates a shift from 
professional logic to market logic at the organisation level, leading to new 
organisational forms, ‘the multidisciplinary practice’ including accounting, legal, 
and management consulting services. Professional logic was confined to a 
narrow band of audit services but was replaced by a market logic comprising the 
demands of their clients who expand their business globally. As a consequence, 
a broad range of services such as a legal service was established for the sake of 
responding to clients’ needs. This emphasises the effects of societal logics from 
macro analysis whereby the dominant societal logic is replaced by another 
among organisations. 
One of dominant views on this level of analysis has been groups of 
organisations as the ‘organisational fields’ whereby the institutional logics from 
the societal level operate at the organisation level (e.g., Rao et al, 2003; Marquis 
and Lounsbury, 2007). This view is based on DiMaggio (1983) who defines 
organisational fields as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 




recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” (p148). These macro levels of society and the 
organisational fields are assumed to enable organisational actors’ actions. Reay 
and Hinings (2009), for instance, describe a health care industry as ‘the Albert 
health care field’ in Canada. Thornton and Ocasio (1999) also apply the notion of 
the organisational field to the ‘higher publishing industry’ in the US, an 
organisational field whereby organisations are similar in acquiring their 
legitimacy in their economic activities. This strand in the literature primarily 
focuses on the macro analysis, although these levels of analysis are ‘nested’ in a 
complicated manner of “individuals competing and negotiating, organizations in 
conflict and co-ordination, and institutions in contradiction and interdependency” 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991, p240-1). Nonetheless, the concept of organisational 
fields can be useful to explain the complexity of Japanisation as Westney (1987) 
used, and how practices are revised, rejected, or transformed in different ways.  
Quite recently, Friedland et al. (2014) asserted that varieties of logics 
can be in play across different institutions because of a metaphysical category in 
logics, ‘an institutional substance’ which can transpose across institutional 
sectors. This means that, within a legal institution like the corporation, other 
logics such as religion and ‘family’ may be able to be in play. They further 
elaborate the ontology of institutional logics by denying that they are simply mere 
subjects, objects, or practices, and instead affirming that they are built “through a 
metaphysical category – an institutional substance”. They assert that 
“(i)nstitutional substances are not values per se, but rather institutional objects 




enacted and thereby valorized through practice, that is through the simple fact of 
their production” (p333). This is because a logic is “a social construct, a 
substance enacted in practices by which one gains access to it, affording 
emotions and affects that substantialize it” (p337). This places a strong 
emphasis on an institutional substance embodied by practices.  
 
3.2.2 Constellations of logics as cooperative and competitive 
relationships among logics 
Recently, some scholars have begun to question the dominant literature of 
institutional logics and institutional change as a macro analysis whereby there 
has been a shift from one logic to another logic. In particular, Goodrick and Reay 
(2011) propose ‘constellations of institutional logics’ as “the combination of 
institutional logics guiding behavior at any one point of time” (p399). Like “a 
configuration or positions of ‘stars’” in the sky, multiple logics can coexist, guide 
actors’ behaviours, and eventually be identified as patterns of cooperative and 
competitive logics.  
By conducting a longitudinal study of the professional work of 
pharmacists in the US from 1852, Goodrick and Reay (2011) describe how the 
constellation of logics guides professional actors and their work in each era. The 
logics discussed are the market, professional, state and corporation logics. 
Through five eras, each around several decades, they analysed ‘a set of logics 
in a recognisable pattern’ and identified three constellations of logics: one with a 
single dominant logic, where the other three do not guide behaviours; another 
with two significant logics and other two with a less significant influence; and a 




third constellation with one logic moderating three other less influential logics. 
The difference between dominance and moderation is visualised as the extent to 
which each logic is positioned higher or lower than the others. Primary attention 
here is given to the relationships among more than two coexisting logics. Unlike 
the previous literature which argued for two logics with one ‘winning’ and other 
‘losing’, this is a useful concept which assumes multiple coexisting logics and 
‘their collective influence on a social actor’.  
Through this strong emphasis on the effects of more than two coexisting 
multiple logics, they argue for constellations of logics composed of cooperative 
as well as competitive relationships. The competitive relationship is a ‘zero sum’ 
where there is an equal amount of gains and losses of logics in the available ‘pie’, 
whereas the cooperative relationship is ‘non-zero sum’ where there is a gain of 
multiple logics and possibly an expanded ‘available ‘pie’. Although what the ‘pie’ 
really means was not fully clarified by them, their approach entails a 
comprehensive concept of dealing with multiple logics.  
More recently, Waldorff, Reay, Goodrick (2013) further elaborated the 
mechanisms of the constellations of logics, which enable as well as constrain 
actors’ actions. Adopting a comparative case study of healthcare initiatives at 
micro and macro levels in Denmark and Canada, they conclude that two 
mechanisms, such as the ‘presence of an influential logic’ and an ‘additive 
relationship between logics’, enable actors’ actions and eventually institutional 
change, while three mechanisms, such as ‘strengthening alternative logics’, 
‘segmenting competitive logics’, and ‘facilitative relationships’ constrain actors’ 
actions and in turn institutional stability. Unlike their previous study, which 




focused on the professional work of pharmacists, this work extends its scope to 
the organisational fields in the healthcare industry as a whole. These 
mechanisms, however, can be contextually triggered according to actors in their 
contexts because it is actors that decide these relationships among logics 
(Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). Thornton et al. (2012) briefly touch upon 
actors’ actions as ‘partial autonomy’, albeit not elaborating it further. Given 
enabled and constrained actors’ actions through the constellations of logics, 
ceremonial aspects through boundaries of logic, as well as the cooperative and 
competitive relationships, are discussed below.   
 
3.2.2.1 Cooperative relationship among multiple logics 
The cooperative relationship among logics, the ‘win-win’ relationship in other 
words, has been rarely discussed by institutionalists. This means that 
strengthening one logic does not imply a corresponding weakening of another 
logic. Goodrick and Reay (2011) go on to elaborate on these ‘non-zero sum’ 
cooperative relationships in two different ways: as either ‘facilitative’ or ‘additive’ 
relationships. The facilitative relationship means that multiple logics gain 
collective influence to guide practices. In their study, customer knowledge of 
medication acquired through the internet and advertisements (the market logic) 
supported pharmacists’ abstract knowledge (the professional logic) as the 
pharmacists interact with customers. Thus, one logic can facilitate another logic. 
In contrast, the additive relationship means that multiple logics guide different 
expectations which do not necessarily present conflicting demands. Goodrick 
and Reay (2011) explain this by saying that the pharmacists at some point 




needed to show both professional competence and an ability to meet customer 
expectations. Both professional and market standards are not conflicting but 
simply additive in the sense that they are two different standards guided by the 
professional and market logics. Thus, one logic can be added to another logic.  
 This concept of the cooperative relationship alongside the competitive 
ones is quite useful in illuminating culturally complex meanings in respect to 
practices. It certainly helps to describe and explain the ebbs and flows of 
coexisting multiple logics through the dynamic relationships among logics. Both 
the ‘facilitative’ and ‘additive’ concepts, however, may not generally be used in 
practice unless a group of actors has to be narrowly limited. In their case, 
pharmacists, as the professionals, are the main focus of actors, and thus 
facilitative and additive relationships are easily defined from the view of the 
pharmacists. This means that, for surrounding groups of professionals, like 
nurses and medical doctors, these relationships may not be the same as those 
of pharmacists. For instance, the facilitative relationship for a doctor may turn to 
be additive for a pharmacist. Thus, these two relationships have to be examined 
with great caution. Furthermore, the distinction between facilitative and additive 
relationships may be further blurred: Waldorff, Reay, Goodrick (2013) argue for 
‘facilitative relationships’ additionally meaning ‘strengthening one logic serves to 
strengthen another logic’, while Goodrick and Reay (2011) originally argued for 
‘additive relationships’ as extending the ‘pie’.  
A more useful concept can be that of the ‘amplified’ effects of logics used 
by Greenwood et al. (2011). They lend support to amplified effects by 
questioning: “… whether the logics of family and religion, when they occur 




together, amplify each other’s effects because of their common theme of social 
responsibility and their antipathy to the more individualized implications of the 
neoliberal market logic” (Greenwood et al., 2010, p527). Their study concerns 
the case of ‘family’ firms in Spain, describing the organisational environments 
surrounding the Spanish manufacturing industry. Using quantitative analysis of 
the downsizing of the Spanish manufacturing sector between 1994 and 2000, 
they examine the inter-relationships between the market, family and state logics. 
Then they conclude that the market logic, specifically originating from small to 
medium-sized enterprises, is mediated by non-market logics. This occurs 
directly through the ‘family’ logic and state logics and indirectly through the 
religion logic. The fact that “the relevance of family in Spain is at least partly a 
function of the Catholic Church” (Greenwood et al., 2010, p535) helps to identify 
the amplified aspects of these logics. Here, in respect to constellations of logics, 
this study of the amplified logics (Greenwood et al, 2011) is simply considered as 
‘facilitative relationships’ among logics by Waldorff, Reay and Goodrick (2013). 
Nonetheless, it emphasises the strengthened effect of logics, rather than simply 
facilitating logics, bringing about a distinction between amplified and facilitative 
relationships: the former strengthens logics yet the latter only facilitates logics 
without necessarily strengthening them. Although it primarily concerns the 
heterogeneous effects of multiple logics from the macro analysis, the notion of 
amplified effect can be useful in describing enactments of cooperative 
relationships among logics through practices.  
 In Japanese MNCs, the cooperative relationships can probably be 
identified with the ‘family’, corporation, religion, and market logics because 




Japanese are considered to view ‘company as family’ (e.g., Keys and Miller, 
1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981; Kondo, 1990) (see 2.4). Japanese 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing practices are underpinned by the notion 
of ‘family’ which is ‘hearth’, “signifying people who belong to the same domestic 
group” (Kondo, p121) and thus, share ‘a common destiny’ (Kondo, 1990). The 
notion of ‘family’ can be recognised especially in Asia, and therefore may be 
amplified with other logics. Nonetheless, this may not be the case in the Western 
regions because of their cultural preference for individualism (e.g., Graham, 
1994).  
 
3.2.2.2 Competitive relationships among multiple logics  
The competitive relationship among two logics, both the ‘victory’ of one logic and 
the ‘defeat’ of another logic, has been frequently discussed by institutionalists. It 
implies a ‘zero sum’ where the strengthening of one logic provokes a weakening 
of the other logic. The concept is associated with early institutionalists such as 
Thornton and colleagues, who argued for zero sum relationships among logics 
(e.g., Thornton, 2004). Goodrick and Reay (2011) claim that, in competition 
among logics, there must be an equal amount of both gains and losses in ‘the 
total available “pie”’. Despite no clear definition of what the ‘pie’ really is, the 
competitive relationship heavily implicates a zero sum relationship among logics, 
thereby bringing about ‘segmented’ practices guided by different logics. The 
concept of ‘segmenting’ responds to the competitive relationship among logics, 
arguing that the coexistence of multiple logics results in “segmenting their 
impacts on different actors, geographical communities, or types of organisations” 




(p379). In a nutshell, each practice is guided by different logic. ‘Segmenting’ can 
be a mechanism which allows competitive logics to coexist by dividing up the 
total ‘pie’, thereby concluding that professional work is segmented by multiple 
logics. This competitive relationship can include ‘incompatible’ relationships 
among logics, such as conflict and tension.  
 This ‘segmenting’ echoes ‘organisational responses’ to ‘institutional 
complexity’ (Greenwood et al., 2011). Like the constellations of logics, 
institutional complexity is built on parts of a critique of the current literature, with 
its overriding emphasis on a single logic dominating the organisational field. It 
has different underlying assumptions from the constellations of logics, however: 
it is limited only to the competitive relationship among logics; and it treats 
primarily ‘organisations’ as institutional actors. The concept of institutional 
complexity is based on the competitive relationship between logics in reference 
to “the number of logics and the degree of incompatibility between them” (p334). 
In their study, a response can be the ‘partitioning/compartmentalising’ of an 
organisational unit into different norms, practices, processes and mind-sets. 
These are parts of the ‘organisational response’ to institutional complexity 
generated in the organisational field.  
Furthermore, the conceptualisation of complexity is apparently based on 
the assumption that organisations are institutional actors, giving a high priority 
on macro analysis. They then go on to argue that multiple institutional logics at a 
societal level can be played out at the organisational and intraorganisational 
level. This demand is an outgrowth from their assumption that not all 
organisations receive institutional pressure equally at the organisational field 




level because organisational arrangements serve to filter complexity. Although 
institutional complexity has a limited focus on only the competitive relationship 
and organisational actors, the concept of ‘partitioning/compartmentalising’ 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) may help to explain how logics are fragmented within 
‘organisations’.  
 Other possible responses to the competitive relationship among logics 
can be ‘actors’ active collaboration’. With the case study of health organisations 
in Canada, Reay and Hinings (2005) describe coexisting logics as a part of 
institutional change, focusing on the empirical investigation into how a field can 
be re-established after institutional change. Later, they develop this investigation 
to the question of how to manage competing logics. Reay and Hinings (2009) 
clarify that favouring conditions of dealing with competing logics can be 
‘mechanisms for managing the rivalry of competing’. They identify conditions 
that make the coexistence of multiple logics possible. That is, multiple coexisting 
logics can be managed through collaborations of actors because active 
collaboration by actors can resolve the contradiction and conflicts which can be 
introduced by the rivalry of competing logics. Their argument is based on actors’ 
voluntary actions and motives to manage institutional logics, rather than norms 
and myths in institutionalism, which shape actors’ actions.  
 In Japanese MNCs, the competitive relationships among logics are 
estimated to be identified in the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs, 
especially in Western regions, as the unsuccessful cases of transferring 
Japanese management practices imply (Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005). In 
particular, the ‘family’ logic associated with group orientation and collective 




responsibility may sharply conflict with independent individuals based on the 
market logic (e.g., Graham, 1994). By contrast, in Asia, the competitive 
relationship may be minimal.  
 
3.2.2.3 Ceremonial aspects though boundaries of logics 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) define ceremonial aspects deriving from formal 
organisational structures which reflect on institutional rules as myths. They 
argue that ‘organisations’ need to incorporate institutional rules gaining 
legitimacy from society in order to survive in those environments. The 
ceremonial organisational structures are due largely to inconsistencies between 
technological efficiency (market logic) and institutionalised organisational 
structure (corporation logic). This proposition of Meyer and Rowan (1977) was 
supported by the work of Westphal and Zajac (1998) who examined the share 
price of corporations. Adopting a quantitative method, they discovered that the 
price went up when the corporations adopted a legitimate practice such as 
‘long-term incentive plans’, regardless of whether they actually implement it or 
not. This indicates that their adoption was principally a ceremonial corporate 
practice. Similarly, Oliver (1991) positions these ceremonial organisational 
structures as distinct from real activities as a consequence of the ‘strategic 
responses’ to institutional process. Following Oliver, Greenwood et al. (2011) 
rephrase it as ‘organisational responses’ to institutional complexity.  
 In the constellations of logics, the ceremonial aspects emerge as a 
consequence of ‘segmenting’ logics. Goodrick and Reay (2011) indicate the 
complexity of coexisting logics by showing that some dimension of the 




professional work of pharmacists enacts different logics, thus ‘segmenting’ their 
impact on practices. The pharmacists’ work is manifested through segmenting 
the professional logic (their professional competence in pharmaceutical 
knowledge) and the market logic (the commercial ability to meet customers’ 
expectations about medicinal drugs). As Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue, 
however, while ceremonial aspects are expected to emerge in particular through 
‘segmented’ inconsistencies between efficiency (the market logic) and 
organisational structure (the corporation logic), this may not always be the case 
in respect to constellations of logics which comprise of more than these two 
logics. Not only do other logics, such as the ‘family’ and religion logics, affect 
ceremonial aspects, but they can also be sources of inconsistencies causing 
ceremonial aspects. This ‘segmenting’ assumes the intimate relation between 
logics and ‘different actors, geographical communities, or types of organisations’, 
rather than within intra-organisations.  
 Furthermore, articulating this ‘segmenting’ as a ‘compartmentalisation’ 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p342) touches upon the existence of ‘organisational 
communities’ by stating that “(t)he structural division of this sense, creates 
intra-organizational communities which, connected to ﬁeld-level occupational 
communities, are “quite likely to differ in their awareness of, and receptivity to, 
institutional pressures”. The concept of organisational communities assumes the 
organisational field level structure which influences ‘organisational actors’, in 
their words, at the organisational level. Greenwood et al. (2011) further imply 
that these organisational communities are expected to play a key role in 
‘segmenting’ logics, ‘compartmentalising’ in their words, by representing and 




importing logics into different ‘organisational’ units. They further raise the 
possibility that the receptivity of the organisational communities’ members may 
be strongly affected by ‘the thickness of ties’ of organisational communities to 
their organisational fields. The thicker ties are, the stronger role they can play.  
 Focusing on the individual level, rather than intraorganisational units, 
Suddaby et al. (2012) sheds light on actors’ profiles of their ‘life histories’ which 
constitute actors’ ‘institutional reflexivity’. Analysing the communications 
consultancy field in France, they reach a conclusion that “incumbents were able 
to maintain their position in the social order because of… their ongoing 
understandings” (p44). They attribute ‘institutional reflexivity’ to actors’ ‘life 
histories’, which are social position, expert power, and rhetorical skill, by arguing 
that:  
 
Variations in one’s personal biography, thus, may afford greater 
institutional reflexivity because of their social position, their 
educational history, their network relationships, their hierarchical 
position within organizations and a host of other factors that 
differentially expose some to higher degrees of reflexivity than others 
(p13).  
 
Thus, actors’ profiles can be a key to achieving institutional reflexivity to 
surrounding institutional environments. In institutional logics, this strongly 
echoes the work of Battilana and Dorado (2010), which illuminates actors’ 




profiles of conducting practices enacting a particular logic. Conducting 
comparative analysis between successful and failed microfinance banks in 
Bolivia, they conclude that the particular logic manifested by the previous 
experience of hired employees ultimately prevented them from acquiring other 
ways of working, and thus becoming a successful bank.  
For Japanese MNCs, Japanese expatriates can be organisational 
communities who are closely associated with ‘a field level family logic’ to the 
subsidiaries (Greenwood et al., 2011; Elger and Smith, 2005). The ‘family’ logic 
is considered to be bounded to only Japanese communities and thus may allow 
only Japanese expatriates to be uchi; the inner group of ‘family’ members. Their 
ethnocentric structures, whereby Japanese expatriates play a dominant 
decision-making role (Kopp, 1999), echoes the idea of ‘two management 
structures’ between Japanese and locals (Elger and Smith, 2005). Actors’ 
profiles of organisational communities, however, play an important role in 
referring back to the organisational fields (Suddaby et al., 2012). A key point can 
be whether or not actors have experience of conducting Japanese management 
practices enacting the ‘family’ logic in their profile. This may provoke ceremonial 
aspects of work organisation since, as Kopp (1999) indicates, Japanese 
expatriate managers dominate the decision-making process in the subsidiaries 
while local managers are little involved.  
 
3.2.3 Relationality of constellations of logics in Asia and the West 
Constellations of logics are quite useful in unpacking the nuanced relationships 
between more than two logics. One emerging issue with regard to a workable 




definition of these competitive and cooperative relationships, however, is what 
really makes logics incompatible or compatible. The source of both 
‘incompatibility’ and ‘compatibility’ between logics does not rest on the logics 
themselves but upon actors conducting particular practices (e.g., Smets and 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). It is crucial to understand how actors in their contexts 
reproduce, resist and transform practices through constellations of logics.  
 Granted, the constellations of logics unpack multiple logics operating in 
certain contexts, such as the work of professional pharmacists being built on 
cooperative as well as competitive relationships among multiple logics. 
Notwithstanding this strong emphasis on varieties of multiple logics, this may 
lead to reified constellations confined to one historical context only. The 
constellations cannot simply be given by society. Rather, constellations 
themselves can be assumed to be generated through individual actors’ actions 
and identification. Hallett and Ventresca (2006) argue for ‘inhabited institutions’ 
rather than institutions carried by logics. They claim that institutions are not just 
an ‘inert container of meaning’ through logics but that they are ‘inhabited’ by 
individual actors. The term ‘inhabited institutions’ helps to explain the notion of 
constellations of logics from individual actors’ views. This relationality of the 
constellations of logics can be investigated in depth as individual actors’ 
products and individual actors’ enablements and constraints.  
 The relationality is also ensured by the ‘geographical communities’ in 
which particular institutional logics are rooted (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; 
Lounsbury, 2007). By exploring a case study in which a national bank acquires 
local banks across a number of states, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) show that 




particular institutional logics can be embedded in geographically different 
locations. They examine a tension of competing logics between national and 
community logics: a ‘community’ logic of local autonomy focuses on avoidance 
of financial consolidation, whereas a ‘national’ logic of economic efficiency 
focuses on geographical diversification through expanding and standardising 
bank branches. In this case, a community tends to ‘protect local autonomy’ 
against a demand to standardise for efficiency. This shows that the geographical 
locations where constellations of logics are formed do matter.  
 In subsidiaries of MNCs, these geographical locations among home and 
host countries are highly likely to provide different sets of co-existing logics 
(Kostova et al., 2008). Geppert et al. (2006) assert that transferring practices 
from the headquarters to their subsidiaries may cause potential conflicts 
because the subsidiaries of MNCs are locally embedded in their home and host 
countries. In institutional theory, this echoes a ‘relational institutional analysis’, 
as Delbridge and Edwards (2007) suggest. More recently, Delbridge and 
Edwards (2013) have also argued that these contexts result in ‘conditioned’ 
actions of individual actors and agency due to constellations of logics and 
institutional complexity consisting of multiple conflicted logics in play together. 
This assumes that actions and agency are ‘evolving through time’ according to 
each relational context. This context, surrounding different institutional 
environments, would be expected to have a different set of constellations of 
logics. The ‘geographical communities’ in Japanese MNCs can be all the 
non-Japanese actors, such as local employees and local customers, who have 
nothing to do with the Japanese, and are therefore divided by two managements 




(Elger and Smith, 2005).  
Furthermore, in Japanese MNCs, the ‘family’ logic is manifested in 
‘company as family’ (Kondo, 1990), which strongly implicates the relationality of 
logics themselves because the concept of institutional logic was coined from the 
analysis of Western society, not Japanese society. Friedland and Alford (1991) 
did not forget to remind us of the limitation of their model by stating that people in 
non-Western societies, “are less likely to conceptualize individuals 
independently of the roles they occupy and the contexts in which they are 
sustained” (p239). In particular, the application of logics to Japanese MNCs 
needs to pay more attention to surrounding contexts since they posit that: 
 
In Japan, a highly industrialized nation, the concept of individualism 
was a foreign introduction, for which there is still no adequate 
translation. Its translation still has the pejorative connotation of 
self-centeredness. For whatever reason, some societies do not 
conceptualize, let along value, an abstract individual. Clearly, the 
achievement of individuality was as much a cultural transformation as 
it was the natural outcome of the division of labor. (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991, p239)  
  
Thus, the application of institutional logics needs to be done with attention to the 
geographical locations of Japanese MNCs in both home and host countries. This 
echoes the ‘cultural space’ warranted by Thornton et al. (2012), who raise the 




possibility of a national culture.  
 This is the case especially in the West, where the preference is for 
individuality rather than the collective identifies of Japanese actors (Kondo, 
1990). Comparing Japanese identities with American ones, Kondo (1990, p22) 
identifies the existence of collective identities in Japan when reporting a 
comment from an informant that “Japanese don’t treat themselves as important, 
do they?” (p22). She continues to reflect on the significance of the comment by 
stating that:  
 
Not only did it perfectly capture my own feelings being bound by social 
obligation, living my life for others, it also indicated to me a profoundly 
different way of thinking about the relationship between selves and 
the social world. Persons seemed to be constituted in and through 
social relations and obligations to others. Selves and society did not 
seem to be separated entities; rather the boundaries were blurred” 
(p22).  
 
If so, then the relationality is profoundly taken into consideration when adopting 
institutional logics. As a Japanese American, her view stems from comparison 
and contrast between American interpretations of ‘individuality’ and Japanese 
interpretation of selves ‘constituted in’ society. This echoes ‘company as family’ 
where the boundary between the two axes is blurred (Kondo, 1990). Indeed, this 
illuminates the new ‘cultural space’ which Thornton et al. (2012) articulate as 




logics operating in a cultural manner. Thus, institutional logics need to be 
considered together with their relationality in Asia and the West, and this 
possibly addresses their limitations.  
 
3.3 Framing agency, culture and practice with compatibility and centrality     
This section aims further to review other important concepts related to agency 
and culture through practice theory and examines a possible framework for 
locating the various relationships between logics in a comprehensive manner. 
First, the concepts of agency and practice are reviewed. Second, the concepts 
of culture and practice are elaborated. Third, a compatibility and centrality model 
is introduced as a potential framework.  
 
3.3.1 Focusing on agency and practice: embedded agencies, 
institutional work, and institutional complexity 
In institutional theory, the concept of agency has been influential as far back as 
DiMaggio (1988), who argued for the importance of agency, especially in 
explaining institutional change. He claimed that institutional theory could not give 
an adequate account of institutional reproduction and transformation without 
taking into account actors’ interests and agency. This is because “new 
institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional 
entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly” (p14) (emphasis in original). If institutional change is understood as being 
driven at the societal and organisational levels (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), however, a question is raised as to how human 




agency that is embedded in and confined to existing institutions can change 
institutional arrangements. This is called ‘the paradox of embedded agency’: 
how actors become institutional entrepreneurs if they are embedded in the 
existing institution (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Sewell, 1992; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002). Holm (1995), for instance, 
asks: “How can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and 
rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?” (p398). 
Holm (1995) points out that “In a nested-systems perspective, a distinction is 
made between action guided by institutions on the one hand, and action aimed 
explicitly at manipulating institutional parameters, on the other” (ibid, p400). His 
question directly talks to an issue of agency in institutional change, which may 
derive not only from exogenous factors but also from endogenous ones.  
Adopting a dialectic perspective, Seo and Creed (2002) illuminate the 
processes by which actors could and could not change institutions by which they 
had been conditioned. They focus on enabling conditions surrounding agency, 
because in a society “multilevel processes produce a complex array of 
interrelated but often mutually incompatible institutional arrangements (Totality). 
Such institutional incompatibilities provide a continuous source of tensions and 
conflicts within and across institutions (contradiction)” (p225). Hence, they 
conclude that “institutional contradiction may trigger, enable, and limit praxis for 
institutional change” (p231-232). Moreover, they argue that the contradictions 
are the ‘driving force’ of institutional change, enabling “a shift in partially 
autonomous social actors’ collective consciousness from unreflective and 
passive mode to a reflective and active one” (p231). These may also provide 




“alternative logics of action and psychological and physical resources to be 
mobilized, and appropriated and transposed in the process of institutional 
change” (ditto). This argument, therefore, asserts that agency may rely on 
whether actors recognise that inter-institutional incompatibilities should be made 
compatible or not.  
Although their explanation of agency in institutional change helps to 
clarify the roles of agency and interests, a question about the autonomous 
aspects of agency still remains. That is, given perceived contradictions, actors 
may choose to either maintain or change existing institutions. Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) propose the concept of ‘institutional work’, to deal with this 
situation, assuming the concept of active actors as argued by DiMaggio (1988) 
and Jepperson (1991). Lawrence and Suddaby use "the concept of 'institutional 
work' to represent the broad category of purposive action aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (p216). Then, Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) go on to enumerate the possible forms of institutional categories such as 
creation, maintenance and disruption. They elaborate tactics and patterns of 
actions of agents who encounter institutional pressures rather than theorise 
agency in institutional change.  
 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009) subsequently published an edited 
book titled ‘Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of 
Organizations’, developing the concept of institutional work and its empirical 
analysis. In this book, the concept of agency is married with that of institutional 
work. In particular, Battilana and D’Aunno (2009) propose a three by three matrix 
framework combining forms of institutional work and dimensions of agencies 




(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Through this framework, they clarify that 
individual agency is not a ‘constant attribute’ but is ‘evolving through time’. 
 This dynamic view of agency was further considered and developed by 
Zietsma and Lawrence (2010), who proposed two forms of institutional work, 
boundary work and practice work. According to them, boundary work refers to 
“the attempts of actors to create, shape, and disrupt boundaries while practice 
work refers to ‘institutional work aimed at creating, maintaining, or disrupting 
practices” (p190). Adopting ‘an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the coastal 
forest industry in British Columbia, they reveal that the interplay of boundary and 
practice wok affect institutional stability and change. They explain the 
interdependent relationship by arguing that “(t)hus boundaries and practices are 
distinct, interdependent features of groups that exist in a recursive relationship, 
with boundaries delimiting sets of legitimate practices, and practices supporting 
particular group boundaries” (p193). Then, they find that, while agency is 
primarily habituated to maintaining boundaries and practices in institutional 
stability, it can also be projective and practical in terms of challenging boundaries 
and practices. They conclude, therefore, that embedded agency is not 
paradoxical with understanding of heterogeneous agencies.  
Later on, the issues of agency was further elaborated and analysed with 
the concept of institutional complexity, which Greenwood and his colleagues 
coined (Greenwood et al., 2011) (e.g., Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; 
Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; McPherson and Sauder, 2013) (see also 3.2.2; 
3.2.3). Unlike the examination of institutional complexity from a macro 
perspective (Greenwood et al., 2011), the work of Smets and Jarzabkowski 




(2013) aims to suggest a relational and dynamic perspective on institutional 
complexity by drawing on the idea institutional work. In their understanding of 
institutional complexity, competing logics are not given but constructed by actors. 
Delbridge and Edwards (2013) took a different methodological approach. 
Drawing on critical realist ontology, they proposed a relationship between 
agency and structure to show how agents are oriented for events in either the 
past, present, or future, are coupled with different outcomes and actions. They 
elaborate how agency is conditioned by institutional complexity and competing 
logics. 
In a closer examination of individual agency, the work of McPherson and 
Sauder (2013) reveals how actors manage institutional complexity by exercising 
their agency, drawing on available logics in daily practices. Through an 
ethnographic study of a drug court in the US, they clarify that actors use both 
home logics associated with actors’ interests and non-home logics irrelevant to 
their interests. Unlike non-home logics, which are irrelevant to particular actors’ 
interests, home logics concern those logics with which actors are primarily 
associated: e.g. probation officers are associated with the criminal punishment 
logic;  clinicians with the rehabilitation logic; public defenders with the 
community accountability logic; and state attorneys with the efficiency logic.. 
Through their ethnography, actors used available logics within three types of 
structural constraints: procedural, definitional and positional. Procedural 
constraints refer to the formal rules and norms of the drug court, limiting the use 
of particular logics. Definitional constraints concern the contents of logics limiting 
the achievement of actors’ goals. Positional constraints concern different actors’ 




formal positions limiting the use of logics. Assuming a cultural ‘tool kit’ approach 
where actors can have a repertoire of habits and skills (Swidler, 1986), 
McPherson and Sauder (2013) argue that, in order to manage institutional 
complexity, actors need to draw collectively on ‘a shared toolkit of logics’, i.e. the 
logics of other actors as well as their own. In their argument, autonomous actors 
are expected to use available logics in order to achieve their particular goals. 
 Furthermore, McPherson and Sauder (2013) analyse and elaborate 
negotiation among actors in terms of competing logics at the individual level, as 
opposed to at the organisational and societal levels (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007; 
Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). Observing individual negotiations, they found 
that, through negotiation, “actors exploit available resources to solve the 
problems at hand” (McPherson and Sauder, 2013, p186). Thus, this micro level 
analysis demonstrates that actors can even ‘hijack’ the logic of other actors for 
the sake of achieving their own interests. This also indicates the significance of 
the ability of local actors to draw on resources from other actors’ institutional 
backgrounds in order to maintain the existing institutional structures since “the 
need to meet the pressing demands of the local organisations overrides more 
remote professional and institutional differences” (ditto).  
 In contrast, other research still elaborates the concept of institutional 
complexity at the organisational level, rather than at the individual level or with 
agency. Kodeih and Greenwood (2014) conducted empirical research about four 
French business schools responding to the demand to internationalise their 
management education and, at the same time, to retain their organisational and 
institutional identities. They argue that the identity aspirations of organisations, 




rather than their current identity and status, shape the institutional complexity 
they experience and the organisational responses they create. With an 
emphasis on decision makers, rather than other organisational members, 
Raaijmakers et al. (2015) examine the responses of decision makers in 
organisations, bringing about two factors influencing organisational responses, 
such as actors’ interpretation of institutional complexity and personal beliefs 
regarding practices. Furthermore, Raynard and Greenwood (2014) propose a 
framework to sort out types of institutional complexity, defining four ideal-type 
configurations: segregated complexity, restrained complexity, aligned complexity, 
and volatile complexity. These studies, however, focus on more organisational 
responses to institutional complexity than on agency inhabiting institutional 
complexity. 
 A series of arguments about embedded agency, institutional work, 
structural constraints, and institutional complexity, has therefore comprised the 
debate on structure and agency, with either at various times dominating the other. 
Both arguments regarding structure and agency, however, need to be 
considered and incorporated in terms of constellations of logics in order to 
explore the meanings embodied in practices in Asia and the West. In the next 
sub section, therefore, the relationship between culture and practice is 
discussed. 
 
3.3.2 Focusing on culture and practice: institutional duality, adaptation 
and recontextualisation 
With an emphasis on practices which are especially transferred across different 




geographical contexts, some scholars have conducted micro level analyses 
rather than the traditional macro analyses. This is referred to as the ‘practice turn’ 
in institutional theory (Schatzki et al., 2001, Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et 
al., 2012). Originally, the transferring practice studies tended to be based on a 
macro analysis across national contexts. Kostova (1999) and Kostova and Roth 
(2002), for example, argue for ‘institutional duality’ by analysing MNCs, the 
subsidiaries of which suffer competing institutional demands from both a host 
country and its headquarters. With an emphasis on a global firm transferring its 
practices, Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013) analyse how the practices of a global 
English law firm are mediated by local institutions in Italy, such as regulations, 
norms, and cultural framework (Scott, 2008). Based on institutional duality 
(Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002), their claim is that the diverse 
practices generated by each institutional environment, rather than the 
institutions in their host and home countries, mediates ‘one firm’ applying the 
practices in England to those of Italy. This research prompts another research 
question of “how distinctive geographic logics combine and interact with other 
types of institutional logics” (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013, p920), assuming 
that geographically dominant logics are distinctive across countries. This 
distinction, albeit clearly defined, is due to either or all of societal, economic and 
cultural difference. 
 Ansari et al. (2010), meanwhile, put forward the characteristics of the 
adaptation of practice by analysing not only the demand side, such as adopters’ 
organisations, but also the supply side, diffusing practices. They argue that there 
are political, technical and cultural fits on the demand side, adopters’ 




organisations, intraorganisations, and supraorganisations where they operate. 
On the supply side, a practice can be a ‘cultural object’, “the meaning structures 
and cultural values the practice embodies” (Ansari et al., 2010, p78). Later 
Ansari et al. (2014) elaborate this cultural object in international contexts. 
Conducting empirical research, they propose a model of management practice 
adaptation by studying the transfer of a quality management practice across 
national contexts. The adaptation of ‘Achieving Competitive Excellence’ (ACE) is 
analysed in subsidiaries of a MNC in the US, Europe and Asia. It was first 
devised in the US, then transferred to Europe and Asia, bringing about political, 
technical and cultural misfits, and modifications of the practice to fit itself into 
local contexts. For example, Asian respondents accepted it without question, 
while Europeans questioned it and the US transformed it. They claim that the 
adaptation of a practice in local contexts is a necessary condition for diffusion of 
practice.  
In practice adaptation across national and cultural contexts, the cultural 
fit can be established through mutual efforts between a home country and host 
country. Canato et al. (2013) do not forget to remind us that the organisational 
cultural misfits are overcome by coerced practice implementation. Although not 
focusing on a national culture, they conclude, using the case of the 
implementation of Six Sigma in 3M, that low cultural fit can lead to a mutual 
adaptation of practice and culture. Furthermore, this depends on actors’ 
cognition of multiculturalism. These cultural misfits are treated as constraints in 
practice adaptation, strongly supporting the work of Abo (2015), who points to 
the limitations of Japanese management practices in the West. Furthermore, 




Lücke, Kostova, and Roth (2015) explore the effects of multiculturalism, using a 
cognitive perspective to explain how individual cognition interacts with its 
national contexts. In their conceptual paper, they further define five stylised 
patterns of MNC managers dealing with practices, compartmentalisation, 
integration, inclusion, convergence and generalisation.  
In institutional analysis, the cultural influence of transferring practices is 
scrutinised and evaluated in recent work (e.g., Gond and Boxenbaum, 2013; 
Cramton and Hinds, 2014). Exploring institutional work in different national 
contexts, Gond and Boxenbaum (2013) conduct two case studies where a 
responsible investment practice is transferred and transformed from the US to 
France and Quebec. They then propose three types of contextualisation of a 
practice by adopters: filtering, repurposing and coupling. Filtering concerns 
disentangling the material elements in a given context while repurposing refers 
to changes of meanings in the context. Coupling, meanwhile, refers to a 
combination of meanings and objects. These types explain how a responsible 
investment practice in the US (so-called ‘ethical investment’) is expected to solve, 
to some extent, racial, religious and consumer problems in that context, but 
cannot from French perspectives in France and Quebec. These cultural misfits 
stem not only from practice but also actors’ cognition. 
With a focus on adaptation practices across national and cultural 
contexts, the work of Cramton and Hinds (2014) demonstrates how actors adopt 
practices across national contexts. Analysing how global teams dynamically 
adapt software development practices across different national and cultural 
contexts, Cramton and Hinds (2014) propose ‘an embedded model of cultural 




adaptation in global teams’. With their dialectic model, they demonstrate how 
actors interact and adapt themselves to cultural differences among developers’ 
teams, in this case located in India, Germany and the US, and with each 
embedded in local conditions, institutions and norms.  
More recently, some scholars directly combine an institutional logics 
perspective and transferring practices across different national and cultural 
contexts. Adopting an ethnographic study about an MNC, Värlander et al. (2016), 
for instance, argue that transferring practices are recontextualised across 
geographical locations through constellations of logics. They claim that 
constellations of logics, differing by site and by practice, guide the 
recontextualisation of meaning and action in local contexts. To demonstrate this, 
they analyse three practices in software development: the 90-day cycle, 
user-centred design, and open collaborative spaces. Transferred practices are 
elaborated and analysed at three sites, the US, India and China through 
constellations of four logics, entrepreneurial, market, community and 
engineering. Each practice at each site embodies different constellations of 
logics. Given their analysis by practice and by site, they propose a two by two 
quadrant that is ‘outcome based on recontextualisation of meaning and action’. 
Within this, they introduce four types of recontextualisation: absence of 
recontextualisation; performance recontextualisation; reconstrued 
recontextualisation and radical recontextualisation. They claim that these 
recontextualisations of meanings and actions in the transferred practices are 
informed by multiple logics which are drawn from local actors. The concept of 
recontextualisation stems from Brannen (2004), who describes how when 




Disney’s theme park practices are transferred from the US to other a country, 
such as Japan and France, there is a shift from one dominant meaning to 
another one. Adopting semiotics, she characterises as recontextualisation as the 
process by which actors adapt the meanings attributed to practices in different 
contexts. 
One of Värlander et al.’s (2016)’s contributions is that their work 
demonstrates national cultural influence on institutional logics with a focus on 
transferring practices, thus responding to a recent call not only to “explain how 
and why culture influences a range of organizational processes” (Giorgi et al., 
2015, p30) in practices, but also to “better account for the role of contextual 
factors in cultural processes” (ditto, p35). In particular, each site demonstrates 
different constellations of logics. In the transfer of user-centred design, actors in 
the US enact the market logic only, while those in China additionally apply the 
engineering logic, and those in India instead use only the community logic. 
According to Värlander et al. (2016), this is not the ‘adoption’ of practices 
typically elaborated by other scholars. Kostova and Roth (2002), for example, 
explore quality management practices which are transferred from an MNC’s the 
headquarters in the US to its subsidiaries within an MNC are ‘ceremonially 
adopted’. Kostova and Roth’s (1999; 2002) studies emphasise the transfer 
process itself rather than the meanings and actions associated with practices. 
Värlander et al. (2016), in contrast, raise concerns regarding the possibility of 
universal logics by mentioning that the contents of logics themselves may not be 
free entirely from the cultural influence of a nation state. Their position echoes a 
series of articles published in the Journal of Management Inquiry 2012 which 




discussed a boundary between culture and institutional theory (i.e., Schultz, 
2012; Aten and Howard-Grenville, 2012; Hatch, 2012). The work of these 
scholars tends to clarify the existence of a relationship between culture and 
institutional theory in terms of different levels of analysis and causal 
relationships. 
To date, the influence of a national culture has been treated as static, 
rather than dynamic. In other words, the meanings attributed to logics are 
universally consistent. Moreover, the literature tends to discuss the effects of 
culture on logics and or practices across national contexts by treating national 
culture, practice and logics separately. In the next section, a compatibility and 
centrality framework is introduced in order to solve these issues related to 
agency, culture and practice in a comprehensive manner.  
 
3.3.3 A compatibility and centrality framework for institutional logics 
In order fully to understand actors’ meanings in terms of institutional logics, the 
concepts of agency, culture and practice have to be absorbed into a single 
comprehensive picture. In their conceptual paper, Besharov and Smith (2014) 
propose a two by two quadrant which clarifies four types of multiple logics within 
organisations by two dimensions, such as compatibility and centrality. 
Compatibility refers to ‘the extent to which the instantiations of logics imply 
consistent and reinforcing organisational actions’. It can be influenced by all the 
levels of analysis, such as institutional field, organisation, and individual levels. 
At the institutional level, the ‘number of professional institutions and relationship 
between them’ influence compatibility, that is compatibility is higher when 




organisational goals, not organisational actions, are consistent, and lower when 
they are inconsistent. At the organisation level, meanwhile, hiring and 
socialisation influence compatibility since they define who are in organisations 
with multiple logics, and which organisational members have been engaged. At 
the individual level, the characteristics and interdependence of organisational 
members influence compatibility because the members may have carried over 
logics in relation to their field and organisations.  
 Similarly, the dimension of centrality concerns ‘the degree to which 
multiple logics are each treated as equally valid and relevant to organisational 
functioning’. Centrality is higher when multiple logics are manifested in core 
organisational functioning and lower when a single logic manifests itself in core 
functions while other logics guide peripheral operations. For example, older 
Japanese management studies (e.g., Bhappu, 2000, Keys and Miller, 1984; 
Hatvany and Pucik, 1981), are based on high centrality in which all the logics, 
such as family, market and corporation, are manifested in a core function in a 
harmonious manner. In contrast, the ethnographic work of Kondo (1990) 
manifested low centrality in which the family logic is dominant in the core 
function although there are other logics in peripheral functions. At the 
institutional level, the power and structure of field actors influence centrality 
according to whether or not the field creates strong pressures to conform its 
organisation, (thereby determining whether organisations are fragmented or 
centralised in the field). At the organisation level, mission and strategy, and 
resource dependence, each influence centrality because they themselves 
embody logics. At the individual level, actors’ adherence to logics, and their 




relative power, influence centrality according to those actors’ individual networks 
and positions, depending on whether or not the actors are able to incorporate 
the logics that the actors embody.  
 Besharov and Smith (2014) then define the quadrant with a dotted line 
and propose four ideal types of organisations; aligned, contested, estranged, 
and dominant organisations (see figure below).  
 
Figure 1: Types of logic multiplicity within organisations (Besharov and Smith, 2014) 
 
 
 First, aligned organisations have high compatibility and high centrality 
where conflicts are minimal. This means that multiple logics cooperate and 
coexist in core functions of organisations, such as their missions, strategy, 
structure, and identity, mostly bringing about consistent expectations about 
organisational goals. This echoes what Goodrick and Reay (2011) refer to as a 
‘cooperative relationship among logics’ (see 3.2.2.1). Multiple logics shape 
consistent organisational goals in core functions, cooperating with each other. In 
reference to constellations of logics theory, ‘facilitative relationships’ and 




‘additive relationships’ as well as amplification (Greenwood et al., 2010) and 
hybrid logic (Thornton et al., 2005) are also located in this box. The early 
success of Japanisation is partially explained here (see 2.2). This type is 
elaborated further in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 Second, contested organisations have low compatibility and high 
centrality where conflicts are extensive and intractable. This means that multiple 
logics compete with themselves in core functions of the organisations, such as 
their missions, strategy, structure and identity, so bringing competing 
assumptions and expectations about organisational goals. In reference to 
constellations of logics theory, ‘competitive relationships among logics’ 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Reay and Hinings, 2009) and the concept of 
institutional complexity are located in this box (see 3.2.2.2). The work of 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) is also in this type. The studies about local 
resistance to Japanese management practices can be located here (see 2.4.2). 
This type is further discussed in chapter 7. 
 Third, estranged organisations have low compatibility and low centrality 
where conflicts are moderate, rather than extensive and intractable. This means 
that a single logic is dominant in the core functions of the organisations, yet there 
are also other competing logics in peripheral functions, meaning that effort must 
be devoted to mediating conflicts. This echoes the ceremonial aspects of ‘two 
management structures’ in that Japanese expatriates play a major role within 
organisational communities that bridge their headquarters and their subsidiaries 
(see 3.2.2.3). The boundaries of family logics limited to Japanese expatriates 
are clearly separated from local employees, although the local president and 




managers are in communication with their headquarters (Kopp, 1999) (see 
2.3.3). This is further illuminated in chapter 8.  
 Finally, dominant organisations have high compatibility and low centrality 
where conflicts do not arise. This structure is what traditional Japanese 
management studies have argued for; attributing the success of Japanese 
management to dominant organisations where family and other logics are 
harmoniously enacted without any conflict in Japanese management practices 
(e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988 and 1992; Elger and Smith, 1994 and 2005, 
Bhappu, 2000, Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and Pucik, 1981) (see 2.3.1; 
2.3.2). All these studies imply a single logic that is dominant in core functions of 
organisations and that also cooperates with other logics in peripheral operations.  
 These ideal types of organisations are useful to sort out constellations of 
logics in a comprehensive manner, yet they also provoke several concerns. First, 
the multiplicity of logics may even differ within subunits of organisations, as 
Besharov and Smith (2014) have already pointed out. This implies that each 
subunit could have different types of compatibility and centrality according to the 
functions of the subunit. Furthermore, as Besharov and Smith (2014) remind us, 
the line between the four types is depicted as a dashed lines rather than a solid 
one because “compatibility and centrality are continuous and that organisations 
can therefore exist between the ideal types” (ditto, p370). Thus these ideal types 
need to be used with caution.  
 
3.4 The enactment of corporation, market, family and religion logics  
This section aims to elaborate on what types of logics are possibly enacted 




within Japanese MNCs through the constellations of logics. Drawing on 
Friedland and Thornton’s arguments, it adds relational components of Japanese 
MNCs. From an institutional logics perspective, Japanese MNCs are 
corporations where the legitimacy of corporation logic, i.e. ‘market position’, is 
the top priority. Corporation logic concerns the ‘market position of the firm’ in 
order to ‘increase size and diversification’ (Thornton et al. 2012), and can impose 
overarching assumptions onto and within economic organisations such as 
Japanese MNCs in relation to the market and non-market logics. Important 
elements of the logics are selected: ‘root metaphor’, ‘source of legitimacy’, ‘basis 
of norms/attention/strategy’. These elements reflect how interpersonal 
relationships are interpreted in practice within the corporation: root metaphor 
and legitimacy help to characterise the interpersonal relationship of individuals 
on organisational practices while norms/attention/strategy support or connect to 
organisational goals. The table below is a summary of selected elements of 
logics from Thornton and colleagues. 
 
Table 1: The definition of institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) 
Logics Corporation Market Family Religion 
Root metaphor Corporation as 
hierarchy 










Basis of norms Employment in 
firm 




Basis of Status in Status in market Status in Relation to 





This section is broken into four sub-sections. First, the ‘family’ logic is reviewed. 
Second, the corporation logic is considered. This is the overarching logic 
because a Japanese MNC is a corporation, ‘a legal institution’ in other words. 
Third, the market logic is reviewed, and finally, the religion logic is presented.  
 
3.4.1 ‘Family’ logic: Unconditional loyalty over self-interest  
‘Family’ logic concerns “community and the motivation of human activity by 
unconditional loyalty to its members and their reproductive needs” (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991, p248). In practice, it assumes “families attempt to convert all 
social relations into reciprocal and unconditional obligations oriented to the 
reproduction of ‘family’ members. Families are not infrequently threatened when 
market-based inequalities, universal bureaucratic rules or religious differences 
become the basis of affiliation, obligation or loyalty” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, 
P249). Following this characterisation, Thornton et al. (2012) add a series of 
elements which characterise each logic. For instance, ‘unconditional loyalty’ is its 
legitimacy, ‘membership in household’ is its norm, and ‘increase family honor’ its 
strategy. In contrast to the market logic, prioritising ‘self-interest’, the ‘family’ logic 
tends to prioritise family memberships over individual interests through its 
organisational performance and code of honour.  
attention hierarchy household super natural 
















In research examining the ‘family’ logic within enterprises, ‘family’-owned 
firms tend to be a typical manifestation of ‘family’ logic and assume the blood 
relations in terms of the ownership and governance structure. Thornton et al. 
(2012) insist that family-owned firms can often be tightly integrated such that 
interpersonal relations are based on ‘unity of will, belief in trust and reciprocity’. 
Greenwood et al. (2011) specifically illustrate how ‘family’ logic operates in 
family-owned firms in Spain and how this mediates and restricts the pressure 
from the market logic. They argue that family-owned firms are less likely to 
impose layoffs than non-family owned firms, manifesting the ‘family’ logic against 
the market logic. Similarly, Chung and Luo (2008) also assume that the ‘family’ 
logic applies in family-owned firms in contrast to those owned by shareholders 
from foreign countries, and posit that this brings about distinctive forms of 
acquisition and restructuring. In general, the body of literature tends to assume 
that blood relations dictate the enactment of the ‘family’ logic in terms of the 
ownership and structure of such firms. 
Nonetheless, the ‘family’ logic is not confined only to the ownership and 
structure but is often influential among interpersonal relationships within the 
firms. Edwards et al. (2006), for instance, propose a theoretical framework of 
how low-value added (LVA) firms are owned and run by ‘family’ operated 
businesses. The ‘fraternal firm’, in their words, allows workers’ ‘participation’ 
whereby “workers’ preferences are treated seriously and that workers are not 
treated as mere factors of production” (p712). This family-like relationship is 
manifested in the cooperative relationship between employees, suppliers, and 
customers, who mutually support each other. Supporting this, Miller et al. (2009) 




argue for this cooperative relationship within ‘family’ businesses which 
eventually leads to a ‘cohesive internal community’ within the firms, bringing 
about deeper and more extensive connections with outside stakeholders. Their 
comparative research between ‘family’ businesses and non-’family’ businesses 
in high tech industries reveals that ‘family’ firms have more motivation and loyalty, 
not just from their employees but also from outside stakeholders.  
Likewise, the ‘family’ logic operating within Japanese MNCs, as in the 
family-owned firms, transposes meanings of ‘family’ norm among employees, 
suppliers and customers. For these organisations, ‘family’ logic is manifested not 
as a simple form of governance, like in family-owned firms, but as a way of 
management and of structuring interpersonal relationships, because a ‘family’ 
logic enable actors to share a common destiny (Kondo, 1990; Bhappu, 2000). 
This is not consistent with the parental altruism identified in Western ‘family’ 
firms, which refers to “a utility function that connects the welfare of one individual 
to that of others” (Karra et al., 2006, p863) rather than “a moral value that leads 
individuals to act in the interests of others without the expectations of reward or 
positive reinforcement in return” (ibid.). Instead, ‘family’ logic concerns 
‘family’-like relationships in the sense of how managers treat themselves as well 
as subordinates in the workplace. Here it prioritises collective effort, identity, and 
norms rather than individual effort, identity, and norms. 
In fact, this Japanese version of the ‘family’ logic can be quite distinctive 
from that of the Western society. This is mainly because the logic used has come 
about not only in Japanese society but also in Japanese enterprises. According 
to Bhappu (2000), the concept of the ‘family’ is historically embedded in 




merchants’ families in Japanese society. Since the Edo Period in 17th century 
Japan, the concept of the ‘family’ has functioned as a social institution because 
“the ‘ie’ is the material assets of the family, as well as its prestige, class, and 
ranking in society” (Bhappu, 2000, p410). This ‘family’ logic is assumed to be 
influential in Japanese MNCs as well as Japanese society. Furthermore, 
historically elaborating on ‘family’ logic and interpersonal relationships, Bhappu 
(2000, p413) gives a clear account of the ‘family’ in Japan:  
 
Relationships between individuals are characterized by reciprocity 
and obligation rather than obedience, with emphasis placed on the 
equivalence of ko and on. The system of pay and promotion rewards 
seniority within the organizational hierarchy. Achievement is 
secondary to trust, in keeping with the tradition of the ie. Lifetime 
employment guarantees are extended to employees as on in 
exchange for the employees' subordination, ko, to the needs of the 
organization. 
 
This articulation of the ‘family’ logic echoes a series of Japanese management 
practices oriented to harmony and collectivism (Elger and Smith, 2005). 
Furthermore, in the Japanese language, the concept of ‘ko’ and ‘on’ relationship 
is strongly implicated in the terms of ‘Oyabun’ and ‘Kobun’ (Ishino, 1953) and 
‘Ongaeshi’ which characterise interpersonal relationships. This ‘ko’ and ‘on’ 
relationship based on ‘reciprocity and obligation’ is shared with the Chinese 




‘family’ norm ‘Guanxi’ (Chung and Hamilton, 2001). These practices are 
distinctive from those of the Western approach to management (Elger and Smith, 
2005). Thus, the ‘family’ logic can be exemplified through harmony and 
collectivism oriented practices such as seniority, teamwork, long term 
employment, and sharing information. 
 In the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs, the ‘family’ logic may be 
quite different between the Asian and the Western regions. It may cause conflict 
and competitive relationships with other logics in the West, or may not operate at 
all, while it may take the form of cooperative relationships in Asia. In the Western 
regions, a ‘family’ refers to ‘a utility function’ (Karra et al., 2006), thus it may not 
coexist with the corporation, market and religion logics. Even if it does, the 
competitive relationships are expected to be identified. In contrast, the ‘family’ 
logic in Asia can enable reciprocity and obligation through the cooperative 
relationships, as in Japan. It may enable the corporation, market and religion 
logics to coexist.  
 
3.4.2 Corporation logic: Organisational hierarchies for market position 
Corporate logic originally stems from ‘democracy’, which Friedland and Alford 
(1991) assert as concerning “participation and the extension of popular control 
over humans” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p248). In practice, it assumes that 
“parliaments and electoral institutions convert the most diverse issues into 
decisions that can be made either by majority vote or consensus among 
participants, and cannot directly recognize claims of authority based on technical 
expertise or class privilege” (p249). Later on, Thornton et al. (2004; 2012) extend 




this democracy to ‘corporation’ logic. This is because they view democracy as a 
dependent variable of institutional orders of corporations, not institutional order 
itself. Rather, they argue that the corporation as ‘a legal institution’, an 
independent societal sector, has a democratic way of management within flat 
hierarchies. Thus, the corporation logic enables individual actors to acquire a 
dominant ‘market position’ as their legitimacy in order for individuals and 
organisations to raise their statuses in the hierarchy and increase the size of 
their firms. For Japanese MNCs, the corporation logic is an overarching 
assumption whereby “the person becomes an employee, which equates to being 
under the control of managers” (Thornton et al., 2012, p55). All the 
organisational practices and interpersonal relationships can be based on the 
corporation logic yet are not limited to it.  
 In the analysis of the corporations, attention was initially given less to the 
corporation than government organisations, schools, and other non-profit 
organisations, thus overlooking “the dominant organizational form: the publicly 
traded, for-profit corporation” (Suddaby et al., 2010, p1238). Instead, some 
literature discusses as part of institutional change a shift in logics between the 
profession and the corporation logic. Thornton et al. (2004; 2005), for instance, 
analyse public accounting in the US, a professional business service to 
corporations, and conclude that there is a shift from the profession logic to the 
corporation logic which led to more state regulation. The professional logic 
enabled accounting firms to sell the legitimacy of financial statements for public 
corporation. Accountants’ job is to protect ‘public trust’ of their clients. 
Nonetheless, after World War II, a consolidation of accounting firms was 




triggered by the action of the Federal Trade Commission which promoted 
competition and bidding among the accounting firms. Then, the corporation logic 
emerged to enable the accountants to sell additional services such as legal and 
management consultancy as ‘a salesman’, not ‘an auditor’.  
 In Japanese MNCs, ‘company as family’ possibly manifests the tight link 
in the cooperative relationship between the corporation and ‘family’ logics 
because ‘family’ is ‘hearth’, “signifying people who belong to the same domestic 
group” (Kondo, 1990, p121). Generating corporations’ profits is enhanced on the 
basis of reciprocal obligation among their ‘family’ members. Japanese 
management practices, such as seniority, manifest the corporation logic in 
relation to the ‘family’ logic. Nonetheless, the relationships among the logics 
need to be scrutinised in Asia and the West.  
 
3.4.3 Market logic: Individual actors’ self-interests  
Market logic concerns the “accumulation and the commodification of human 
activity” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p248). In practice, it assumes that 
“commodity producers attempt to convert all actions into the buying and selling 
of commodities that have a monetary price … capitalist firms cannot exchange 
unpriced human activities that may be rational for an organization or useful to 
individuals” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p249). Following this articulation, 
Thornton et al. (2004; 2012) explore this further: for them, ‘share price’ is its 
legitimacy, ‘self-interest’ is the basis of norms; ‘status in market’ is the basis of 
attention; ‘increase economic efficiency’ is basis of strategy. Based on the 
fundamental operation of corporation logic, market logic enables actors to 




conduct exchange of their labour and its outcome, possibly manifesting itself in 
the contract of employment and job description which confirm the commercial 
nature of the job within the corporations. It is based on an exchange of 
employees’ labour for their outcome, namely the salary they may get. Possible 
practices manifesting the market logic are an efficient organisational structure, 
roles and responsibilities, and performance appraisal and salary.  
 The current literature tends to argue for the market logic as parts of a 
shift of logics or competition among logics (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Thornton, 2002; Reay and Hinnings, 2005; Lounsbury, 2002; Greenwood et al., 
2010). For example, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) described a shift from 
professional logic to market logic at the organisational level in the publishing 
industry in the US. Professions of editorial work were replaced by the market 
logic, enabling actors to pursue economic efficiency; profit over revenue. 
Focusing on the organisational level logics, this strand in the literature describes 
a shift from professional logic to market logic which enabled organisational 
actors to increase economic efficiency and grow revenue. 
 In Japanese MNCs, ‘company as family’ possibly manifests the 
cooperative relationship between the market and ‘family’ logics because ‘family’ 
members may be constituted in the company (Kondo, 1990). Nonetheless, the 
market logic in their foreign subsidiaries may be enacted very differently 
according to different geographical locations. In the West, the self-interest of 
independent individuals in respect to the market logic may generate a 
competitive relationship with ‘family’ logic, which prioritises collective 
responsibility and collective identities. In contrast, in Asia, it may generate a 




cooperative relationship with the ‘family’ logic on the basis of the group 
orientation in Asian regions (Hofstede, 2010).  
 
3.4.4 Religion logic: Each religious faith and worship   
The religion logic as originally defined was based on Christianity. Friedland and 
Alford (1991) argued that “contemporary Christian religions attempt to convert all 
issues into expressions of absolute moral principles accepted voluntarily on faith 
and grounded in a particular cosmogony” (p249). Later on, Thornton et al. (2012) 
broadened this focus from the Christian religion, referring simply to the ‘religion’ 
logic, and seeking to extract the significance of religion in general. They add a 
root metaphor to the religion logic, ‘temple as bank’, which is legitimated by ‘faith 
and sacredness in economy and society’, although they do not clarify what the 
metaphor of ‘temple as bank’ really means. This approach implies the 
universality of institutional logic perspectives, but a universality that originates 
just from the analysis of Western society. As a critique of Thornton et al. (2012), 
Friedland (2012) questions the legitimacy of this religion with reference to the 
importance of value in logics, proposing that of religion as simply being ‘God’. It 
seems that both authors assume that the religion logic primarily concerns 
Christianity in Western society. Notwithstanding this implicit assumption, 
Thornton et al. (2012) eventually turn institutional logic perspectives forged in 
Western society into a universal framework: a set of organizing principles which 
guide actions of actors anywhere. In Asian societies, for example, other religions 
such as Buddhism and Islam are dominant, and these possibly generate 
different effects from those of Christianity. 




Granted, in empirical studies of institutional logic, the religion logic tends 
to be based on Christianity. For instance, Greenwood et al. (2010) demonstrate 
that the implicit effects of Catholicism are accompanied by the family logic 
through restricting the processes of family-owned firms in Spain. In their 
historical analysis of the restructuring small to medium-sized firms in Spain, they 
illustrate how family and regional state logics, implicitly affected by the regional 
Catholic Church, tempered the market logic. Looking more closely at individual 
actors, Thornton et al. (2012) give a good illustration of the religion logic in the 
case of Penney, a retailer in the US. The founder, Penney, attempted to instil the 
values of his religious ethics as a management philosophy named the Golden 
Rule. This rule viewed “managers and customers as the congregation – 
managers as associates and customers neighbours” (Thornton et al., 2012, 
p111). Regarding Christianity, there are two main forms, namely Protestantism 
and Catholicism. This can be the case in the classic literature of Max Weber, 
who wrote extensively on “The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism” 
(Weber, 2010). This does not elaborate on Protestantism per se but establishes 
an interplay of logics in terms of how a religion logic based on Protestantism 
enables actors to engage in a market logic based on capitalism. Accumulation of 
wealth and investment are considered as a sign of salvation in Protestantism. 
Similarly, Mutch (2009) claims that there is a complementary relationship 
between market and religion logics. Analysing the historical development of 
church governance in the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, he argues that 
practices of accountability and record keeping enforce theological beliefs among 
members, establishing a complementary relationship.  




Thornton et al. (2012) realise that there is a ‘cultural space’ which serves 
to vary and disturb the effects of institutional logics, either inside or outside of 
Western society. They suspect that the cultural conditioning of the religion logics 
produced in, for example Islam, is quite unlike that of Protestantism, and may be 
in conflict with economic capitalism. It could also be argued, for instance, that 
Buddhism may or may not be in conflict with the concepts central to Christianity. 
It is imperative that when institutionalists refer to the religion logic or logics they 
identify the strand of logic concerned and clarify precisely the religion to which 
they are referring. Summarizing the wide variety of religions into one logic may 
lead to a simplistic view of religion.  
In the studies of Japanese management, the Christian ethic cannot be 
said to apply. Rather, Confucianism alongside Buddhism and ‘Shinto’ (Japanese 
ritual observances and sacred sites) are more likely to shape Japanese values 
(e.g., Kondo, 1990). Bhappu (2000) argues for recognition of the strong 
influence of Confucianism which has historically resided in the concept of family:  
 
Whereas feudalism in Europe was based on the "rights and duties" 
defined by the relations of the lord and vassal, feudalism in China was 
based on the Confucian dominance-submission relations between the 
family patriarch and his family members. The feudal family system in 
Japan possessed some elements of the dominance-submission 
pattern found in China but also had features of the European rights 
and duties conception. Rights and duties in the Japanese family were 
learned and practiced as the concepts of ko and on - ko referring to 




duty to parents and on referring to the reciprocal obligations between 
family members. (p410) 
 
This Japanese version of Confucianism has been historically dominant and was 
also included in the Meiji Civic Code which marked a shift from the Samurai era 
to the Meiji Restoration. The educational policy of the code, The Imperial 
Rescript on Education, gave Confucian teachings the top priority as the historical 
assets of the Japanese Emperors, thereby raising the importance of Confucian 
values: respect for elders and parents and harmony within the social group. In 
modern management practices, this emphasises ‘patience’, ‘the respect of 
elders’, ‘upholding the family’ (Beechler and Bird, 1999), possibly replacing 
Christian faith and worship with one’s relationship with one’s surrounding people. 
It is doubtful, therefore, to assume that ethics represented by the Christian faith 
exist in the same way in the relational contexts where Confucianism is dominant.  
Similarly, the tenets of Christian faith and worship may not be useful in 
contexts where Buddhism is dominant. This is simply because faith in 
Christianity is based on the existence of God but this is not the case in Buddhism. 
Buddhism does not have a concept of God as the world creator, but instead has 
‘karma’ – the cause and effect relationship constituting the world. For instance, in 
Thailand, where Theravada Buddhism is dominant, Atmiyanandana and Lawler 
(2003) point out that:  
 
Buddhists believe that karma (the sum of both good and bad deeds 




one achieves during life) helps determine one’s next life and most 
Thais seem concerned mainly with achieving a good ‘next life’ rather 
than the blissful state of nirvana… The centrality of Buddhism means 
that values associated with acquiring positive karma (merit), such as 
kindness towards others, particularly the less fortunate, has a strong 
influence on managerial behaviour: the ideal Thai leader is seen as 
more of a benevolent father than an autocrat. (p234)   
 
In this sense, it may be fair to say that attention in Buddhism may be oriented 
more to surrounding people rather than God. Furthermore, Buddhism in general 
assumes an endless cycle of death and rebirth while Christianity a one-off cycle 
of birth and death, representing transition to an eternal life. This cultural space 
for the religion logic needs to be considered.  
 In the foreign subsidiaries in Japanese MNCs, the religion logic may 
exist very differently in Asia and the West, where there is a wide variety of 
religions. In Asia, the religion logic may generate cooperative relationships with 
other logics because of the dominant Buddhism and Confucianism. In contrast, 
in the West, this religion logic enables actors to see individuals express 
themselves within the collective rather than the individual (e.g., Hofstede, 2010). 
Similarly, another study points out the effects of the religion logic which flows 
from Buddhism and Confucianism (Dollinger, 1988) and their role in building the 
ethics of Japanese management. Japanese management practices, in fact, 
concern ‘keiretsu’ (conglomerates), seniority, and long term employment, all 
based somewhat on collectivism. In the West, this may not be the case. In 




Western society, Christianity in general is closely associated with individualism in 
terms of the relationship to God. Thus, the religion logic is deeply rooted in the 
geographical community of a host country compete and cooperate with other 
factors such as the ‘family’, corporation, and market logics at Japanese MNCs.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a conceptual framework for studying practices 
across the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC. As a point of departure, the 
institutional logic approach (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, (2004); 
Thornton et al., 2012) was reviewed. Constellations of logics (Goodrick and 
Reay, 2011) were further identified in order to characterise how practices in a 
Japanese MNC can be conducted and interpreted. These are composed of 
cooperative as well as competitive relationships among logics. The cooperative 
relationship implies a “win-win” of multiple logics while the competitive 
relationship implies the “victory” of one logic in exchange for the “defeat” of 
another. This also raises possible ceremonial aspects through the boundaries of 
logics because of the dominant Japanese organisational communities within 
Japanese MNCs. In addition, the relationality is considered in the constellations 
of logics because what makes logics cooperative as well as competitive is actors 
in their contexts in Asia and the West, in that logics are rooted in their 
‘geographical communities’ (Lounsbury, 2007). Across the foreign subsidiaries of 
a Japanese MNC, geographical locations possibly affect constellations of logics 
in given practices. This implies that, in the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC, 
actors interpret and act in various ways according to their relational contexts in 




their host countries. Friedland and Alford (1991) raise the possibility that the 
relationality between actors in a Japanese MNC may be guided by different 
logics than those in the Western society where the institutional logics 
perspective was developed. This echoes the ‘cultural space’ in logics proposed 
by Thornton et al. (2012).  
Recent concepts and frameworks further advance the theory of 
constellations of logics in different international contexts. At the individual level, 
negotiation among actors is elaborated as competing logics (McPherson and 
Sauder, 2013), illuminating three types of structural constraints: procedural, 
definitional and positional constraints. In each national context, different 
constellations of logics are illuminated (Värlander et al., 2016), providing a 
dynamic view of logics, national culture and practice. Furthermore, the types of 
constellations of logics can be defined into four ideal types of organisations with 
logic multiplicity using Besharov and Smith’s (2014) compatibility and centrality 
framework. Compatibility refers to the extent to which multiple logics enable 
consistent organisational action while centrality refers to the extent to which 
multiple logics are equally treated and relevant to organisational functions. The 
two dimensions are expected to sort out the issues relating to agency, culture 
and practice in terms of the constellations of logics. 
Given the constellations of logics, ‘family’, corporation, market and 
religion are identified and elaborated. In particular, non-market logics such as 
‘family’ and religion are identified as areas of focus. The family logic is rooted in 
Japanese society where Japanese management practices are born and raised. 
The family logic in Japanese management does not depend upon whether or not 




a company is owned by a family. Rather, it operates among the interpersonal 
relationships between management and employees, as reciprocal ko on 
relationships within a firm, characterizing the ‘company as family’ (Kondo, 1990). 
Lifetime employment, teamwork and consensus-orientation are closely 
associated with the family logic. The religion logic, in respect to Confucianism, is 
a secondary feature of Japanese management practices. Its priorities include 
respect for elders and this is echoed through a tendency for promotion by 
seniority. The market and corporation logics remain the overarching logics 
among Japanese MNCs and are fundamental to viewing their economic 
activities. These logics are targeted to characterise and interpret practices in a 
Japanese MNC. They are deeply rooted in geographical communities in the 
subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs.  
 In the next chapter, the research method is discussed and the 
characteristics of logics are further defined in actors conducting practices.  
  




 Research Design and Method Chapter 4:
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to identify the research design and justify the research 
methods in order to answer the research questions. It is organised into three 
sections: research design and methods. First, the research design is identified 
and elaborated. Second, the research method is specified and elaborated. In a 
concluding section, the need for a comparative ethnographic case study is 
justified and confirmed in line with the research methods. 
 
4.2 Research design 
This section aims to discuss and identify the research design. It is divided into 
three sub-sections. First, the ontology and epistemology of institutional logics 
are defined with practice theory. Second, the purpose and type of research are 
discussed. Finally, the cases are selected. The subsidiaries in ‘JapanCo’ are 
identified in Asia and the West, allowing an understanding of the subjectively 
created social world through constellations of logics.  
 
4.2.1 Considering ontology and epistemology: Constellations of logics 
and practice theory 
Constellations of logics comprise multiple logics in play as ‘a set of material 
practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organizing principles’ 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991, p248). They have been considered to be socially 
constructed from the views of earlier institutional researchers, such as Zucker 




(1977) and Meyer and Rowan (1977). Berger and Luckman (1966) presume that 
what is to be ‘rational’ is socially constructed rather than existing independently 
‘out there’. Later on, other institutionalists, such as Zilber (2002; 2006), 
emphasised a social constructionist approach by stating the ‘social becoming’ of 
individual actors. Following this social constructionist tradition, Thornton et al. 
(2012, p10) assert that “[b]y material aspects of institutions, we refer to 
structures and practices; by symbolic aspects, we refer to ideation and meaning, 
recognizing that the symbolic and the material are intertwined and constitutive of 
one another.” This type of constructionist approach does not help one to 
understand the cultural meanings of practices in depth, however, because it 
parallels a positivistic approach which aims to define institutional logics as a 
social reality ‘out there’ through pursuing objective ‘social facts’, such as 
quantitative analysis (e.g., Thornton 2004) and clear detailed definitions (e.g., 
Thornton et al., 2012). 
 As a serious attempt to understand how actors make sense of the social 
world within Japanese MNCs, interpretive epistemology is considered. This 
focuses on an understanding of how individual actors make sense of ‘the world 
as it is’, which is ‘the subjectively created social world’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, 
p28). From a basis in constructionist ontology, interpretive epistemology focuses 
on actors’ subjective interpretations of practices and their shared intersubjective 
reality. Here, attention is given to an “‘interpretive understanding of social action’ 
rather than social forces” external to it (Bryman and Bell, 2011), thereby allowing 
an understanding of the cultural meanings of practices.  
 Furthermore, ‘practice theory’ (Giddens, 1984) is combined with an 




institutional logic approach, subsuming all the levels of analysis, such as 
individuals, organisations and society (Friedland and Alford, 1991) into a 
comprehensive concept of ‘practices’ as an “ongoing series of practical activities” 
(Giddens, 1976, p81). Giddens (1984, p2) further asserts that the concept “is 
neither the experiences of individual actor, nor any form of societal totality, social 
practices ordered through time and space”. Here, practices are not conceived as 
a mere additional unit of analysis but as a micro-cosmos which is expected to 
reveal multiple logics in play through constellations of logics. In fact, Thornton et 
al. (2012), albeit presenting practice theory, still seem to conceive practices as 
mere ‘tangible focal points’ of logics, thereby assuming that the locus of 
practices can provide a mere link between social structures and individual and 
organisational actions. This view obviously retains a residue of positivism and 
objectivism in the institutional logic approach, and thus emphasises the 
significance of social structure over that of human agency.  
Indeed, the combination between the institutional logics approach and 
practice theory is a newly emerging approach, now beginning to be labelled the 
‘practice turn’ (Schatzki et al., 2001) and more lately, the ‘practice bandwagon’ 
(Corradi et al., 2010). Lawrence et al. (2011) further elaborated practices as 
‘both intentional and unintentional outcomes’ in the ‘everyday getting by of 
individuals’. Yet, much institutional logic literature, like the work of Thornton and 
colleagues, treats organisational fields and society as an objective reality which 
can be achieved through positivistic methods. Interpretive constructionism with 
practice theory is expected to illuminate the institutional life of a Japanese MNC 
regarding how individual actors make sense of practices through constellations 




of logics.  
 
4.2.2 Purpose and type of research: Comparative ethnographic case 
study 
The purpose of this research is to understand cultural meanings of practices 
through constellations of logics across Asia and the West within a Japanese 
MNC. In order to understand cultural meanings in depth, a comparative 
ethnographic case study is adopted. Each of these terms, such as comparative, 
ethnographic, case is justified. 
First, the research is a case study. Abercrombie et al. (2000, p41) define 
a case study as “the detailed examination of a single example of a class of 
phenomena”. Thomas (2004, p127) also asserts that “the case study aims for 
the intensive examination of one of a smaller number of instances of the units of 
interest”. This ‘detailed’ and ‘intensive’ examination of institutional complexity is 
central to the research. Furthermore, my research question concerning 
constellations of logics well suits the purpose of case studies as Yin (2003, p9) 
clarifies that “‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to 
the use of case studies … as the preferred research strategies”.   
 Second, the research is also ‘ethnographic’ in the sense that it adopts ‘at 
home ethnography’ (Alvesson, 2009) to understand how actors make sense of 
practices in the subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC. Ethnography, in general, is 
referred to as the “intensive empirical investigation of everyday lived cultural 
reality” (Foley, 2002, p472). It investigates ‘people in places’ (Zussman, 2004) 
with a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973). Here, ‘at home ethnography’ (Alvesson, 




2009) refers to “a study and a text in which the researcher-author describes a 
cultural setting to which s/he has a ‘natural access’ and in which s/he is an active 
participant, more or less on equal terms with other participants” (p159). This is 
not a traditional ethnography which originally stemmed from anthropology. Yet, it 
is being applied to organisation studies and sociology.  
Although ethnography appears well-suited to understanding cultural 
meanings through constellations of logics, it has several serious drawbacks in 
terms of the process of conducting research, such as “being time consuming, 
often personally tiring, and stressful to carry out” (Alvesson, 2009, p158). The 
period of a PhD is limited so does not allow multiple ethnographic studies across 
Asia and the West which would consume even more time. In fact, Alvesson 
criticises conventional ethnography as ‘uneconomical’. ‘At home ethnography’, 
which “draws attention to one’s own cultural context, what goes on around 
oneself rather than putting oneself and one’s experiences in the centre” (p160), 
helps to reveal what cultural meanings are embodied in a Japanese MNC. In a 
nutshell, it is more economical and practical than a conventional ethnography. 
Thus, the ‘at home ethnography’ method is adopted. 
 Finally, the research is also a comparative case study with emphasis on 
actors’ subjective interpretations. The thick description of a single case may be 
confined to the specific case and contexts, which may limit the validity of the 
research. Thus, it is critically important to compare and contrast cultural 
meanings of practices across Asia and the West. In a sense, a comparative case 
study is essential to make constellations of logics ‘open to interpretation’ 
(Voronov et al., 2013) across different geographical locations. This is rather 




consistent with the interpretive approach which concerns how actors make 
sense of practices within a Japanese MNC; and how practices are being 
interpreted rests on different actors in Asia and the West. The study helps to 
reveal multiple complex cultural meanings by comparing and contrasting 
meanings themselves across Asia and the West.  
Thus, a comparative ethnographic case study is adopted for the 
research which allows cultural meanings to be compared and contrasted through 
constellations of logics.  
 
4.2.3 Selecting cases: A Japanese MNC and its the subsidiaries 
My case selection is based on the large size of multinational Japanese 
manufacturers whose headquarters are located in Japan and whose overseas 
subsidiaries operate across multiple countries. The units of the cases are sales 
offices located across overseas regions, preferably North America, Asia and the 
EU. Candidate industries are automotive, equipment and industrial 
manufacturers.  
Given these criteria, ‘JapanCo’, a pseudonym, is selected. JapanCo is 
actually one of the clients whom my father, as a management consultant and 
coach, has taught for more than two decades. As a son of his, as well as a 
management consultant, I often assisted him and took part in his seminars in 
corporate training programmes at JapanCo. In a sense, I am not a ‘professional 
stranger’ (Agar, 1986) since I have known some managers in this company for 
more than seven years. I am familiar with their management issues through 
interaction with my father and them. Some of them have known me more than a 




decade since they often came to my home when I was young. With my father, I 
sometimes had dinners and lunches with them and advise them on management 
issues. As an ‘at home ethnographer’, I had a ‘natural access’ in JapanCo at the 
beginning of this research. 
 My identity in relation to others is confirmed according to participants’ 
interpretations. A Japanese Managing director (MD) in JapanCo in Thailand 
(JTHAI) made use of me as a management consultant by requiring practical 
advice from me. Another Japanese MD in JapanCo Taiwan (JTAIW), albeit 
well-acquainted with me for more than seven years, treated me as an academic 
researcher. During the first interview on site, he seriously questioned whether 
JHQ had formally accepted my research or not. Another Japanese MD in 
JapanCo EU (JEU) asked me to make a presentation in front of top 
management in JapanCo’s headquarters (JHQ) in order to deliver what the 
subsidiary actually look like. This tendency to perceive me more as a 
management consultant than a researcher needs to be paid attention to 
throughout the process of data collection and analysis. 
JapanCo is a large industrial manufacturer in Japan with a revenue of 
about 200 billion Japanese Yen, which is equal to about 1.1 billion pounds 
sterling (one pound equal to 180 Yen). The number of employees is about 9,700 
across JapanCo groups, including all the affiliates and overseas sales offices. It 
owns 12 major overseas sales offices across Asia, Europe and North America 
and overseas revenue consists around 10% of total JapanCo group revenue. Of 
these subsidiaries, four are selected for this study: they are Thailand, Taiwan, 
Belgium and the US. The selection criterion was to identify subsidiaries in 




different regions which were initiated with greenfield investment, rather than 
through merger and acquisition. There are only two subsidiaries meeting these 
criteria in Western countries, namely Belgium and the US, so both of these are 
automatically selected. In Asia, there are varieties of Japanese ways of doing 
business in each subsidiary according to a pilot study in JHQ. In order to capture 
varieties, Thailand and Taiwan were selected. JTHAI (JapanCo Thailand) is 
managed in a very Japanese way while JTAIW (JapanCo Taiwan) is managed in 
a more Chinese way. Thus, the subsidiaries of JapanCo group in Asia, Europe 
and America are: JTHAI (JapanCo Thailand); JTAIW (JapanCo Taiwan); JEU 
(JapanCo Europe); JapanCo America (JUSA).  
 
4.3 Research method 
In line with this comparative ethnographic case study approach, this section 
aims to identify the specific research methods. It is divided into four sections. 
First, the stages of the research are presented. Second, the means of data 
collection are discussed. Third, data analysis and presentation are elaborated. 
Finally, validity is evaluated.  
 
4.3.1 Six stages of research  
This research is divided into six stages, although these are not mutually 
exclusive in a strict way because the data collection and analysis are conducted 
iteratively. Overall, the stages are as follows:  
 
1st stage: Pilot study in the headquarters (Data collection and analysis) 




2nd stage: Data analysis and literature review 
3rd stage: Data collection and analysis in two cases (JTHAI and JTAIW) 
4th stage: Data analysis and literature review 
5th stage: Data collection and analysis in another two cases (JEU and JUSA) 
6th stage: Data analysis and writing up  
 
The 1st stage is a pilot study in the headquarters of JapanCo, which was 
conducted at the beginning of 2012. Corporate strategy and organisational 
culture were discussed with the main contacts and the subsidiaries were 
identified and the site visits arranged. Necessary materials, such as a corporate 
history book, PR magazines and IR materials were collected. Six interviews 
were conducted to confirm the existence of Japanese management practices 
and how they were employed.  
The 2nd stage of data analysis and literature review was conducted in the 
middle of 2012. Given the information acquired, it was possible to identify that 
institutional theory could be useful to analyse the complex cultural meanings of 
practices within JapanCo.  
The 3rd stage was data collection and analysis in Asia (JTHAI and 
JTAIW) from the middle of 2012. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews 
and participant observations were conducted. Forty-one interviews were 
conducted across various positions from top to bottom and two official meetings 
and two days of seminars were observed as a participant. In addition, lunches 
and dinners were taken together with organisational members. Details of the 
numbers of interviews, and the titles of the participants, are provided in the next 





The 4th stage was data analysis and literature review from the middle of 
2012 to the middle of 2013. Content analysis was employed. The data was 
initially coded into three broad frames: the subsidiary’s history, strategy and 
structure; views of Japanese expatriates; and views of local employees. Both 
sites were compared and contrasted in order to generate data as well as various 
cultural meanings of practices. Then, an institutional logic approach was 
employed in the data analysis through direct quotes of the meanings of the 
‘family’, religion, market and corporation logics. This frame was later revised in 
practice because there were no coherent interpretations from Japanese and 
local employees.  
The 5th stage was data collection in the other two cases (JEU and JUS), 
from the middle of 2013. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews and 
participant observations were again conducted. Thirty interviews were 
conducted across various positions from top to bottom and one official meeting 
was observed as a participant. In addition, lunches and dinners were taken with 
members of the organisations.  
The 6th stage was data analysis and writing up. The code framework was 
revised and fixed as three broad categories of practices: customer development; 
work and employment; and work organisation. The four cases were compared 
and contrasted to illuminate the different cultural meanings embodied in 
practices. Additional observations were conducted in management meetings.  
 




4.3.2 Data collection 
4.3.2.1 Semi-structured and open-ended interviews 
In order to understand cultural meanings through constellations of logics, 
semi-structured and open-ended interviews were adopted as the main data 
collection method. As an interviewer, it was necessary to be reflexive in asking 
questions freely about the meanings of multiple logics. This approach also alters 
the role of the interviewer from being a simple data collector to an active and 
reflective agent (Mason, 2002). The researcher is active in the sense of 
examining and actively interacting with the meaning of the topic in the interviews, 
and reflective in the sense of reflecting on the researchers’ position and those of 
the participants. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews made it possible to 
interact with interviewees by asking various questions according to the 
comments of the respondents, while also reflecting on my role, such as being a 
consultant as well as an academic researcher, and a participant. This allows one 
to understand cultural meanings as part of the subjectively created social world.  
Furthermore, semi-structured and open-ended interviews necessarily 
promote such self-reflexivity among research topics and help in the elaboration 
of constellations of logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns” 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p804). Baker, 2004 (p131) assert that “the process 
of interviewing is better described not as data ‘collection’, but rather as data 
‘making’ or data ‘generation”. This is also because “interviewing is understood as 
an interactional event in which members draw on their cultural knowledge … and 
interview responses are treated as accounts more than reports” (Baker, 2004, 
p131). Thus, in the interviews, Japanese management practices and their 




meanings are directly asked. The sample parts of the interview questions were 
as follows: 
 
-Are there any Japaneseness or Japanese management practices here? If so, 
what are they, and how are they being employed? 
-Are these practices being implemented and interpreted as in Japan? If so, how? 
-Are there norms of family behind these practices? If so, what are they and how 
are they being interpreted? 
 
These questions further help an interviewer to be flexible in asking various 
questions according to comments from the respondent. As Miller and Glassner 
(1997, p104) point out, “a strength of qualitative interviewing is precisely its 
capacity to access self-reflexivity among interview subjects, leading to the 
greater likelihood of the telling of collective stories.” 
 Self-reflexivity is employed to prevent potentially distorting interview data. 
Thomas (2004: p151) specifies that “what matters is not that the same words are 
used, or that questions are presented in the same order, but that the questioner 
and questioned share the same frame of reference and understand the 
meanings of their communication in the same ways”. An inconsistent frame of 
reference for both respondents and interviewers may potentially distort interview 
data. In this case, my experience as a management consultant in JapanCo was 
very helpful to understand cultural meanings in the specific context of JapanCo. 
Otherwise, the issue may be not only the frame of reference but also the order of 
questions and recent experiences. According to Bryman (2008), interviewers 




have a series of questions in their frame of reference, but can vary the sequence 
of questions, and ask additional questions depending on the significance of 
replies. In a sense, this self-reflexivity is especially important for conducted 
across different geographical contexts where the first language of informants 
may be neither Japanese nor English.  
The self-reflexivity is further employed in terms of the position of the 
researcher in relation to respondents. My identity from the respondents’ 
perspectives could be either as a management consultant, who seems to have a 
link to management in the headquarters, or an academic researcher who just 
seeks to collect data for his thesis. On the one hand, as a management 
consultant, I was actually asked to advise how to manage local employees by 
the managing director in JTHAI. Likewise, I was also encouraged, as well as 
politically used by the president in JEU, to make a presentation regarding my 
findings in front of top management in JHQ, although I have not yet made this 
presentation or received a formal request to present it as of the day of the 
submission of this research. In some interviews with some participants, I found 
that my position as a consultant made the participants rather defensive in 
respect to my questions. On the other hand, as an academic researcher, I was 
treated simply as a PhD student who just wanted to pursue data for its academic 
interest, and thus was not really welcome in some interviews. In the beginning of 
an interview, a Japanese president was deeply sceptical about my site visit and 
directly asked me whether my research was formally accepted by JHQ. 
Therefore, the researcher’s position and those of its respondents are constantly 
reflected. 




 Targeted interviewees were local employees and Japanese expatriates, 
with positions ranging from top executives to non-managerial employees. Since 
job titles varied for essentially the same functions, the table below provides a 
comparison of actual job titles and functions.  
 
Table 2: Table of actual job titles and their functions 
Functions  Actual job titles  
Top management 
 
Managing director (MD), president, director, vice 
president (VP) 
Middle management Manager, senior manager, assistant manager 
Non managerial position Sales, secretary, accountant, etc. 
 
The main contacts in each subsidiary were all Japanese expatriates. The order 
of interviews was first the main contacts, usually Japanese top management, 
and then local employees. Interviews with Japanese expatriates included facts 
about subsidiaries as well as their interpretations and meanings. Interviews with 
local employees focused on specific practices according to the interviewees’ 
position.  
It should be noted that most of the interviewees are male and that this, to 
some extent, influences the research outcomes. During the interviews in each 
subsidiary, there were only a few female interviewees, meaning that some of the 
interviewees’ responses are based on male oriented perspectives: interviewees’ 
tendency to say ‘salesmen’ instead of ‘saleswomen’, ‘my men’ instead of ‘my 
subordinates’, and ‘a father and his son’ relationship. In particular, a family 




relationship is often exemplified through the term ‘a father and his son’, not ‘a 
mother and her daughter’. In the targeted four subsidiaries, all the presidents 
and MDs are male, with almost all the sales directors being male except for one 
female director in JTHAI. Upon reflection, out of the total interviews, around 
twelve interviewees are female, given the fact that there are a few female 
respondents in each subsidiary. They are, in general, sales assistants, 
secretaries, accountants, and managers in HRM and finance functions. In 
practice, these male dominated perspectives do not distort or change the 
research outcomes. Rather they are likely to represent the male oriented society 
in Japan (e.g., Kondo, 1990; Hofstede, 2010). In particular, the perspectives are 
supported by the work of Hofstede (2010) which argues for a high masculinity as 
a cultural dimension in Japan in comparison with that of other countries. Even 
some female informants especially in JTHAI and JTAIW characterise some 
managers as ‘a father’, not as ‘a mother’. These, therefore, are supposed to 
show an actors’ shared intersubjective reality.   
In total, eighty-three interviews were conducted and transcribed into 
Japanese for the Japanese expatriates and into English for local employees. 
The length of the interviews was normally one hour or several hours at a 
maximum. A full list of interviews is provided in the appendix.  
 
4.3.2.2 Participant observation 
Participant observation was adopted as another data collection method. These 
terms are strongly associated with each other and thus are hard to distinguish 
itself from ethnography (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In fact, participant observation 




goes beyond the simple act of observation. In the context of at home 
ethnography, participant observation is rather rephrased as ‘observing 
participant’ in the sense that the “participant comes first and is only occasionally 
complemented with observation in a research-focused sense” (Alvesson, 2009, 
p159). This is somewhat true because JapanCo is a corporation with which I 
have been familiar through my father’s business, so participant observation is 
adopted. Furthermore, participant observation is helpful to avoid the possibility of 
distorting interview data by misunderstanding the surrounding contexts of the 
interviews. Hence, participant observation is discussed here as a means of data 
collection.  
 Participant observation occurs in both formal and informal settings: 
corporate seminars, regular meetings, and lunches and dinners. With my 
father’s help, I luckily got the chance to attend and present in his corporate 
seminars in JTHAI. This took place over two days in Bangkok. Participants were 
sales directors and managers. Furthermore, during my stay at each subsidiary, I 
had lunches and dinners with participants every day. In a casual manner, I was 
requested to advise them about some managerial issues at each subsidiary. 
This complements the weaknesses discussed in interviews, reminding me of the 
surrounding contexts of the interviewees. It also helped to employ self-reflexivity 
between the topics and the researcher’s positions. Thirty-one events were 
observed. A full list of events for participant observation is provided in the 
appendix. 
 





As a supplementary method of data collection, public and some internal 
documents were used. These mainly support an understanding of the 
surrounding contexts of constellations of logics in each subsidiary, rather than 
the constellations of logics themselves. The main documents used were public 
documents, such as investor relationship reports and presentations. Another 
document was a book called ‘100 years of the history of JapanCo’, which 
describes the whole history of the company from its foundation up to 2012 in 549 
pages. Another document was country presentations, being made for reporting 
to JHQ from the subsidiaries. Others were internal documents regarding 
corporate strategy and marketing in each subsidiary, internal ‘JapanCo group 
PR magazine’, and a published book by a former CEO of JapanCo, 
‘OldJapanCo strategic management’. A full list of documents is given in the 
appendix.  
 
4.3.3 Data analysis and presentation 
As an ethnographer, from the beginning of data collection, I started to analyse 
data by observing, interviewing, advising, and recording events. Put differently, 
all events are apparently interpretive opportunities to understand cultural 
meanings through constellations of logics. My presupposed knowledge about 
JapanCo and Japanese management practices, which I acquired from 
interaction with organisational members and my father, as well as through my 
professional career, greatly influenced what data was selected and interpreted. 
Given my focus on cultural meanings of practices, this might influence what I 




saw and failed to see, meaning that some events might be inappropriately 
selected over others. An event without apparent conflict or cooperation between 
cultural meanings might have unintentionally less attention paid to it. This 
contrasts the way of grounded theory, which assumes that data ‘stands alone’ 
before the data analysis. 
A large quantity of textual data from interviews and formal transcribed 
meetings was coded by broad categories of practices. CAQDAS (Computer 
aided qualitative data analysis software) was initially considered but later 
dismissed as a data analysis tool because the interviews were conducted in two 
languages, Japanese and English. Besides, the use of a software tool may serve 
to alienate the researcher from the lived reality, possibly weakening the merits of 
comparative ethnographic case study (e.g., Kelle, 2004). All the data was 
therefore manually and iteratively analysed and connected and disconnected to 
constellations of logics where multiple institutional logics manifest as ‘motives 
and vocabularies’ of institutional logics and their cultural meanings. 
From the beginning of this research, the coding framework evolved 
continuously. In the 1st stage of the research when the pilot study in JHQ was 
conducted, coding was done in broad categories for each subsidiary: its history, 
strategy and structure; its sales activities; actions of Japanese expatriates; and 
reactions of local employees. This was because the subjectively created world 
might be expected to be coherent at some degree within each group of 
Japanese expatriates and of local employees. In the 2nd stage of the research 
where data analysis and literature review were conducted, the concept of ‘family’ 
emerged in relation to Japanese management practices, such as cooperation, 




team work, and life time employment. From the current literature explaining 
conflicts between Japanese expatriates and local employees (e.g., Elger and 
Smith, 1994 and 2005; Kopp, 1999), actions and interpretations of both actors 
were expected to be distinctive and central to data analysis. Then, in the 3rd 
stage of this research where data was collected on the first two subsidiaries, 
JTHAI and JTAIW, a coding was considered on the basis of how the concept of 
‘family’ is interpreted by both groups of actors: Japanese and locals. In the 4th 
stage of the research, given the data analysis of JTHAI and JTAIW and the 
further literature review on Japanese management practices and institutional 
theory, the norm of ‘family’, although varying, was assumed to remain. Then, a 
coding framework was putatively established with four themes: a subsidiary’s 
history, strategy, and structure; its sales activities, and the views of both 
Japanese and locals. The first two themes are more factual and based on actors’ 
actions while the second is more based on actors’ interpretations, although this 
distinction is not clear cut (see the table 3).




Table 3: Initial coding framework (in Thailand and Taiwan) 
Themes   Codes Contents of codes 
Its history, strategy, and 
structure 
- Relation to Japanese customers 
- Sales and marketing strategy 
- Organisational structure 
- Actions against Japanese customers locally 
- Descriptions of customer development  
- Descriptions of organisational structures  
Its sales activities  - Pressure from JHQ 
- Two management structures 
- Roles of Japanese expatriates 
- Artefacts and workplace layout 
- Actions and directions from JHQ:  
- Descriptions of two groups: Japanese and locals 
- Descriptions of roles of Japanese expatriates 
- Descriptions of office layout and its artefacts 
Views of Japanese 
expatriates 
- Interests and identities 
- Sales pressures from JHQ 
- Teamwork as family work 
- Norms and social manner 
- Their frustrations and irritations 
- Interpretations of their interests and identities 
- Interpretations of JHQ’s directions 
- Interpretations of teamwork and the term of family 
- Interpretations of norms and social manner 
- Interpretations of their sales and other activities  
Views of local 
employees 
- Interests and identities 
- Acceptance or rejection of teamwork  
- Team as family or something else 
- Compromise and resistance 
- Religious aspects 
- Interpretations of their interests and identities 
- Interpretations of Japanese management practices 
- Interpretations of teamwork and the term of family 
- Interpretations of their sales and other activities 
- Interpretations of their religion  




 In the 5th and 6th stage of the research where data collection and 
analysis of JEU and JUSA were undertaken, this framework was found to be 
inadequate in relation to the purpose of the research. The concept of ‘family’, as 
initially assumed, turned out to be little observed among the local employees, in 
contrast to the situation at JTHAI and JTAIW. In addition, the actions and 
interpretations of Japanese and locals were found to be quite complex with no 
clear cut distinction between Japanese and locals, indeed with variations even 
between and within them. Furthermore, two external organisations which greatly 
affect the existence of Japanese management practices were identified: 
customers locally and JHQ (the headquarters). In addition, ‘practice theory’ 
(Giddens, 1984) was identified as a means to subsume actors’ actions and 
interpretations at all the levels of analysis (individuals, organisations and society) 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991), although the practices are not conducted equally 
across the subsidiaries. These practices are driven by three forces: that of JHQ, 
of customers, and of a president in each subsidiary. Thus, three categories were 
identified to include broad practices in the coding framework: customer 
development, work and employment, and work organisation. The practices in 
customer development were influenced by and derived from customers locally, 
while those of the work organisation were influenced by JHQ, and those of work 
and employment by the upper management levels in each subsidiary, without 
direct influence from customers and JHQ (see table 4 below). 
 




Table 4: Final coding framework  
Themes  Codes Contents of code 
Customer development - Study group  
 
- On-the-job training  
- Sales follow-up 
 
- Weekly study group for salesmen to understand 
products 
- Any training, advice, and even social events  
- Contacting, proposal, negotiating with 
customers . 
Work and employment   - Job delegation 




- Delegating, monitoring, and evaluating 
- Sales incentives, promotion, and evaluation, 
seniority for wage, etc. 
- Social events, such as dinner, lunch, party, 
company trip, etc.  
Work organisation - Communicating expatriate evaluation 
with JHQ 
- Communicating business results with 
JHQ 
- Communicating locals’ complaints 
with JHQ 
- Japanese evaluation for Japanese and local 
evaluation for locals 
- Quarterly review and business update to JHQ by 
Japanese and the local  





Finally, in each of the empirical chapters 6, 7, and 8, meaningful practices are 
selected to illustrate constellations of logics and their coding in a vivid manner.   
 One problem I encountered in the interviews is the interpretation of the 
terms used due to the fact that the interviewees’ frame of reference differed from 
mine. Normally, I started by asking interviewees what Japaneseness exists and 
why they are Japanese. This expects me to elaborate practices manifesting the 
‘family’ logic in their frame of reference. In the actual interviews, however, I was 
instead sometimes asked by the interviewees what Japaneseness is in my 
interpretation. In that case, I had to start to share my understanding of Japanese 
management practices, which are highly likely to manifest the ‘family’ logic 
through collectivism, teamwork, organisational harmony, and intensive 
socialisation. Bell and Willmott (2014) mention that this can be an issue related 
to ‘action frame of reference’ as Silverman (1970) reminds us that “people act in 
terms of their own and not the observer’s definition of the situation” (p37). Thus, 
continuously employing self-reflexivity, I tried to continue to build a consistent 
frame of reference between interviewees and myself during the interviews. At 
the last stage of writing up the research, through data analysis, the detailed 
definitions of the logics embodied by the practices were finally identified in tables 
(see 6.1). 
 Data is presented as a result of interactions with my supervisors, 
colleagues, and conference attendances. Granted, I collected data and brought 
my own findings to them but translated them into their presentation in this thesis 
in the light, primarily, of feedback from my supervisors. This eventually 
conditioned how my findings are presented. Initially, my research was planned to 
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be Japanese management studies adopting institutional logics. As my research 
went through constant feedback from my supervisors, the cultural meanings of 
the Japanese management practices turned out to be main focus. In particular, 
the work of Kondo (1990) was studied at a Cardiff Organisation Research Group 
(CORGies) meeting on the 29th January 2014, and this greatly influencing my 
studies in terms of understanding how actors make sense of practices, rather 
than simply explaining what makes the practices.  
 
4.3.4 Evaluating validity 
Based on positivism, quantitative research is traditionally evaluated by the 
criteria of validity, reliability and generalisability (Silverman, 2006). These criteria 
cannot be used for an ethnographic account which provides a thick description 
of how actors make sense of practices, however. As an alternative, the concept 
of ‘trustworthiness’ is adopted. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), this 
includes four components: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. First, credibility concerns a ‘fit’ between the researcher’s 
description and participants’ views. Adopting the frame of reference of the 
participants, a good fit is pursued in order to match what the researcher sees 
with what the participants really think and believe. The credibility is enhanced, 
however, by spending time with participants and by loosely obtaining various 
pictures through participation, observation and interviews, both at formal and 
informal occasions. In this regard I have known some of informants for more 
than seven years through my father. 
 Second, transferability addresses how the research findings can be 
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transferred to another case, rather than universally generalised. The research 
aims not to provide a correct interpretation confined to this case only but an 
interpretation that is ‘good enough’ to be possibly utilised on another case. This 
is akin to what Geertz (1973) calls a ‘thick description’: an account rich with 
detailed cultural meaning that “provides others with what they refer to as a 
database for making judgements about the possible transferability of findings to 
other milieu” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p398). Furthermore, conducting four 
ethnographic cases, rather a single one, is crucial in this regard because it 
allows the essential findings to be extracted and compared and contrasted 
between the cases. This rich set of findings and accounts gives the potential for 
transferability to another case.  
 Third, dependability refers to how well the research is documented and 
‘traceable’, rather than replicable. In addition to almost all the interviews and 
formal meetings, even casual conversations at some dinners and lunches were 
recorded and transcribed. A short memo was written in each case, developing 
my analysis. Collected data were constantly coded. 
Finally, confirmability indicates the tight link between data and analyses. 
With constant analysis through data collection, the data and codes were 
attempted to be constantly connected so that the themes emerge and refer back 
to particular practices from the data again. This helps researchers to conduct 
their research in ‘good faith’. 
 This ‘trustworthiness’ echoes the transactional validity in qualitative 
research which is defined by Cho and Trent (2006, p321) “as an interactive 
process between the researcher, the researched, and the collected data that is 
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aimed at achieving a relatively higher level of accuracy and consensus by 
means of revisiting facts, feelings, experiences, and values or beliefs collected 
and interpreted”. In this research, the transactional validity is expected to help to 
evaluate whether the key findings can be significant and useful for the audience 
of the research, not only for academic researchers, like institutionalists and 
Japanese management scholars, but also for managers who work at or deal with 
Japanese MNCs. It is also expected to examine whether the participants’ 
experiences and interpretations can be meaningful representations within a 
Japanese MNC.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to identify the research design and justify the research 
methods in order to answer the research questions. The purpose of the research 
is to understand the cultural meanings of practices through constellations of 
logics. Comparative ethnographic case study is selected as the main type of 
research. This is comparative across not only Asia but also the West, where 
constellations of logics were originally identified and theorised. It also is 
ethnographic since at home ethnography is adopted. It is quite important to have 
‘natural access’ to the research target, a Japanese MNC, rather than being ‘a 
professional stranger’. Through my natural settings, JapanCo was selected as a 
case. The interpretation of data went hand-in-hand with the data collection right 
up to the end of the writing of the thesis. Through this iterative process of 
interpretation, self-reflexivity is promoted and utilised, and the researcher 
examined and interacted with the meanings of the topic not as ‘a neutral data 
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collector’ but as an ‘active and reflective’ agent (Mason, 2002).  
Furthermore, in line with the comparative ethnographic case study 
approach, reliability, validity and generalisability are rejected because they are 
less relevant to ethnographic study. Instead, ‘trustworthiness’ (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985) is adopted. Four components of trustworthiness are considered: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability bearing in mind the primary 
concern of whether the participants’ experiences and interpretations can be 
meaningful representations within a Japanese MNC.  
 In the next chapter, the selected case, JapanCo is introduced. This is a 
Japanese MNC that is actively internationalising its businesses. Its history, 




 Comparative Ethnographic Case Study: JapanCo Chapter 5:
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide the relevant background for interpreting the 
remaining empirical chapters. Moreover, particular empirical facts have been 
identified and further selected according to their relevance to the idea of the 
‘family’, religion, market, and corporation logics. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. Firstly, a corporate overview is provided, including the historical 
development of the company, its strategy and structure, and the ways of 
managing its subsidiaries. In the second section, the influence of the corporate 
historical development on each subsidiary, namely JTHAI, JUSA, and JEU, and 
JTAIW, is discussed. The concluding section summarises the whole chapter. It is 
found that, with the alliance partner, AmericaCo, JapanCo is characterised as a 
unique and atypical Japanese corporation, possibly causing complex cultural 
meanings in practices through varied constellations of logics.  
 
5.2 JapanCo group: Corporate overview 
5.2.1 History with AmericaCo 
At the time of the research (2012), JapanCo had been an industrial 
manufacturing business in Japan for 107 years. It is an industrial products 
manufacturer, the headquarters of which are also based in Japan. The 
company’s revenue in 2012 reached around 200 billion Japanese Yen, which 
had been stable for the preceding five years, despite the fact that its major 
market in Japan is gradually shrinking. JapanCo’s business domain is industrial 
products, primarily for buildings and industrial plants, in the company’s own 
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words, the “automation business”. Its slogan is “human-centered automation” 
and the company aims to bring the benefits of automated processes in buildings 
and plants closer to people. In its corporate philosophy, it has four core values: 
safety, comfort, fulfilment and making a contribution to global environmental 
preservation; it pursues these values through “human-centered automation”.  
 At first, OldJapanCo was founded in 1907 as a family business and later 
became a corporation under the son of the founder. According to a book entitled 
“OldJapanCo”, the original name of the current JapanCo, the company was 
established by its founder, described here under the pseudonym “Takahiro 
Tanaka”, as a family business. It started as a trading business, importing 
industrial products from the US for military use. However, in 1934, given the 
increasing domestic demand for military products in World War II, the founder 
decided to change the company from a trading business to a manufacturing one. 
The company then assembled imported industrial products and sold them to the 
Japanese government. Because of this, in 1945, ‘Takahiro Tanaka’ was 
succeeded by his son, ‘Toshihiro’, to avoid being accused of being a war 
criminal.  
 A significant change came about in 1953 when ‘Toshihiko Tanaka’ built a 
strategic alliance with an equity alliance partner, AmericaCo. He had studied in 
New England in the US and understood the Anglo-Saxon culture, making it 
easier for both companies to establish an alliance and, as a result, AmericaCo 
bought 50% of JapanCo’s shares. In this way, the roles of both players were 
explicitly defined: JapanCo was responsible for developing the Japanese market 
with the products of both companies, while AmericaCo was responsible for the 
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overseas markets selling the products of JapanCo. The alliance was therefore 
on an equal footing for both players, and there were normally only 4-5 
expatriates from AmericaCo, one of whom was appointed as vice-president of 
JapanCo. This relationship with AmericaCo lasted from 1953 up until 1990, 
when it was dissolved.  
Despite the equal partnership, JapanCo had been extremely reliant on 
AmericaCo in terms of its international product design and development, as well 
as its overseas sales. AmericaCo provided the know-how to develop overseas 
markets and industrial product developments, this manifesting the market logic. 
One example of this can be seen when it transferred a product launch method, 
known as a Life Cycle Control (LCC), which managed the product launch 
process in four phases: idea initiation, planning, design and the sales phase. At 
the end of a particular phase, each result and performance was intended to be 
evaluated using a Profitability Index value (PI value) to examine whether an 
investment was acceptable or not from the view point of the shareholders. A PI 
value indicates whether a given project can generate profits within three years. 
This therefore enacts the market logic, where the return and investment are 
prioritised for the shareholders.  
This international business development with AmericaCo makes 
JapanCo a somewhat unique and atypical Japanese corporation different from 
other Japanese MNCs, which in general undertake international expansion on 
their own. A book published in 1990 written by the former president of the 
JapanCo group and entitled “OldJapanCo strategic management”, represents 
how unique it was at that time. The book indicates how the management 
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methods of AmericaCo were adopted in JapanCo, and how management issues 
were tackled and defined. Profiles of JapanCo and AmericaCo, and their history 
are provided below.  
 
Table 5: Profiles of JapanCo and AmericaCo 
 
Table 6: The history of JapanCo 
Items JapanCo group  AmericaCo group 
Revenue (2012) 2 billion JPY 36 billion USD 
Ratio of overseas 
revenue 
<=10% 55% 
# of employees 9,700 132,000 
# of overseas 
offices 
12 50 (estimated) 
Ownership Japanese institutional 
investors 




107 years 120 years 
Type of business Automation(A), 
Building(B), and other 
in-house companies 
- 
Ratio of local 
customers 
100% - 
Year Events of JapanCo 
1907 Incorporated OldJapanCo in Tokyo 




From 1991 to 2012, JapanCo began to develop an international business of its 
own following the dissolution of the alliance with AmericaCo. In this period, the 
alliance was becoming useless; conflicts had arisen between both companies 
because AmericaCo wanted to access the growing Asian market, which was 
originally the territory of JapanCo. Additionally, AmericaCo was facing difficulties 
and restructuring its businesses because of losses to its main business. In 1992, 
an internal document in JapanCo indicated that “it [was] high time for JapanCo 
to stand on its own feet in international business independently from AmericaCo”. 
In 2003, JapanCo bought back all the equity from AmericaCo and dissolved the 
alliances. Since the 1990s, JapanCo has established a series of overseas sales 
offices in Asia. 
1953 Formed a technical alliance with AmericaCo to receive technical 
support 
1954 Formed an equity alliance with AmericaCo (50% share owned by 
AmericaCo) (board members, joint product design) 
1957 Renamed OldJapanAmericaCo and developed overseas business 
with AmericaCo 
1991 Reduced stake of AmericaCo to 25% (AmericaCo restructuring)  
1991- Built overseas subsidiaries in Thailand, Taiwan, US, EU & elsewhere 
1999 Assumed original name of OldJapanCo 
2003 Bought back all shares from AmericaCo 
2004 Merged affiliates, adopted an in-house company (consolidating all 
subsidiaries in Japan in JapanCo) 
2006 Renewed its philosophy and symbol of “automation and building” 
2012 Renamed JapanCo 
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From the point of view of JapanCo, AmericaCo was seen as the father in a 
‘family’, having cared for and trained JapanCo. Some directors of JapanCo 
characterised AmericaCo as “the teacher”, “the big brother”, and “the master” 
who educated JapanCo as “an inexperienced child” about how to do 
international business. An experienced director commenting on an internal 
newsletter of JapanCo stated in the anniversary book, ‘JapanCo’s 100 year 
history’ that after ending the alliance “we then …. really got to know how much 
we had been dependent on the capabilities and resources of AmericaCo to 
develop overseas markets … we now [became] unskilled and [had] scarce 
resources to develop these overseas markets”.   
In 2004, JapanCo consolidated all the domestic affiliates of its building 
system and factory automation businesses into one single company and 
adopted a divisional company organisation system, namely, the Advanced 
Automation Company (AA), the Building Automation Company (AB), and one 
other.  
 
5.2.2 International business development 
5.2.2.1 Corporate strategy  
JapanCo’s mid-term strategy is to internationalise its business. It also wants to 
expand its overseas revenue to comprise 30% of total revenue by 2016 from a 
current position of 11% of the total revenue in 2012. Thus, it is at a relatively 





Figure 2: Total sales by domestic and international market (billion JPY) 
 
 
JapanCo adopted a complicated divisional system, controlling each company 
division as an independent business unit accountable for their own profits and 
losses as well as their investments. There are two company divisions: Advanced 
Automation (AA) and Building Automation (BA). The revenue of both companies 
is close to around 100 billion Japanese Yen; AA’s business used to be a major 
source of business which followed that of AmericaCo; BA’s business, for its part, 
was essentially small but, after the acquisition of a domestic building system 
company, has recently grown, and now has 46% of the total sales (while AA has 
37%). AA’s business focuses on the factory automation market; its products are 
sensors, switches, air-conditioning systems and valves. This is largely attributed 
to the influence of AmericaCo’s business. In contrast, BA’s area of business 
focuses on the construction industry with products such as air conditioning 
systems and security products for buildings. This stems from mergers with and 
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the acquisitions of local manufacturers in Japan, thus limiting the influence of 
AmericaCo’s business.  
 
Figure 3: Total sales by in-house company (billion JPY) 
 
 
In order to achieve the strategic goal of overseas profits comprising 30% of total 
revenue, the company has three management initiatives according to the 2012 
investor relations report of JapanCo group, as set out below: 
  
1. To be a long-term partner for both the customer and the community in three 
business areas (building automation, advanced automation and the life 
automation business) using the company’s technology and products in order to 
provide solutions through the pursuit of human-centred automation.  
2. To further the company’s worldwide growth by expanding into new areas and 
making qualitative changes.  
3. To strengthen the company’s organisation and to never stop learning in order 




Item 2 is concerned with the internationalisation of the businesses; given the 
shrinking domestic market in Japan, international expansion is necessary. This 
goal is accepted by the shareholders, and the company is struggling to boost 
overseas revenue since not all the company’s subsidiaries have localised their 
businesses and employees. Interviewees frequently mention the topic of 
“localisation”, meaning the whole process whereby local employees are hired, 
and trained, with a local president being appointed in each subsidiary so that 
JHQ can delegate its authority to the local management. Although this has not 
been formally announced as a corporate policy, it is positively promoted and 
enhanced.  
 According to the 2012 investor relations report, the current philosophy 
was based on organisational change undertaken in 2006 when the former CEO 
was appointed. At that time, the company’s symbol and philosophy were revised: 
the term “JapanCo” was added to OldJapanCo with a new corporate symbol and 
the philosophy was revised with the slogan “human-centered automation”. This 
means that technologies and products of JapanCo provide new value not merely 
for the sake of automation itself but for the benefit of people. The new philosophy 
has four core values, which guide the action of JapanCo, namely safety, comfort, 
fulfilment, and making a contribution to global environmental preservation. Here 
is part of the corporate philosophy:  
  
Under ‘JapanCo’, the Group strives to realize safety, comfort and fulfillment in people's 
lives and contribute to global environment[al] preservation through “human-centered 
automation.” To realize this, 
 
* We create value together with customers at their site. 
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* We pursue our unique value based on the idea of [being] “human-centered.” 
* We think towards the future and act progressively. 
 
These values are created by providing product lines for building and automation 
companies.  
 Although it is more than a decade since the dissolution of the alliance, 
the strong influence of AmericaCo remains. Given the high dependency on 
AmericaCo, a Japanese VP in JUSA described how JapanCo had a highly 
conservative culture which did not encourage its employees to develop business 
themselves. He pointed out how “[JapanCo] [had] never created [a] market on its 
own… the alliance of AmericaCo markets were already there and it [JapanCo] 
provided mass produced products due to the demand of AmericaCo”. The great 
dependency on AmericaCo in the past in terms of international sales and 
marketing implicitly constrained the business development of JapanCo. This 
therefore greatly influences the constellations of logics across the subsidiaries 
because of their relevance to AmericaCo.  
 
5.2.2.2 Overseas subsidiaries management                                                                                             
In total, there are twelve overseas subsidiaries in JapanCo. Most subsidiaries 
are in the Asian region and only two are outside this area, these being located in 
Europe (EU) and the Americas. The largest revenue within the subsidiaries 
comes from China, where there is a joint venture business with a Chinese 
manufacturer. Here, the functions are sales, marketing and manufacturing. 
JTHAI and JTAIW are similar in terms of their sizes and areas of business 
although both have a different customer base. JTHAI has most of its customers 
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in Japan while JTAIW has local customers. The profiles of all of the subsidiaries 
are provided below.  
 
Table 7: Profiles of all the subsidiaries (100 million JPY) 
  
 
Figure 4: Sales volume by subsidiaries (million JPY) 
 
 
To manage the overseas subsidiaries, the International Business Development 

























Revenue(2011)* 100 30 17 18 12 14 11 8 3 5 2 0
Revenue(2012)* 117 34 24 19 15 14 13 7 5 4 2 2
# of employees** 793 107 136 80 91 77 62 12 49 68 37 22
% of revenue by 
Japanese customers*** 30% 10% 80% 30% 10% 15% 10% 0% 20% 20% 30% 30%
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and mainly coordinates financial “numbers” rather than formulating and 
managing business strategies. IBD does not have the authority to manage its 
businesses but in-house companies do have the authority to manage their 
business in the overseas subsidiaries. Here, in-house companies in JHQ have 
the central authority to set up and manage sales goals, to control the staffing of 
Japanese expatriates in overseas subsidiaries as well as product pricing, 
product development and marketing on a global scale. Thus, the in-house 
company system influences the sales goal-setting process enormously. Under 
each company, there are sales and marketing departments divided by region 











Area sales and 
marketing
IBD
JTHAI / JTAIW / 
JEU /JUSA
Corporate staff
Figure 5: The organisational chart of JapanCo  
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All the subsidiaries, except for JUSA, are highly dependent on the management 
resources of JapanCo’s headquarters (JHQ) in Japan. This is because almost all 
the corporate functions of AA and BA are centralised in JHQ. These functions 
constitute production, research and development, the global marketing strategy, 
service and maintenance, while the overseas subsidiaries largely function as 
sales offices with service functions. There is one exception to this, however, 
since JUSA has a manufacturing function and maintains a small factory (it also 
acquired a local gas meter manufacturer in 2012). JHQ adopted an in-house 
company system comprising AA and BA companies; both have independent 
lines of products and both are managed separately. They do however 
occasionally share the same customers and, in the cases of JTHAI and JUSA 
where both divisions exist, may sometime compete for the same customers in 
terms of orders. Both AA and BA in subsidiaries are now controlled by JHQ.  
 The sales goals, expatriates and available products in all the 
subsidiaries are largely negotiated and determined by the in-house companies in 
JHQ through IBD. Specifically, annual sales targets are set up to express 
management’s ‘gut’ feeling and distributed to each overseas subsidiary without 
examining their feasibility from interviews. For example, if the Asian region as a 
whole grew sales by 15% in one year, each of the overseas subsidiaries in Asia 
would be likely to be allocated a sales increase, this being 15% or more in the 
next year regardless of whether the revenue of a subsidiary in Asia increased in 
the initial year. This sales target was actually provided by JHQ although some 
heads of the overseas subsidiaries argued that this sales target was 
unreasonable and irrational.  
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 The job titles of individual actors in all the subsidiaries are summarised 
below: 
 









Responsible for the profits and losses of a business  








Expatriates from the Japanese headquarters (JHQ) 
Local employees Those who were recruited in a given location outside 
Japan 
 
There is always either a Japanese president or a vice president, with the 
exception of JapanCo in Indonesia and China, since these are managed as a 
joint venture. In the selected subsidiaries in the case studies, the president in 
JUSA is an American, but the others are Japanese.  
 Japanese expatriates play a central role in communicating with JHQ 
from each subsidiary although ‘localisation’ is informally promoted. ‘Localisation’ 
means a process whereby local employees, not Japanese expatriates, should 
manage local businesses. In practice, however, a group of Japanese expatriates 
is somehow structurally created and maintained by JHQ. Each in-house 
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company - AA and BA in JHQ - decides to dispatch the next Japanese 
expatriates, while finally evaluating and approving the performance of their 
current expatriates, especially the president or vice-president. The performance 
of the Japanese expatriate manager is normally reviewed by its president, who is 
most likely to be Japanese. Here, the bonuses and salaries of all the expatriates 
are linked to their respective performances in JapanCo as a whole group, and 
are not determined by the respective subsidiaries. In other words, the HR 
system of the Japanese expatriates is free from its business performance. 
Conversely, for local employees, their performance, salary, and bonus are set, 
evaluated, and approved in a given subsidiary. This means that, although 
Japanese expatriates are in the same organisational chart with local employees, 
there are two invisible structures which assess and evaluate managers and staff, 
these being either Japanese or composed of local employees.  
 
Figure 6: The organisational structures between Japanese and locals 
Japanese structure Local structure 
      
 
This structural division between Japanese and locals has partially been 












subsidiaries (see Elger and Smith, 2005; Kopp, 1999). Nonetheless, this division 
is structurally reinforced in JapanCo (see 8.2). For Japanese expatriates, 
regardless of their title, their bonus and salary are separated from performance 
and that of their subsidiaries, being connected instead to the overall 
performance of JapanCo group. Thus, all the Japanese expatriate managers are 
controlled and managed by a top Japanese president and it is not important 
even if they are below their local directors or managers in status.  
 There is an annual performance appraisal for Japanese and local 
employees. Essentially, the Japanese are evaluated by the Japanese top ranked 
expatriate and the local employees by the local managers. Japanese expatriates 
are evaluated by the first direct manager, and then by the department in JHQ 
from which they were originally dispatched. There is no coherent evaluation or 
HRM system specifically for Japanese expatriates because the responsible 
department finally evaluates and approves their performance. According to most 
Japanese expatriates, the problem here is that Japanese expatriates are 
evaluated by JHQ in such a way that they are compared to other Japanese 
employees working in Japan and not with other expatriates in other subsidiaries. 
This leads to an evaluation of Japanese expatriates separately from the 
performance of their respective subsidiaries, and causes a structural and mental 
separation between the Japanese expatriates and the local employees. When 
asked about the roles of Japanese expatriates, one local Thai employee stated 
“well, [Japanese expatriates] are different [from Thais]”. Moreover, even the 
American president in JUSA asserted “I am not like [the Japanese expatriate VP] 
or like an expatriate from Japan”. This separated evaluation applies to all the 
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Japanese expatriates across the subsidiaries of JapanCo group in Asia, Europe, 
and North America. 
 
5.3 The tales of subsidiaries in Asia and the West                                                                                           
5.3.1 Overview of the four subsidiaries 
The four subsidiaries selected are: JapanCo in Thailand (JTHAI), JTAIW in 
Taiwan, JEU in Europe and JUSA in the US. These cases are expected to 
illuminate the cultural meanings of practices through the constellations of logics. 
Each subsidiary has different features which may affect these constellations of 
logics. These features are the customer bases, the functions and the 
organisational identity which they attribute to their subsidiaries as shown below. 
 
Table 9: The features of four subsidiaries at JapanCo 
 




















































subsidiaries. That is, the more Japanese customers there are, the more 
Japanese norms there are. In JTHAI, the interviewees tend to identify 
themselves as belonging to “a Japanese company” and alongside the notion of a 
Japanese norm, some Thais describe themselves by stating “we are family…in a 
typical Japanese company”. This company is entirely dependent on JHQ in 
terms of R&D and manufacturing. In JUSA, however, the interviewees tend to 
identify themselves as belonging to an American company by quickly answering 
“Oh boy, it’s an American company”. Here, the company is less dependent on 
JHQ than the previous company, and very few respondents use the word 
“family”. JEU is quite similar to JUSA, although it is more dependent on JHQ and 
has a mixed identity, with Japanese and European employees. Situated in 
between JTHAI and JUSA, JTAIW is shifting from being a Japanese company to 
being a local one.  
These features, however, do not mean that a customer base at each 
subsidiary determines actors’ cultural interpretations in respect to, for example, 
the “family” norm. Nor do they mean that all the actors in JTHAI, for example, 
interpret practices through a Japanese “family” norm in the same manner. 
Rather, actors attribute cultural meanings to practices according to geographical 
contexts in respect to their customers, interests and JHQ. Here is a summary of 







Table 10: Detailed profiles of JapanCo and subsidiaries 
 In the subsequent sub-sections some of the features of the four 
subsidiaries which are likely to be associated with constellations of logics are 
described: their collective identities, customer base, organisational structure, 
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in-house 
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100% 40% 70% 100% 85% 
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5.3.2 Collective identifies of the four subsidiaries  
The collective identities of the four subsidiaries vary from ‘a Japanese company’ 
to ‘an American company’ and ‘a mixture of Japanese and European’. JTHAI 
was characterised as ‘a typical Japanese company’ by all the interviewees, 
presumably as a result of its high reliance on Japanese customers. A Thai HR 
manager commenting about JTHAI declared, “I think that JTHAI is not different 
from other Japanese companies”. Other Thais also expressed the view that 
JTHAI was a Japanese company, referring to the fact that there are Japanese 
expatriates and president in management positions. In fact, the company does 
adopt typical Japanese management practices, such as those of harmony, 
seniority, Management By Waking Around, an opened door policy and intense 
socialisation. In addition, Theravada, a school of Buddhism is expected to be 
influential on the behaviour of the Thai employees.  
 Similarly, JTAIW tends to be identified as “a Japanese company”. A 
Taiwanese manager pointed out how all the presidents have been Japanese 
expatriates from either AA or BA companies in JHQ. Another emphasised that 
there were no sales incentives, but some form of seniority did exist. Meanwhile, 
a Taiwanese director highlighted the business procedure as a reason for the 
Japanese qualities of the company. Given the fact that Taiwanese and Chinese 
customers are increasingly more important than Japanese ones, a Japanese 
MD asserted that “we are now in the process of localisation”, meaning a change 
from being a Japanese company to being a local Taiwanese one.  
 By contrast, JUSA and JEU are closer to being a local corporation. In 
JUSA, many informants characterise themselves as “an American company”, in 
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the sense that the customer base is American and the company has an 
American president, although some Japanese characteristics remain in the 
operational department. One American director, when asked whether JUSA was 
Japanese or American, asserted: “Oh, boy! It’s an American company”. To justify 
this, he went on to refer to the existence of an American president and VP, many 
American customers, and American salesmen motivated by high sales 
incentives. All the businesses here are under AA’s control and thus the Japanese 
VP is dispatched from AA in JHQ. 
 JEU is identified by European employees as “a mixed Japanese and 
European company”. A Belgian director, when asked if JEU was Japanese or 
European, explained that it was: 
  
a bit of a mix of everything I think. Because of the cost, we have to 
think about the Japanese culture and the Japanese mother company 
who have as a group, certain rules, certain procedures, a certain way 
of working, a certain way of thinking, which is different from the 
European way.  And on the other side, yeah, we have to talk to the 
European customers and our main goal, main job, is to build the 
bridge between the knowledge in Japan and the amount of the 
customers in Europe 
 
The notion of a mix of Japanese and Europeans is manifest in conflicts within 
JEU in relation to JHQ and its local customers. JEU has also long dealt with 
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AmericaCo in Europe and other European manufacturers. 
In fact, JEU was founded to deal with AmericaCo as a customer as well 
as an alliance partner at that time, and AmericaCo Europe has indeed been one 
of JEU’s largest customers. It was an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
customer, buying and reselling JapanCo’s products. Thus, JEU has been reliant 
on AmericaCo, in contrast to JTHAI, which has relied on incoming Japanese 
customers. 
 
5.3.3 Customer bases of the four subsidiaries 
The customer base of the four subsidiaries varies from a majority of Japanese 
customers in JTHAI to that of local customers in JTAIW, JUSA, and JEU. 
Originally, JTHAI opened as a subsidiary in Thailand in response to requests 
from Japanese customers. As a Japanese expatriate succinctly put it: “[W]e 
were taken by the initiative of Japanese customers who wanted to start [an] 
overseas business in Thailand”. From the time that it opened, the company 
expanded its business as a Japanese manufacturer starting to enter the Thai 










Figure 7: JTHAI sales by customers 
 
 
Currently, JTHAI has two main strategic initiatives: one is to acquire new 
local customers and the other is to retain existing Japanese customers. The 
existing Japanese customers are the main source of revenue providing more 
than 80% of current sales. The main strategic initiative was to maintain the 
existing Japanese customers. These customers were not just subsidiaries that 
were 100% owned by Japanese companies but also Japanese joint ventures 
with local companies. Since Thailand’s economic recovery in 2002, and as 
demand for building Japanese plants in Thailand has grown, JTHAI has 
continuously expanded. The increase in revenue is now almost 10% more per 
year and, so far, this has largely been due to an increasing number of incoming 
Japanese customers. Its history is attached in appendix.  
 JTAIW is now adopting a localising strategy, which penetrates both the 
Taiwanese and Chinese customers, these both being connected to a number of 
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manufacturing plants in a growing Chinese market. Since 2008, some Japanese 
customers have started to withdraw their business from Taiwan and others have 
relocated to China as a result of the financial crisis. There has, therefore, been a 
fundamental shift from Japanese customers to local ones. This goes along with 
the increasing importance of the Taiwanese and Chinese customers, who tend 
to purchase their products in Taiwan but receive them on-site in China. 
Nowadays, more than half of JTAIW’s customers are non-Japanese, typically 
either Taiwanese or Chinese. Its history is attached in appendix. 
 
Figure 8: JTAIW sales by customers 
 
 
 Unlike JTHAI, both JUSA and JEU are primarily focusing on local 
customers, American and European manufacturers, and relationships with 
AmericaCo as a customer. Since the termination of the strategic alliance with 
AmericaCo, JUSA has focused on local American customers. In fact, JUSA has 
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adopted a localised strategy concentrating on local customers in the US with 
local employees. 85% of the revenue comes from local, non-Japanese 
customers, who are mostly American. In the past five years, however, sales have 
been flat because of a decline in the semi-conductor market. Thus, the main new 
initiative of JUSA is to develop Japanese as well as American customers. 
Japanese automotive manufacturers in the US are the focus because sales 
activities for the manufacturer were not previously conducted in a proactive 
manner. Semi-conductor equipment manufacturers and shale gas plants are 
specified as potential American and Japanese customers. Both customers were 
actually approached by the American sales team under the Japanese VP’s 
leadership. In particular, shale gas plants are a potential source of business for 
both American and Japanese manufacturers. When using gas meter products 
from a newly acquired American company, the Japanese VP aims to develop a 




Figure 9: JUSA sales by customers 
 
 
 Similarly, JEU deals with only non-Japanese, European and American 
customers. JEU is now adopting a localised strategy to acquire new potential 
local customers (such as plant engineering companies and electronic 
manufacturers), by providing solutions that combine industrial parts. JEU used to 
adopt routine sales activities which provided products for the past alliance 
partner, AmericaCo, with the latter buying and reselling JapanCo products. The 
new strategy of the current president, however, aims to formulate solutions and 
become a solution provider to local customers. This concept should provide 
solutions by combining existing products as required by customers, rather than 
simply selling the products. For example, what customers may want is to adjust 
a certain amount of gas or liquid in plants. In this way, JEU can provide a system 
to control the gas/liquid amounts in plant manufacturers. This type of strategy is 
not intended to be decreed by the Japanese president, but should be formulated 
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together with the local employees. Its history is attached in appendix. 
 One of the major customers has been and still is AmericaCo, which 
comprises more than 60% of JEU’s revenue. The rest are Western companies 
from North America or Europe, and this focus on local customers requires local 
expertise. This makes JEU a localised company of JapanCo to an even greater 
extent, particularly as regards interpersonal communication, the way of doing 
business and the company’s norms and beliefs. A particular point of frustration 
on the part of the local Belgian employees concerns the Japanese way of doing 
business, such as the procedure of launching and terminating products and 
services. Employees here asked questions such as: “Why does JEU bring [a] 
Japanese way of doing things here in [the] European market. We, Europeans, 
know more about this market than the Japanese”.  
 
Figure 10: JEU sales by customers 
 
5.3.4 Organisational structures of the four subsidiaries  
The organisational structures of the four subsidiaries greatly depend on the 
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businesses functions in the subsidiaries. All the subsidiaries, except JUSA, have 
mainly sales and service functions. Only JUSA has research and development 
(R&D) and manufacturing functions.  
In JTHAI, the current organisational structure is divided into the same 
divisions as the headquarters: i.e. two divisions - AA and BA divisions - two 
additional sales branches which sell the products of both divisions and a 
corporate department including HRM, IT, accounting and logistics. Below is the 
general organisational chart, complete with the number of staff.  
 
Figure 11: The overall organisational chart in JTHAI 
 
 
There are four Japanese expatriates in total, two in the Advanced Automation 
division, one in the Building Automation division, with the last one being the 
president. Temporary visitors from JHQ also come and go on a regular basis. 
The corporate and sales branches are made up entirely of Thai employees. 
More recently, Thai managers have for the first time been promoted as directors 
in JTHAI. This has meant that local Thai directors are in charge of all the local 
























between Japanese expatriates and local employees is shown in the figure 




Figure 12: Historical change of organisational structure in JTHAI 
1995-    2006    2012 
     
 
The organisational charts for the Building and Advanced sections where the 
Japanese are located are as follows.  
 Similarly, JTAIW has two divisions, AA and BA divisions. Because of the 
institutionalised rule of localisation, Taiwanese have been appointed to director 
positions in each division. In the AA division, the director is Taiwanese and all the 
managers except for one are Taiwanese. In BA, a Taiwanese manager was 
recently promoted as the deputy director. Below are the organisational charts for 
both AA and BA divisions. Historically, almost all the MDs are Japanese 
expatriates. The number of Japanese expatriates is added in parentheses. The 





























Figure 14: Historical change of organisational structure in JTAIW 
1995-    2008 
   
 
 JUSA only has AA division. Unlike those of the other three subsidiaries, 
the current president is an American and not an expatriate from JHQ. His main 
role is not to manage the business but to function as a chief financial officer 
(CFO) because JUSA had a problem with accounting under former Japanese 
presidents. Here, the Japanese expatriate was appointed as VP and 
communicated with JHQ. In practice, the Japanese VP tends to play a role of the 

































 In the sales and marketing division, the Japanese VP is an acting 
director who formally manages the development of both Japanese and American 
customers. There are Japanese expatriate sales that are mainly responsible for 
Japanese automotive manufacturers in the US. The rest of the American sales 
managers and staff are responsible for American customers. In 2008, the current 



























Figure 15: The overall organisational chart of JUSA 
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Figure 16: Historical change of organisational structure in JUSA 
1995-    2008  
  
   
 
JEU also only has an AA division. The total number of employees in JEU 
is now twelve. The MD is a Japanese expatriate, and another two Japanese 
expatriates work in Germany as temporary engineers. Hence, the organisational 
structure in JEU is simple: the Japanese president manages all the local 
employees. The office of JEU comprises a main office in Belgium and a 
sub-office in Germany. The organisational structure is clearly defined by the 
individual job descriptions. There is a small branch office in Germany, 
































Figure 18: Historical change of organisational structure in JEU 
2001-    2012 
     
 
 
5.3.5 Artefacts and office layouts of the four subsidiaries  
The artefacts and office layouts also vary according to the customer base and 



















Figure 17: The organisational chart of JEU 
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tend to share the same long desk in sales divisions, and there are no partitions 
except for the corporate staff members. This resembles a typical Japanese 
company office in Japan, and the engineers do not have their own space or desk 
because they tend to stay on the customers’ sites. Only the Japanese MD has a 
private room, while the managers have their own desks and spaces, but without 
partitions. Its office layout is attached below. 
  
Figure 19: The office layout of JTHAI 
 
 
 By contrast, in JTAIW, The office layout is different from that of JHQ, 
where every non-managerial employee shares the same desk. At JTAIW all the 
employees have their own desk and space separated by partitions. Only the 
Japanese MD and two members in the finance department have a private room 
for security reasons since they deal with personal information, such as salaries 




Figure 20: The office layout of JTAIW 
  
 
 Unlike JHQ and JTHAI, the office layout in JUSA is quite spacious and 
all the management members, such as the president and VPs, have a private 
room. Each of the other members also has their own desks and spaces. There 
are partitions between the desks which are low enough for them to see each 
other and a space in front of the desks in the office in Phoenix where there is a 




Figure 21: The office layout of JUSA 
  
 Similarly, the office layout in JEU is not like that of JHQ and JTHAI where 
everybody shares a long desk. Rather, each member has his/her own desk while 
sharing the same room. Only the Japanese MD and the HR manager have a 
private room. The office is spacious and its members can easily talk to each 
other. Its office layout is attached below.  
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This chapter has sought to provide relevant background to interpret the 
remaining empirical chapters. With the alliance partner, AmericaCo, JapanCo is 
characterised as a unique and atypical Japanese corporation, possibly causing 
complex cultural meanings in practices through varied constellations of logics. 
Here, two major elements influencing the cultural interpretations of each 
subsidiary in terms of collective identities are provided: the main type of 
customers locally and the dependence on JHQ. Identified as ‘a typical Japanese 
company’, JTHAI seems to be quite associated with Japanese management 
practices according to a large Japanese customer base. It is also quite 
dependent on JHQ in terms of their products and services. By contrast, JUSA 
and JEU have a strong influence from AmericaCo and their local customers, 
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thereby being identified as ‘an American company’ and a mixture of Japanese 
and European company’ by their local employees. JTAIW is facing a change in 
its customer base from Japanese to non-Japanese, such as Taiwanese and 
Chinese yet still identifies itself as ‘a Japanese company’. Furthermore, an 
examination was also made of the dependence on the resources of JHQ where 
research and development functions are concentrated. In particularly, JUSA is 
relatively independent from JHQ because of its manufacturing and research and 
development (R&D) functions while the others, such as JTHAI, JTAIW, and JEU, 
are quite reliant on manufacturing and R&D resources in JHQ. These 
subsidiaries have to communicate frequently with JHQ in order to enquire about 
and negotiate on prices, delivery and the quality of the products.  
 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the features of the subsidiaries 
determine the actors’ cultural meanings in respect to practices. Rather, it is a 
feature that generates complex cultural interpretations of practice through the 




 Aligned Practices in Customer Development: Chapter 6:
Significance of Culture 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to understand how aligned practices in customer development 
are culturally interpreted through high compatibility and high centrality in logics. 
It is organised into five sections. First, the elements of four logics are defined 
and exemplified. Second, the context of the dominant Japanese culture is 
reviewed. Third, ‘Oyabun’ and ‘Kobun’, ‘Ongaeshi’, ‘family’ relationships in 
Japanese are discussed. Forth, Thai Theravada Buddhism is described. In a 
concluding section, two findings, with a related discussion, are offered: the 
Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism logics are culturally interpreted 
showing how aligned logics can be amplified in a cooperative manner.  
 
6.2 Defining the elements of four logics: Family, religion, market, and 
corporation   
Drawing on previous arguments about logics (e.g., Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Friedland, 2012; Friedland et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2012), the elements of 
four logics are defined as components of practices conducted in Japanese 
MNCs. Here, the legitimacy of the corporation logic is the top priority in 
Japanese MNCs, imposing overarching assumptions onto and within economic 
organisations. Important elements of these logics are selected from the work of 
Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al. (2012): ‘root metaphor’, ‘source 
of legitimacy’, and ‘basis of norms/attention/strategy’. This selection also refers 
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to the identified elements of logics through ‘the enactment of logics on the 
ground’ using McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) drug court example to elaborate 
this. It should be noted, however, that the element of primary associated actors 
with specific logics, as McPherson and Sauder (2013) underlined, were not 
explored in this thesis because logics are enacted, rather than intentionally ‘used’ 
by actors as a toolkit or cultural ‘repertoire’. Furthermore, in line with ‘practice 
theory’ (Giddens, 1984), each element of the institutional logics needs to reflect 
how individual actors conduct and interpret practice in their contexts. In 
reference to the ideal types of logics (Thornton et al., 2012), five elements are 
especially selected to help understand how actors conduct and interpret 
practice: root metaphor; legitimacy; the basis of norms / attention / strategy. Root 
metaphor and legitimacy indicate how legitimate practice is for individual actors 
while the basis of norms / attention / strategy shows how the practice is 




Table 11: The ideal types of logics embodied by practices within JapanCo 
 




Corporation logic Market logic 
Root metaphor Company as ‘family’  Religious group for 
making religious merits 
Company as a group of 
people pursuing mutual 
economic goals 




Source of legitimacy Reciprocal and 
obligation based 
relationship (ko - on) 
Pre-determined 
relationship by karma  
Hierarchical 
relationship formed by 
titles 
Independent 
relationship formed by 
self interest 
Basis of norms Maintaining ‘family’ 





Asserting authority by 
titles 
Pursuing individual self 
interest 
Basis of attention (Wa) organisational 
harmony  









Basis of strategy Sharing others’ work, 
information, reward, 
time and space in an 
equal manner 
Dividing work, 
information, reward for 
making religious merits 
Dividing work and  
protecting own 
information according 
to titles  
Strictly dividing work to 
each, and protecting 




The ‘family’ logic represents the concept of ‘family’ discussed in the 
existing literature of Japanese management practices and manifesting the 
Japanese ‘family’ which emphasises a reciprocal obligation between parents 
and their children (‘ko’ and ‘on’ in Japanese) (Kondo, 1990; Bhappu, 2000) (see 
3.4.1). This differs from the source of legitimacy being unconditional loyalty as 
Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al. (2012) argue. In reference to 
collectivistic aspects of Japanese ‘family’ (Kondo, 1990; Bhappu, 2000), the 
‘basis of norms / attention / strategy’ is the action of sharing things through the 
concept of ‘family’. The basis of norms is identified as maintaining ‘family’ 
members by active participation (Kopp, 1999) while the basis of attention is 
organisational harmony, ‘Wa’ in Japanese, and the basis of strategy is the action 
of sharing things, such as work, information, rewards, and space and time.  
 With interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation, this 
Japanese ‘family’ logic was identified through practices such as seniority, 
teamwork, long term employment, and sharing information, rewards, space and 
time. Associated key words related to ‘family’ are ‘family’ and its children, father, 
kids, parents, and Japanese terms related to ‘family’, such as ‘Oyabun’ and 
‘Kobun’, ‘Senpai and Kohai’, ‘Ongaeshi’, and ‘Shita-Gekirei’. In particular, the 
accounts of practices using the metaphor of ‘family’ were considered the 
enactment of ‘family’. A direct example is that Thai managers activate notions of 
‘family’ by saying “we are ‘family”. Another example is the claim of a frustrated 
Japanese expatriate that a Thai director does not nurture and train his Thai 
subordinates as ‘family’ kids, at least in the way he thought to be an enactment 
of Japanese ‘family’ logic.  
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 The religion logic represents Thai Theravada Buddhism, as discussed in 
the existing literature on management in Thailand, especially Atmiyanandana 
and Lawler (2003), who argue for the importance of religious merits, 
benevolence and forgiveness in Thai business management (see 3.4.4). In 
particular, the concept of religious merit, ‘Tam Bun’ in Thai, emerged through 
interviews and observations as a unique idea in the location of Thailand. Since 
the religion logic discussed in the work of Thornton et al. (2012) and Friedland 
and Alford (1991) is based on Christianity, not Buddhism, this thesis extends the 
literature on this logic.  
In the data analysis, the religion logic was specified through actors’ 
frames of reference in which they, mainly Japanese expatriates, identify the 
existence of Thai Theravada Buddhism in their workplace. This was identified 
through key words, such as religious merits, ‘Tam Bun’ in Thai, never mind, ‘Tam 
Bun’ in Thai, the land of bliss, Karma, benevolence, kindness, and forgiveness. 
The concept of Buddhism is infused in that of ‘family’, where the benevolent 
father is identified as an ideal leader in Thailand (Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 
2003). Here, the ultimate purpose of life is considered to be rebirth as a better 
human by gaining religious merits and so manifests as an emphasis on 
individuals’ interest.  
 The corporation logic represents a hierarchy within organisations with 
reference to the work of Thornton et al. (2012) which argues for the importance 
of raising one’s status in the organisational hierarchy (see 3.4.2). Wages being 
determined by seniority is identified as the organisational hierarchy in Japanese 
MNCs with reference to the Japanese ‘family’ logic discussed in the work of 
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Kondo (1990) and Bhappu (2000). Furthermore, a hierarchy between Japanese 
and locals is also expected to exist, as the work of Kopp (1999) implies although 
this is dynamically formed by actors’ active participation. ‘Laopan’ in Taiwanese, 
president or boss in English, is also identified as a symbolic term to manifest the 
hierarchy between superiors and their subordinates in JTAIW.  
 The corporation logic is specified through key words, such as seniority, 
‘Laopan’ in Taiwanese, a distinction between Japanese and the locals, the 
influence of actors’ job titles and positions, and cultural interpretation of 
hierarchies between regions and countries. In particular, the key words are 
elaborated in relation to actors’ interpretations of their practices, negotiation, and 
interactions. For example, ‘Laopan’ in Taiwanese manifests the corporation logic 
whereby ultimate authority rests on the president in JTAIW and no Taiwanese 
employees act against the decision of the president, even though they may 
argue and complain before the decision. Another example is the hierarchy 
between Japanese and the locals manifested in the workplace. In particular, 
cultural interpretation of hierarchies is also manifested among Japanese 
expatriates who claim that Japan is underneath the West while above other 
Asian countries.  
The market logic represents actors’ self-interest as discussed in the work 
of Thornton et al. (2012) (see 3.4.3). In Japanese MNCs, self-interest seems to 
be infused into the organisational interests and thus, according to the work of 
Kondo (1990) and Bhappu (2000), both are interdependent. The Western 
concept of the independent self does not seem to exist in Japanese MNCs, 
however, which echo collectivistic practices manifesting the Japanese ‘family’. 
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Thus, the concept of self-interest is expected to be enacted specifically in the 
West, and it is on this premise that the institutional logics perspective has tended 
to be based.  
The market logic is identified through key words, such as self-interest, 
individuality, own benefit, individually defined work, compartmentalised 
information, personal room in the office as opposed to desks and room shared 
with other employees, and individual rewards as opposed to organisational 
rewards. It emphasises individuality as opposed to the collective Japanese 
‘family’ concept. Actors’ interpretations of practices that contain these key words 
are identified as the enactment of the market logic.  




Table 12: Examples of quotations in terms of logics 
Logics Examples of quotations 
Family logic (Japanese 
family) 
“We are family! We spend time together on not only working hours but also lunches and dinners ” (a Thai manager in JTHAI)  
 
“It’s not only America, America is just a result of me being transferred, and then I just came here by chance… It’s simply 
because I have owed a lot to JapanCo in Japan, and JapanCo asked me to expand the business of JUSA, therefore, it is 
imperative for me to repay by growing the business, thereby doing ‘Ongaeshi’.” (a Japanese vice president in JUSA) 
 
“The Japanese normally conduct ‘Shita-Gekirei’ (giving a pep talk while scolding in English) to the young and inexperienced 
who are incapable of doing something, don’t we? The Japanese tend to expect you (as a child) to change in the future, so 
training you, scolding you when you are wrong, advising you, or proposing you with some ideas…” (a Japanese manager in 
JTHAI) 
Religion logic (Thai 
Theravada Buddhism) 
“… everybody here gets along with each other … and tends to give a hand to inexperienced employees and others … there is 
probably Theravada Buddhism behind these behaviours …” (A Japanese manager in JTHAI) 
 
“They [Thais] would not scold or call you an idiot but would treat you really well. This is expected in order to make them great 
men; men of religious virtue. I imagine that, even if one makes a mistake, they would still forgive him in order to be able to go 
to Sukhavati [Land of Bliss]. I am wondering if they think of it this way. I have recently been considering this. Neither have they 
investigated into the cause [of lost sales] nor have they made a critical movement in others [sales].” (A Japanese manager in 
JTHAI) 
 
“ We [Thais] do not give much pressure by asking why, why and why to the sales managers. I just try to help them explain the 
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situation. My style is different from that of the [Japanese] president who is always asking why, why and why.” (A Thai assistant 
director in JTHAI) 
Market logic “Different from Japan, a luncheon meeting here is a common practice where we have lunch with the customers together. It is 
uncommon in Japan yet is the culture in America… where [the host] receives the customer’ information [which possibly leads 
to new business opportunities] in return for paying for lunch.” (A Japanese vice president in JUSA)  
 
“… I am sales and considering only numbers. The reason why I care about profits and sales is to think about more salary and 
more incentive to change their life. How can we change life? That can be done by salary right? Wage, that is salary, right? If 
we make big numbers, that means that Taiwanese could get more salary. Japanese think about the benefit of Tokyo only.” (A 
Taiwanese manager in JTAIW) 
 
“It is all about [sales] numbers so I can’t help but pay more [salary and sales commission] to the one who performs better [than 
agreed sales budget] because it will be trouble if he or she leaves [JUSA]… I cannot evaluate other than with [numbers]…” (A 
Japanese vice president in JUSA) 
Corporation logic “Given a generation gap [between the customer contacts and his subordinates], the contacts at customers whom I have dealt 
with are promoted to become directors so ‘Ko’ [my kids in English] whom I took to customers tend to communicate with the 
same job titles within [Japanese] customers organizations. I could talk to anyone, but my subordinates neither directly talk to a 
director nor are allowed to talk by him. There is a seniority based [social] order [within the Japanese customers’ 
organizations]. My subordinates instruct their men in the same way [as I do].” (A Thai manager in JTHAI) 
 
“I told a Taiwanese manager [in a performance evaluation meeting] that well, this man is already 32 year old and has kids so 
said why don’t you raise his salary… but [the Taiwanese manager] told me it’s irrelevant. He seems to care more about the 
lengthy of service rather than age.” (A Japanese managing director in JTAIW) 
  
 212 
 The next three sections demonstrate aligned practices in customer 
development where there is high compatibility and high centrality between 
Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism, and between the market and 
corporation logics.   
 
6.3 Collective efforts to develop Japanese customers  
Japanese customer development has long been recognised as a collective effort 
in JapanCo’s international development. To be exact, JapanCo has long 
followed Japanese customers going abroad, rather than initiating its 
internationalisation by itself. The Japanese Managing Director (MD) in JTHAI 
claims that “we were taken by the initiative of [Japanese] customers who wanted 
to start overseas businesses”. He critically asserts that JapanCo group has 
literally never formulated and executed an overseas strategy on its own. As a 
consequence of chasing Japanese customers in Japan, it has, in turn, followed 
what Japanese customers told them in overseas markets. This heavy 
dependence on Japanese customers echoes the idea of ‘relational 
embeddedness’ in Asia (Collinson and Rugman, 2008) in which the Japanese 
customers there allow ‘customer-led new product development’. In particular, 
this is evident in JTHAI where the main business is to develop the existing and 
incoming Japanese customers. While JTHAI has developed its business with 
Japanese customers since its foundation, with Japanese customers comprising 
more than 70% of its total revenue, JUSA and JTAIW started with a similar 
intention but now have few Japanese customers. Meanwhile, all of JEU’s 
customers are non-Japanese.  
  
 213 
 In practice, Japanese expatriates are the primary contacts and play a 
key role in the selling process: proposing products and services and executing 
sales projects; for instance, installing valves or air conditioning systems into 
factories, and closing the sales contracts and collecting receivables. This is 
mainly because communications with the customer contacts are done in 
Japanese if they are Japanese. A Japanese expatriate manager in JTHAI 
explains:   
 
In the projects handled by Japanese managers at [the Japanese] 
customers, Japanese expatriates are all the contacts for the 
customers … Thais wouldn’t get involved in … They would be under 
our [Japanese] control and told by us to submit this and that quotation 
… [in the projects by Thais] it will be totally reversed  … they do not 
consult each other … so both of us [Japanese and Thais] do live and 
let live … as a matter of fact, it is meaningless to get Thais involved 
with Japanese in handling projects so I would rather tell them to do as 
they are told…  
 
This is consistent with how Japanese customer development occurs in JTAIW 
and JUSA. In most sales jobs, local employees are the ‘doers’ while the 
Japanese expatriates are the leaders. This means that Japanese expatriates 
plan and give orders to local employees about what to do. A Japanese MD in 




before the launch of a project … pre-project work design and 
quotation are work tasks which Japanese at customers are 
responsible so I will be in charge of these tasks … then, after project 
acquisition, say let’s execute it at site, local employees will take over 
and implement these projects …  
 
So, due to the Japanese customer contacts, the roles of Japanese and local 
employees are fixed. In practice, Japanese to Japanese relations between 
JapanCo’s subsidiaries and Japanese customers in a given location is 
constantly prioritised in the Japanese customer relationship  
 This Japanese to Japanese relationship is based on the collective 
identity, ‘company as family’. This allows actors to view Japanese customers as 
‘organisational assets’ meaning that it needs to be shared and in turn developed 
with a collective effort as in Japan. Intensive socialisation, seniority, seasonal 
greetings are identified in developing Japanese customers. For instance, 
Japanese top management tends to be invited for a greeting by the customer. 
Japanese Vice President (VP) mentioned that “I still make a greeting to 
Japanese customers here in the US because I am often invited by them”. All the 
Japanese expatriate directors or presidents tend to greet the existing or new 
Japanese customers in a host country. The Japanese expatriate explained that 
“the main aim of the greeting is to gain more sales opportunities from the 
Japanese customer locally which the Japanese are visiting”. He went on to 
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mention that “I made a greeting with some Japanese customers and then, got 
sales opportunities to submit a quotation, which is not yet finalized… so 
everyone makes a visit for greeting Japanese customers locally but not [for 
American customers]”. All the customers are not Keiretsu at all but the greeting 
custom still remains even outside Japan like JUSA.  
 Moreover, in JTHAI, this close relationship with Japanese customers 
enacts Japanese cultural collectivism. There are no individual sales incentives in 
developing Japanese customers because of aspects of organisational assets. 
This is remarkably consistent with the sales activities in JHQ where all Japanese 
salespersons are assumed to contribute to team goals and be rewarded by 
promotion. Although sales quota is assigned to salespersons, they often share 
the same corporate customers so rather are expected to cooperate together with 
team members and mentor the inexperienced ones. In line with the same 
assumption, the Japanese MD in JTAIW assumes that Japanese customer 
development itself should be, and actually is, treated as an organisational effort. 
He views sales performance from Japanese customers as a consequence of 
teamwork rather than individual performance. In fact, there is an individual sales 
incentive programme for only local salespersons in JUSA and JEU where it is a 
common business practice, not in JTHAI and JTAIW. In addition, salespersons, 
when developing Japanese customers, are expected to have technological 
expertise and knowledge, as in Japan. Thus, the title of local Thai salespersons 
in JTHAI, for example, is not just sales but Sales Engineer (SE) in order for them 
to deal with Japanese customers.  
 In a sharp contrast to Japanese customer development, that of local 
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customers enacts the market and corporation logics, where an economic 
incentive is paramount, more than the Japanese ‘family’ logic. In JEU, for 
example, there are European or American rather than Japanese ones. The 
largest customer, comprising more than 60% of total revenue in JEU, is 
AmericaCo Europe, as the corporate alliance partner, with which JapanCo has 
long dealt. It has been an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customer, 
buying JapanCo’s products and reselling them under the name of AmericaCo. A 
Belgian manager simply points out that dealing with AmericaCo is a ‘boring’ 
routine job. He describes  
 
[JEU] was founded about twelve or thirteen years ago … to serve 
AmericaCo. Everybody was looking for only one dedicated customer 
– AmericaCo, then it’s easy. If you have one customer who sells one 
million or millions of products a year, then the only thing you have to 
do is every week sign so many boxes, you give them to them and 
that’s it. Get invoice and that’s it. Easy job. But if it’s an easy job you 
become sloppy, you become lazy. 
 
Dealing with AmericaCo is based on their corporate contract as an OEM, rather 
than for local business which JEU developed, thus enacting the corporation logic 
where the organisational hierarchy between JEU and their headquarters is 
legitimised. Indeed, none of the respondents in JEU have attributed Japanese 
‘family’ to the practices in local customer development. Types of customers, 
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whether Japanese or non-Japanese, therefore, matter to constellations of logics.  
 The fact that there are surrounding Japanese players, Japanese 
customers, Japanese expatriates, opens up a cultural space to be filled with 
Japanese ‘family’ and collectivism, as Kondo (1990) articulate. Japanese 
customer development is conducted through actors’ cultural interpretations of 
Japanese ‘family’ and other logics; market, corporation, religion as reviewed in a 
next few sub-sections. 
 
6.4 Dealing with Japanese customers through the Japanese ‘family’ logic  
The Japanese ‘family’-like relationship is supported by a clanship in the 
corporation, rather than the blood relationship normally assumed in the Western 
‘family’. This notion of ‘family’ is shown in the interviews with Thai sales 
managers in JTHAI. A Thai sales manager describes his sales force as a ‘family’ 
by saying that “we are family”, as Kondo articulates (1990). He and his 
subordinates often go out together, have lunches and dinners together, and even 
go on company and team trips together. He treats his men as his kids and tries 
constantly to advise them formally and informally. Other managers also use 
‘family’ as an expression for their salesforces. In JTAIW, there is one Taiwanese 
manager who refers to the Japanese corporation as ‘family’. In fact, he has been 
working since the company’s initiation and believes that teamwork is important. 
Another Taiwanese manager agrees with the concept of ‘family’ in reference to 
the Japanese leadership style of caring for its employees all the time. Mentioning 
a former Japanese expatriate, she says “in the beginning, at that time, there 
were maybe only 20-30 people so he treated us like his children”. This concept 
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of ‘family’ is deeply associated with the Japanese cultural version of ‘family’ 
when they develop Japanese customers.   
 Another Thai manager, who was brought up in Japan, and speaks fluent 
Japanese, raises the importance of ‘family’ which possibly stems from his 
relationship with Japanese customers. In the actual interview, he calls his 
subordinates kids. He went on to point out that this notion of ‘family’ might 
transpose from Japanese customers to his salesforce. He states:  
 
Given a generation gap [between the customer contacts and his 
subordinates], the contacts at customers whom I have dealt with are 
promoted to become directors so ‘Ko’ [my kids in English] whom I took 
to customers tend to communicate with the same job titles within 
[Japanese] customers organizations. I could talk to anyone, but my 
subordinates neither directly talk to a director nor are allowed to talk 
by him. There is a seniority based [social] order [within the Japanese 
customers’ organizations]. My subordinates instruct their men in the 
same way [as I do]. 
 
Treating subordinates as ‘Ko’ in Japanese, kids in English, he views managing 
people as like nurturing young subordinates like his kids. This paternalism is the 
Japanese version of the ‘family’ where the older has to care for the younger. It 
also means that Japanese ‘family’ members in the corporation are ranked by 
seniority, rather than their performance; Bhappu (2000) states that ‘achievement 
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is second to trust’ in Japanese organisations. The seniority here is based on a 
Japanese father and child relationship transposed into Japanese customer 
organisations. In order for the Thai manager to communicate effectively with the 
contacts in Japanese customer organisations, he utilises the concept of 
Japanese seniority in his salesforce. He expects and actually teaches his ‘Ko’ to 
do the same as he maintains the seniority. This seniority of the ‘family’ is 
manifested in Japanese business organisations (the corporation logic) for 
gaining economic benefits (the market logic).   
 Furthermore, this father and child relationship is strongly implied 
between Thai managers and their Thai subordinates. At first sight, the Japanese 
‘family’ seems to be legitimised by full ‘unconditional loyalty’ just as the Western 
‘family’ means a child’s complete dependence on his father (Thornton et al., 
2012). In reference to the ‘Oyabun Kobun’ relationship, however, a Japanese 
ritual kinship relationship (e.g., Ishino, 1953), the Thai manger actually 
emphasises the concept of ‘family’ in Japanese as a metaphor when providing 
practical advice to his subordinates. This means that the subordinate, as a child, 
should follow advice from, and learn from, the manager, as a father. He 
describes how to train and instruct his men. 
 
[For subordinates] rather than teamwork unconditional support is 
necessary. It is from mental to professional support. Like an older 
brother caring for the younger, I need to teach them by visiting the 
customer sites together. The experienced [the old] need to instruct the 
inexperienced [the young]. I teach the basics and they follow me, and 
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let them see what ‘Oyabun’ [their boss] is doing. I have them see my 
interaction with [Japanese] customers. They in general would 
understand what this business is in one year and half or two years. 
Yet, they still need to learn more continuously.  
 
He characterises his men as his ‘children’ who need to copy his behaviours and 
attitudes as he insists that “as a child grows, the parents let him watch how they 
live, so my men should do the same”. Occasionally seizing his chance to teach 
his children especially in visiting Japanese customers, he tends to tell what is 
right and wrong in communicating with the Japanese customers. In this sense, 
parents are always their children’s role model. As a matter of fact, I, when a 
salesman in Japan, was trained exactly like this. This expression is often used 
as a typical way of raising the inexperienced salespersons by Japanese 
managers. The experienced sales persons need to take on the role of the father 
to raise the inexperienced as a young child. This is quite distinctive in the sense 
that this Japanese ‘family’ norm exists within a corporation. By contrast, the 
Western ‘family’ primarily concerns a blood relationship, thus caring for the direct 
family only.  
This Japanese ‘family’ strongly implies ‘reciprocity and obligation’ 
(Bhappu, 2000; Kondo, 1990) between a father and his children. It means that 
the relationship between a father and his child is expected to be legitimised 
through reciprocal obligation. In addition to on-the-job training, the Thai manager 
regularly facilitates study groups within his department as part of sales training. 
In the study group, the inexperienced salespersons can study the JapanCo 
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product lines. This usually takes place once a week during non-working hours, - 
non-payable hours in other words. He emphasises the burden on his children by 
asserting that “each member should study the products on his own”: it is an 
obligation of his children as responsible ‘family’ members. He exemplifies that 
“for instance, this week, my subordinate is ordered to study the heat source 
system, and he studies this and becomes a teacher in this study group… 
normally, we need to deal with another new job when we do a topic by half”. This 
strongly manifests not the Western ‘family’, but the Japanese ‘family’ norm 
where the ‘family’ is based on ‘reciprocity and obligation’. 
 Moreover, this Japanese ‘family’ relationship is also distinct from the 
Western ‘family’ in terms of ‘Ongaeshi’ in Japanese, which means repayment to 
someone to whom one thinks one owes a lot to. Ongaeshi is the Japanese word 
in which each child once they have become an adult needs to repay (gaeshi) its 
own parents in exchange for having received the favour of being nurtured (on). 
Bhappu (2000) considers this as the basis of the Japanese ‘family’ relationship 
Through Japanese customer development, the Japanese Vice President in 
JUSA states that his ultimate goal is not promotion or salary raise. What really 
motivates him to grow drastically the business of JUSA is to conduct ‘Ongaeshi’ 
in Japanese by repaying those who had taught and trained him since he joined 
JapanCo. He asserts:  
 
I would not have been working here if I wanted to make much money... 
I could not make much money here... I could change a job and there is 
a plenty outside of JapanCo, and actually many job opportunities 
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came to me… but even if I change the job, I’m not sure that I would 
continue to have fun in the job as I do… so my goal is to grow the 
business of JTHAI, not to change a job for a higher salary… I have 
owed a lot to [JapanCo] and many olds... indeed [JapanCo] is not a 
great prestigious company but I could not find myself outside here…  
 
Here, he denies that he is motivated by a higher salary or promotion. His 
motivation is to grow the business based on repaying JapanCo group, Ongaeshi 
in Japanese. This is the moment when he repays for what he believes he owes: 
a sense of being trained and nurtured. So he concludes that ‘it is absolute that I 
do achieve good economic results in order to respect those to whom I have 
owned’.  
 Thus, for him, to grow the business of JUSA is not the sole purpose of 
his business but is simply his ‘obligation’ in exchange for what he had got. 
Developing the American market is simply one approach of conducting 
‘Ongaeshi’. He continues to explain what ongaeshi means to him: 
 
It’s not only America, America is just a result of me being transferred, 
and then I just came here by chance… It’s simply because I have 
owed a lot to JapanCo in Japan, and JapanCo asked me to expand 
the business of JUSA, therefore, it is imperative for me to repay by 




This American market development is purely economic activity while 
encouraged by ‘family’ ‘obligation’ because he feels ongaeshi in Japanese. 
Ongaeshi originally stems from the ‘family’ relationship between parents and 
their child. Similarly, there is another Japanese expatriate manager who 
continues to work at JUSA due to the advice from his senior, ‘Senpai’. He is 
trying to keep the words of the seniors who used to advise him and even ‘protect’ 
him within JapanCo from being treated in an irrational manner, such as being 
relocated or fired. He still keeps the words that he was told to “put the customer 
needs first whenever you cannot decide”. He was also advised to ‘be patient and 
continue to stay at JapanCo’ when he wanted to resign before. The ‘family’ 
relationship with his seniors still remains and directs local customer 
development.  
This indicates actors’ cultural interpretation of the Japanese ‘family’ logic, 
which is somewhat distinctive from the Western ‘family’ logic based on 
‘unconditional loyalty’. Japanese expatriates incline to repay by increasing 
economic results while feeling this obligation for the seniors who cared them. 
This also develops the reciprocity and obligation relationship based on ‘ko and 
on’ as Kondo (1990) and Bhappu (2000) assert. A series of Japanese 
management scholars, mainly non-Japanese, fail to illuminate these cultural 
interpretations of the market logic because they lack ‘area knowledge’, as Elger 
and Smith (2005) point out.  
 
6.5 Gaining religious merits in sales follow up 
This ‘family’ norm is strongly manifested among the Thai salesforces, rather than 
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Japanese expatriates. In fact, none of Japanese expatriates in JTHAI expressed 
themselves by saying that “we are family” as the Thai managers do. The 
Japanese MD, when asked whether he thinks of JTHAI as ‘family’, was dead 
against the concept of ‘family’. He said that “for me, this is not ‘family’ but a 
professional workplace. Family sounds very light-hearted. I could not take it 
easy”. Another Japanese expatriate manager interprets Japanese ‘family’ 
among Thai employees very differently. He argues for Theravada Buddhism by 
stating:  
 
… everybody here gets along with each other … and tends to give a 
hand to inexperienced employees and others … there is probably 
Theravada Buddhism behind these behaviours …  
 
He asserts that, for the Thai, it is the religion logic of Theravada Buddhism that is 
activated rather than the family logic. He went on to point out the importance of 
religious merit in Theravada Buddhism for the Thai employees: helping others, 
showing benevolence, and forgiving the mistakes of others. Indeed Theravada 
Buddhism is the dominant religion in Thailand, observed by about 95% of the 
citizens (Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003). The concept of Japanese ‘family’ 
with ‘obligation and reciprocity’ may be emphasised through Theravada 
Buddhism, where the ultimate purpose is to gain religious merit through 
mundane jobs. The religion logic based on Thai Theravada Buddhism is strongly 
identified only in JTHAI, not in other subsidiaries, such as JTAIW, JEU, and 
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JUSA. In particular, in JUSA, a local director told me, when asked about religious 
influence, that “we are not allowed to talk about religion”.  
Similarly, another Japanese expatriate casts doubt on this ‘family’ which 
the Thais always mention, although this is admired by other Japanese 
expatriates. He rather calls these practices, conducted by the Thai manager and 
its subordinates, as ‘quasi-Japanese management practices’ with some 
individualism. He meant that these practices, while superficially similar to 
Japanese practices, are somehow ‘Thai’ Japanese practices influenced by 
Theravada Buddhism, which promotes the practices of helping others for 
religious merit. He adds that gaining religious merit, ‘Tam Bun’ in Thai, which is 
central to Thai people, can be achieved not only by making a donation but also 
by forgiving and helping others in order for them to achieve a good ‘next life’, as 
Atmiyanandana and Lawler (2003) explain. The study group, for instance, can 
also be interpreted not as maintaining the Japanese ‘family’ norm but as gaining 
religious merits. It is neither organised nor ordered by the Japanese expatriates 
but purely volunteered by the Thai manager. All the other Thai managers 
proactively provide on-the-job training for sales, even after working hours. This 
on-the-job training is also not assigned as a job or ordered by the Japanese 
expatriates. In the same way, at social events, the person with the highest 
position tends to be the one to pay for all the bills in order to gain religious merit 
(see 7.3.1). The Japanese expatriate exemplifies this as a typical Japanese 
management practice among Thai local employees, stating that “[Thais] get 
along with each other and tend to help each other.” He admires the fact that Thai 
employees are really doing good at this practice. These may superficially look 
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like ‘a Japanised subsidiary’, as a Japanese expatriate mentioned, yet it is not 
really Japanese but in some sense the Thai religion. In addition, although both 
Japanese and Thai nations are collectivistic societies, ‘family’ from the Thai point 
of view seems to be quite influenced by religious aspects since the Thai 
behaviour of gaining religious merit is based on individual efforts.  
This becomes evident in sales follow-up. For instance, there was a huge 
sales opportunity from a customer. A Thai salesman was expected to submit a 
quotation by the deadline but did not prepare until just the day before. As a result, 
the opportunity was lost. The only person who got angry over the sales loss and 
closely questioned the salesman was a Japanese expatriate. In this case, the 
Japanese expatriates got upset over lost sales and yelled at the Thai local 
salesman. Thai directors, however, reacted quite differently. They tended to view 
a lost sale as an opportunity to gain Theravada Buddhism merits. In losing sales 
opportunities, they try to gain religious merits by resigning to their mistakes. 
According to the Japanese expatriate, Thai managers or directors showed no 
reaction over this incident. He continued to state that “well, none of the Thai 
managers blamed the sales persons for losing the sales opportunity … they 
were just saying mai pen rai (never mind in English) … this is incredible”. A 
Japanese expatriate suspected that behind this incident is the concept of gaining 
a religious merit, or ‘Tam Bun’ in Thai. According to him, not only making a 
donation but also forgiving and helping others are the means to make religious 
merits in Theravada Buddhism. In other words, forgiving and helping others are 
not for business purposes such as expanding the business and increasing the 
revenue but for gaining one’s own religious merit. This religious merit in 
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Theravada Buddhism is reflected in an ideal Thai leader helping and forgiving 
(Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003). 
 This Japanese expatriate interprets the religious merit as a guiding 
principle for Thai people in business as well as in daily life. This is possibly 
related to the ultimate interest for Thais which is to gain religious merits in order 
to have a better next life by being born into a wealthy ‘family’ (Atmiyanandana 
and Lawler, 2003). Comparing this with Japanese behaviours, he went on to 
share his interpretation of the Thais: 
 
They [Thais] would not scold or call you an idiot but would treat you 
really well. This is expected in order to make them great men; men of 
religious virtue. I imagine that, even if one makes a mistake, they 
would still forgive him in order to be able to go to Sukhavati [Land of 
Bliss]. I am wondering if they think of it this way. I have recently been 
considering this. Neither have they investigated into the cause [of lost 
sales] nor have they made a critical movement in others [sales].  
 
In actual work practices, this resignation is highly likely to bring about another 
economically irrational result in sales activities because it does not allow any 
investigation into what causes lost opportunities and therefore learning from a 
mistake. For the Thais, it is a passive action in order to gain a religious merit 
while for Japanese, it results in ‘no learning curve’. One’s current status is a 
consequence of one’s prior life; thereby the Thais continue to revise their 
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possible future status by seeking to gain religious merits.  
 The religious norm is strongly implicated in the tendency to be 
‘benevolent’ to others although this is not clearly articulated by Thai local 
employees. A Thai local director responded to the question regarding how to 
deal with salespersons who are losing sales opportunities. Unlike the Japanese 
president, he pointed out that applying pressure on sales itself is not right. He 
claimed: 
 
We [Thais] do not give much pressure by asking why, why and why to 
the sales managers. I just try to help them explain the situation. My 
style is different from that of the [Japanese] president who is always 
asking why, why and why. 
 
It is true that, due to the importance of forgiveness, he tends not to investigate, 
or be investigated, about the cause. Religious norms seem to be quite implicit 
among Thai employees. In the interviews, he clearly denies the existence of 
Theravada Buddhism in the workplace when asked whether Theravada 
Buddhism may or may not influence Thai behaviours. Similarly, there are some 
Thai employees, when developing local customers, who tend to insist on sales 
incentives for individual sales performance. They often tend to ask Japanese 
expatriates by saying “why do we need to acquire and develop new local 
customer… since we have enough Japanese customers”. They then tend to 
insist on an increase in salary by taking on difficult tasks, such as acquiring local 
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customers. However, the fact that they end up smiling or being quiet in the face 
of lost sales opportunities tends to be understood by the Japanese as a 
reflection of Thai religious beliefs. This forgiveness and avoidance of anger is 
accommodated not only by the cultural custom, but also by Theravada 
Buddhism which encourages the Thais to gain religious merits such as by being 
generous, by being forgiving of others, as well as by helping others.  
 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter has sought to understand how the aligned practices of customer 
development are culturally interpreted through high compatibility and high 
centrality in logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014). There are two main findings 
which are identified in this chapter: Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada 
Buddhism logic are culturally interpreted; logics are amplified in a cooperative 
manner, rather than being compatible.  
 The first finding is that the Japanese ‘family’ logic and Thai Theravada 
Buddhism are culturally interpreted according to a national culture with which 
actors conducting the practices are associated. The elements of the Japanese 
‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism logics fundamentally differ from those of 
logics defined by Thornton et al. (2012). The distinctive elements of cultural 
interpretations are threefold. First, the concept of the Japanese ‘family’ is not 
exactly the same as that of the Western ‘family’. First, the Japanese ‘family’ is 
governed by reciprocal ko and on relationships, rather than ‘unconditional loyalty’ 
which legitimates Western the ‘family’ (Thornton et al., 2012). This originates 
from the importance of ‘reproduction of ‘family’ members’ as Friedland and Alford 
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(1991) state. This Western ‘family’ logic seems to be consistent with Western 
‘family’ firms (e.g., Karra et al., 2006). What legitimises the Japanese ‘family’, 
however, is ‘reciprocity and obligation’ based on the Japanese notion of ‘family’. 
‘Oyabun Kobun’ and ‘Senpai’ are expressed as a burden of Japanese ‘family’ 
members: ‘Ongaeshi’, repayment to those whom one owes a debt to, especially 
in the context of a child or subordinate who is obligated to return the favour to its 
parents or seniors for the nurturing they offered. The Japanese VP in JUSA is 
originally motivated to return the favour to senpai, the senior to whom he thinks 
he owes a debt (see 6.4). For him, it is common sense to return the favour by 
generating profits. Then, he further interprets a demand for ongaeshi based on 
the Japanese ‘family’ logic in the contexts of corporation. This meaning of ‘family’ 
is also influenced by the collectivistic nature of Japanese society (Hofstede, 
2010). It here has little to do with ‘unconditional loyalty’ as such, prioritizing more 
“reciprocity and obligation rather than obedience” (Bhappu, 2000). It is also not 
really consistent with the parental altruism which can be manifested in Western 
‘family’ firms (e.g., Nordqvist and Melin, 2010; Karra et al., 2006).  
Next, each meaning of ‘family’ in Japan and the West entails a different 
scope of ‘family’ members. The Japanese ‘family’ means an expanded concept 
of ‘family’ including non-blood relationships (Bhappu, 2000), while the Western 
‘family’ usually means direct blood relationship in a nuclear ‘family’. It even 
includes its subordinates as ‘family’ members by saying that “we are family”. A 
body of literature about ‘family’ firms tends to assume blood relations for the 
enactment of the family logic in terms of their ownership and structure (Thornton 
et al., 2012; Chung and Luo, 2008). The ‘family’ in Japan, however, includes the 
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non-blood relationship; as Kondo (1990) asserts ‘ie’ in Japan should not be 
treated just as a kinship based on biological blood relations but is “best 
understood as corporate group that holds property (for example, land, a 
reputation, and an art or ‘cultural capital’) in perpetuity” (p122) (emphasis in 
original). This is also connected to the national culture: in Japan’s collectivistic 
society, Japan, people “‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty” 
while in an individualistic society, “people are supposed to look after themselves 
and their direct ‘family’ only” (Hofstede, 2010).  
 Finally, the Thai Theravada Buddhism logic is also culturally interpreted. 
In contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism enables actors to gain 
religious merits in the form of outward signs during their daily lives 
(Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003). The Thai Theravada Buddhism logic is not 
consistent with the meanings of Western logics as put forward by Thornton et al 
(2012). A leader in Theravada Buddhism is expected to be a ‘benevolent’ father. 
This contrasts with a religion logic based on Christianity, governed by 
‘sacredness’ (Thornton et al., 2012). Although Thornton et al. (2012) utilised a 
more universal religious logic, it is fundamentally based on the Christian view of 
religion, which may not be easily transferred to the Asian context. This 
Theravada Buddhism version of the religion logic is deeply embedded in Thai 
society as the logic rooted in a national context as its ‘geographical community’ 
(Lounsbury, 2007). Both Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism once 
again highlight the limitations of the current Western institutional logics 




 These distinctions extend our knowledge about a relationship between 
logics and national cultures where the national culture affects the logics, rather 
than simply being a part of them. The current literature assumes the universality 
of logics by demonstrating how different constellations of logics are enacted in 
different national contexts (e.g., Värlander et al., 2016). This chapter 
demonstrates that the logics themselves manifest the national cultures with 
which actors are associated. Giorgi et al. (2015), for example, make a distinction 
between the cultural effect on institutions and institutions’ effect on culture, 
positioning culture as able to play a role in institutional change and stability. In 
their review of the current literature, culture and institutions are assumed to be 
intertwined and thus inseparable given their comment that “institutions are 
thoroughly cultural” (ditto, p27). Indeed current studies have not explicitly argued 
for the relationship between culture and institutions on the assumption that 
culture and institutions are clearly separated (Giorgi et al. 2015). This is 
somewhat true in the recent work of logics and culture. For example, analysing 
transferring practices in a MNC, Värlander et al. (2016) illuminate different 
constellations of logics in the US, China and India according to their national 
cultures, providing thereby a dynamic view of how logics manifest in different 
institutional environments. They did not forget to remind us of their particular 
concern about the relationship between logics and national culture by saying 
that “the content of familiar logics may themselves vary across sites” (Värlander 
et al., 2016, p103). They are very aware of the potential distinctions between the 
market logic in China, where the economy is planned, and that of the US. This 
concern is consistent with the current calls for a better understanding of the 
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relationship between culture and institutions (Giorgi et al., 2015). In this thesis, 
the enactments of the Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism logics 
confirm that not only are logics and culture interdependent, but they also 
manifest one another. It argues that national cultures are incorporated in logics 
themselves, thus changing the interpretations of logics per se.  
 The second finding is that logics are amplified in a cooperative manner. 
The finding directly elaborates on the presupposition of amplification itself 
(Greenwood et al., 2010; 2011). Here, the Thai employees in JTHAI are 
motivated to be ‘family’ members (the ‘family’) who cooperate through seniority 
(the corporation), helping the other (the religion logic) to ultimately gain 
economic results (the market logic). The benevolence of the Thai leader is 
strongly implied in the term of ‘family’, so its father needs to not only care its child 
but also to gain religious merit, not only facilitating but also strengthening both 
the ‘family’ and religion logics. This is consistent with what Greenwood et al. 
(2010) showed as the relationship between Spanish ‘family’ owned firms and 
Catholicism. This also confirms Bhappu’s (2000) identification of the ‘family’ and 
religion logics within Japanese MNCs. She demonstrates the existence of the 
‘family’ and religion logics simply operating within Japanese MNCs, but fails to 
point out how these logics coexist and cooperate. Logics are likely to intertwine 
with each other through the meanings of ‘reciprocity’. This further elaborates on 
the concept of amplification which Greenwood et al. (2011) propose to be the 
amplified effects of the ‘family’ and religion logics, because both logics concern 
social responsibility in society, rather than self-interest.  
 Moreover, this raises a significant doubt as to whether the concept of 
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compatibility (Besharov and Smith, 2014) is adequate to describe the 
relationship between the ‘family’, religion, market and corporation logics in this 
chapter. Aligned practices are enacted with high compatibility, meaning that 
‘logics provide compatible prescriptions for action’ (Besharov and Smith, 2014). 
Here, however, Japanese ‘family’ is incorporated in other logics, such as the 
Thai Theravada Buddhism, market, and corporation logics, all amplifying each 
other without the hierarchy. In this chapter, the Thai employees characterise 
themselves as ‘family’ when developing Japanese customers (see 6.4) while 
also manifesting religious merit in Theravada Buddhism when developing 
customers (see 6.5). They do not scold or yell as Japanese expatriates do but 
forgive the mistakes of their subordinates by saying mai pen rai. The significance 
they attribute to religious merit is not only facilitated, but also amplified by the 
demand to generate revenue for the corporation (the market and corporation 
logics). Here, it is much more than just compatibility among logics providing 
‘compatible prescriptions for action’ (ibid). None of ‘compatible logics’ (Besharov 
and Smith, 2014), ‘a hybrid logic’ (Thornton et al., 2005), nor facilitative 
relationship (Goodrick and Reay, 2011) can adequately describe how these 
logics strengthen each other: amplifying logics in other words.  




 Contested Practices in Work and Employment: Chapter 7:
Significance of Context 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to understand how the contested practices in work and 
employment are interpreted through low compatibility and high centrality in 
logics. The ‘family’, religion, market and corporation logics are enacted in a 
contradictory manner in the practices of work and employment. The chapter is 
organised into four sections. First, job delegation is discussed. Next, 
performance appraisal is evaluated. Finally, socialisation is reviewed. The 
concluding section articulates the finding of the chapter: constellations of logics 
are ongoing and continuously formed in relation to geographical locations. 
 
7.2 Job delegation: A conflict between self-improvement, self-acceptance, 
and self-interest 
Job delegation contextually enacts conflicts between the Japanese ‘family’, 
religion, corporation, and market logics on an ongoing basis. In JTHAI, where 
there are Japanese sales managers dealing with Japanese customers, 
Theravada Buddhism contextually enacts religious merit gained through 
self-acceptance, while Japanese ‘family’ self-improvement is a reciprocal 
obligation. A conflict arises between Theravada Buddhism and ‘family’ logics 
when a Thai director finds it difficult to delegate a job properly. For Japanese, 
self-improvement is assumed to be a burden of ‘family’ members and thus a 
manager has to help his subordinates to improve. Japanese tend to treat local 
employees by saying ‘Shita Gekirei’, a phrase often used in reference to 
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Japanese ‘family’, meaning to give a pep talk while scolding if necessary. In a 
sense, job delegation is treated as an opportunity for on-the-job training by 
Japanese managers. In contrast, for Thais, self-acceptance is assumed to be 
central to gaining religious merit. In fact, a Thai director simply accepts the fact 
that there may be people incapable of doing the task, completing it by himself 
instead. This echoes a religious belief that “one’s current status is related to the 
way one led one’s prior lives” (Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003, p235). In a 
nutshell, Theravada Buddhism enables actors to gain religious merits through 
acts such as “kindness towards others, especially the less fortunate” 
(Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2003, p234).   
 Thus, when a Thai director finds it difficult to delegate a job to his 
subordinates he sees this as a consequence of ‘prior live’ and tend, therefore, to 
accept incompetent subordinates as they are by immediately giving up training 
and encouraging. A Japanese expatriate exemplifies that:  
 
There is one [Thai] salesman who is really incapable under a Thai 
director. So I ordered the Thai director to tell the salesman do a 
particular job. Then, what happened is that the director did that job 
instead, not the salesman. Thus the salesman would not be educated 
nor would he recognise this as an issue because the director did the 
job instead. I observed that the director already gave up asking the 
salesman to do the job and did it by himself. He never tried to give a 
pep talk to the salesman. In brief, he is an individual [not a team 
member]. [He thinks] he is capable but the other isn’t. It means that I 
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am I and you are you… Here, Theravada Buddhism is immensely 
influential … 
 
He went to say that this is attributed to the religious aspect of Theravada 
Buddhism behind the Thai behaviours, the importance of forgiving other 
mistakes. The Japanese expatriate did not notice this contextual religious aspect 
in job delegation until the moment when the Thai director did the job instead. The 
Thai director simply accepts the fact that his subordinate is incapable while 
Japanese tend to feel ‘obligated’ to encourage their men until the subordinates 
become competent. This conflict is triggered by contextual enactment of the 
religion logic, Theravada Buddhism. 
 On this occasion, the Japanese expatriate would tend to become angry 
and scold these Thai employees. This is simply because job delegation enacts 
Japanese ‘family’ which promotes self-improvement of its members. He 
interprets this by showing anger as a feature of the father’s role to his children in 
the process of raising them, while it is also a habit of pursuing one’s economic 
contribution. He believes that “there must be someone who should scold 
irresponsible salespersons… in a sense, I am taking on this burden … I am not 
Thai or will I live here forever … this is why I can be mad at local employees who 
are irresponsible”. It is true that he knows full well how much the Thais dislike 
being scolded at. In a harmony with Thai Theravada Buddhism, it is quite 
important to keep face ‘in-group’ so Thais tend not to show anger or be upset in 
front of others. Instead, they are smiling and often saying ‘Mai Pen Rai’ (never 
mind in English). Nonetheless, he would rather adopt the role of a commercial 
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manager in order to justify the need to care and therefore scold the locals for 
their irresponsibility. In fact, this Japanese expatriate manager asked my 
concurrence by saying that:  
 
The Japanese normally conduct ‘Shita Gekirei’ (giving a pep talk while 
scolding in English) to the young and inexperienced who are 
incapable of doing something, don’t we? The Japanese tend to expect 
you (as a child) to change in the future, so training you, scolding you 
when you are wrong, advising you, or proposing you with some 
ideas…  
 
This contrasts meanings of job delegation between the Japanese ‘family’ and 
Thai Buddhism. The Japanese ‘family’ prioritises the virtue of self-improvement 
as a burden of the Japanese ‘family’, while Thai Theravada Buddhism the virtue 
of self-acceptance is a religious merit. This Japanese expatriate is convinced 
that a manager should continuously encourage and supervise his subordinates 
regardless of whether or not they are capable, as Kondo (1990) strongly implies. 
This contrasts with the notion of Theravada, however, which prioritises accepting 
subordinates as they are and forgiving all the mistakes they make.  
In this interview, I completely agreed with him because this echoes my 
personal working experience at Japanese MNCs. Japanese managers tend to 
feel ‘obligated’ to encourage and even to reprimand if necessary, their 
subordinates until they become competent. In fact, I was told by supervisors, 
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when at Japanese MNCs, to teach and care for freshmen in the workplace. This 
type of anger showed by Japanese expatriate is not interpreted as a negative 
but rather as a positive behaviour demonstrating care for one’s employees. 
Indeed, the term of ‘Shita Gekirei’ manifests what an ideal family should be: 
children are to be raised and trained by being given a pep talk and by being 
scolded whenever necessary.  
These constellations of logics are formed very differently in other 
geographical locations, such as in JUSA, JEU and JTAIW. Here, job delegation 
tends to be viewed as job efficiency in order to achieve the self-interest of the 
manager who delegates, rather than as ‘Shita Gekirei’ to nurture one’s own kids 
as in JTHAI, conducts it. In JUSA, for instance, jobs are clearly delegated and 
separated between local employees. In particular, each field salesperson is 
assigned to different customers so there is little need to share or delegate jobs 
between local employees. In JTAIW, the situation is similar to that of JUSA, 
although there are conflicts between the Taiwanese employees when job 
delegation is necessary. The Japanese MD in JTAIW points out that “a job, 
whenever being shared, causes conflicts because the Taiwanese seem to feel 
that it is likely to be stolen by other sales, rather than delegated”, manifesting the 
self-interest of the market logic.  
Similarly, in JEU, job delegation is illustrated as the manifestation of 
self-interest (the market logic) in the corporation (the corporation logic), which 
would be against ‘Shita Gekirei’ (the family logic) . A Belgian operator shares her 
job delegated by her Belgian manager when she joined JEU. Although she has 
never worked at Japanese MNCs before, the operator contrasts the way of 
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working of the Belgian and the current Japanese MD. She states:   
 
In the beginning [a Belgian manager] was more controlling.  
Checking everything; which I can understand because you need to 
watch a lot of details in the Customer Service Department.  He also 
gave us a bit of room but not so much as [Japanese MD] did… Also 
depending upon the problem and the personality of the boss, of 
course. [the manager] wants to protect his own thing and wants to 
control everything…  
 
This comment implies a difference in job delegation between self-improvement 
and self-interest. Actually, the Belgian manager shares how he wants to treat his 
employees as follows: 
 
So I really I try to… should I say… create somebody who can work 
independently without too much… I try to create somebody who can 
work independently…  It’s more maybe my way, not typically 
Japanese; I think more my way because I want him to learn things 
also. … you can learn by yourself you remember better…I give him 
also targets and within these targets he can manage for himself… he 
has his freedom to work between the targets.  
 
This echoes the job delegation he conducted for her in the past. It manifests the 
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self-interest of the manager in terms of delegating jobs in an economically 
efficient manner. He has worked at JEU for a long time, but not had working 
experience at Japanese MNCs before. The market logic enacted in job 
delegation constrains actors to efficiently delegate a job to their subordinates so 
that both can work independently for the manager’s interest. This excludes 
sharing work enacting the family logic because job delegation involves only 
Belgium employees and is not directed by the Japanese MD.  
 Furthermore, in JTAIW, job delegation often causes conflicts between 
Taiwanese salespersons, manifesting the self-interest in the market logic. In 
practice, each salesperson often receives the same sales inquiry from the same 
customer. They seldom shared the types of sales inquiries on which they were 
working, leading to different salespersons proposing different prices for the same 
product to the same customer. A Japanese expatriate, calling this ‘ridiculous 
practice’, continues to describe what happened by delegating the job of deciding 
who to deal with each sales opportunity to his subordinates.  
 
[Taiwanese sales persons] rarely share or coordinate their jobs with 
other colleagues… Then, all of sudden, a salesperson often comes to 
me and complains that other salespersons are trying to steal his sales 
opportunity. I replied to him by saying, ask and talk to them. If you 
sceptical about your inquiry, you had better ask! … I don’t mind who 
deals with each sales opportunity but the Taiwanese want to build an 




This is because “[Taiwanese salespersons] are always afraid of losing their job 
by delegating it to, and sharing it with, others” according to the comment of a 
Japanese expatriate. According to the Japanese expatriate, teamwork is quite 
hard to implement. This comes down to the extent to which job delegation 
manifests the self-interest of the salespersons in JTAIW.  
 Here, job delegation manifests different constellations of logics 
according to geographical locations. Job delegation in JTHAI, therefore, 
manifests a conflict between the ‘family’ and religion logics while that in JEU 
manifests managers’ self-interests enacted by the market logic without the 
enactment of the family logic. Furthermore, in JTAIW, it strongly manifests the 
market logic, with salespersons protecting their own sales inquiries. In job 
delegation across geographical locations, different constellations of logics are 
enacted on an ongoing basis. 
  
7.3  Performance appraisal: Bonus, sales incentive and promotion   
A bonus and sales incentive can contextually manifest the competitive 
relationships between Japanese ‘family’ (‘family) and self-interest (market) on an 
ongoing basis. Granted, constellations of logics are contextually enacted, 
conflicted, and contextually mediated on an ongoing basis. However, there is 
some distinction between Asia and the West. In Asia, a bonus rewards collective 
performance (i.e. the ‘family’ logic tends to be manifested) while, in the West, a 
sales incentive promotes individual performance (the market logic). Nonetheless, 





7.3.1 A bonus as a collective reward: Japanese ‘family’ in the 
corporation  
In Asia, an equally distributed bonus is recognised as a collective reward for 
collective performance, enacting the Japanese reciprocal ‘family’ logic. In JTAIW 
and JTHAI where a bonus is adopted, sales performance is viewed not as an 
individual performance but a collective one. This logic conflicts with the market 
logic, however, with a strong demand for an individual bonus or salary increase 
from local employees.  
Taiwanese salespersons in JTAIW, for example, tend to treat a bonus as 
a consequence of individual performance. They tend to argue for a greater 
bonus than that of others who, they think, performed less. For them, a bonus is 
expected to be distributed according to each salesperson’s performance. In 
particular, in annual salary negotiation, this demand is put forward. A Taiwanese 
director explains the importance of individual salary:  
 
… I am sales and considering only numbers. The reason why I care 
about profits and sales is to think about more salary and more 
incentive to change their life. How can we change life? That can be 
done by salary right? Wage, that is salary, right? If we make big 
numbers, that means that Taiwanese could get more salary. Japanese 




This manifests sales performance as a consequence of individual self-interest 
(the market logic), not collective (‘family’). Facing a strong demand from his 
Taiwanese employees, the director favours the importance of individual 
performance evaluation and a salary increase according to one’s performance. A 
Taiwanese manager echoes the importance of salary by stating: “I created 
customers, and achieved big revenue, then I could negotiate an increase in 
salary with the boss. That is the American style. But in a Japanese company, I 
am not sure of if they accept it”. This tendency to argue for a salary increase 
continues especially among Taiwanese local employees. A Taiwanese secretary 
summarises this demand through her observation as follows: 
 
There are no Japanese management features here, such as loyalty 
and harmony… an individual Taiwanese salesman appeals his 
performance to his managers but the bonus amount is almost the 
same as others. Finally one’s bonuses are the same as others, 
usually equal to several months’ salary, so they are disappointed. This 
occurs over and over.  
 
This observation illuminates a confrontation between the Japanese ‘family’ and 
the market logics. There is another Taiwanese director who has worked long at 
JTAIW. He rather accepts the existence of the ‘family’ norm by stating that “But a 
Japanese company is a family. Competition among employees is less than that 
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of an American company.… JTAIW is not Taiwanese but is Japanese because of 
its Japanese style”. Then, he goes on to state the job security of Japanese 
companies because Japanese companies do not fire their employees but rather 
prefer long term and lifetime employment. For him, a bonus is a collective reward 
than individual reward. The competitive relationships are continuously formed 
‘over and over’ in everyday practices within JTAIW. 
 This confrontation between the ‘family’ and market logics, however, is 
contextually mediated by the corporation logic where an ultimate authority in the 
corporation tends to be given to ‘Laopan’ (president in English). Actual bonus 
negotiation is often escalated to the Japanese MD because Taiwanese tend to 
claim a salary increase directly to the Japanese MD over the heads of 
Taiwanese managers and directors. In the Taiwanese business, ‘Laopan’ is 
believed to be the only decision-maker in the corporation. A Japanese expatriate 
comments that there is a societal effect of the corporation on Taiwanese 
employees by ‘Laopan’ because, whatever it is, they tend to eventually follow 
what ‘Laopan’ says and orders. In actual performance appraisal meetings with 
the Taiwanese claiming directly, Japanese MD asks “What do you think really 
contributes to achieving your sales quota? In other words, is your sales 
performance achieved solely by your own effort?”. He then tends to go on to 
raise the possibility of other colleagues and experienced managers’ helping to 
coordinate sales opportunities by communicating with the executives in the 
customer organisations. Finally, the Taiwanese concluded that his sales 
performance was not solely the result of his own efforts but rather the product of 
organisational efforts. Salespersons may be reluctantly convinced by this 
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argument but it causes them considerable displeasure. One Taiwanese local 
salesman who claimed an increase in salary in the past declared: “I had no 
choice but to accept his claim… he is the president” after performance appraisal. 
This manifests ongoing constellations of logics: the corporation logic mediates 
the market logic in Asia where the authority of ‘Laopan’ through the corporation 
logic is rooted. 
Of course, performance appraisal does not always enact self-interest 
(the market logic). A Taiwanese director confessed that he could live with his 
own salary while admitting the fact that the young salespersons tend to put a 
request for salary increase. He clarifies:  
 
Comparing with that of my co-workers in the previous workplace, this 
salary cannot be comparable. It is very poor. As a young salesman’s 
quote, this salary is too low comparing with foreign companies such 
as even Japanese… But my salary is enough given the fact that I 
have a house in Taipei city, a wife and a daughter without a house 
mortgage.  
 
According to his situation with his family, the market logic does not enable him to 
pursue self-interest. Through daily interaction with his subordinates, this is 
continuously forming a competitive relationship between the ‘family’ and market 
logics in relation to the corporation logic.  
For the Japanese, this competitive relationship between the ‘family and 
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market may look quite unusual. From the Japanese MD’s point of view, this 
demand is unlikely to happen in Japan because of the importance of ‘Wa’, 
organisational harmony in English. He went on to say:  
 
… this is a point of difference between the Japanese and Taiwanese ... 
the Japanese, in general, will never insist on a salary increase in 
comparison with others ...[paused]… well, at least, I have never done 
this in my professional career … because it would make me an egotist 
going against ‘Wa’ (organizational harmony in English) from the point 
of view of others [organisational members]. 
 
In the actual interview, after glancing at me, he added the conditional sentence 
“at least, I have never done [salary increase]”. At the moment, I was bit 
embarrassed. He added the sentence since I was quiet in respect to his 
comment of “the Japanese, in general, will never insist on a salary increase”. 
From his view, I am not quite in the category of ‘Japanese’ because I actually 
negotiated with the managers for salary requires in the past when in an 
American corporation in Japan. His comment raises the importance of ‘Wa’ in 
the Japanese ‘family’ in performance appraisal regardless of whether one 
performs better or worse than do others. The market logic based on self-interest 
sharply contrasts with Japanese ‘family’ as the corporation.  
Likewise, there is a demand for salary increases among non-managerial 
Thai employees. Some young Thai salespersons tend to argue for an increase in 
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their individual salary, manifesting self-interest. Unlike the demand in JTAIW for 
the reward of individual performance, that of JTHAI suffices in exchange for new 
projects or new business. For instance, in new customer acquisition, Thai local 
employees tend to often question why they need to expand their business by 
doing something new. This type of salespersons would tend to leave JTHAI 
within a few years given the fact that its salary is relatively low compared to other 
Western companies. A Japanese expatriate describes: 
 
[Thais] motivation is… money. Given revenue growth every year, 
[Thais] often ask me why it is bad to keep the status quo… [Thais] 
never understand, although I explained to them that, given the fact 
that market is growing, keeping the current amount of revenue means 
decreasing market share… in initiating a new project, they again ask 
me how they can be motivated … then it boils down to money [sales 
incentive]…  
 
In order to initiate something new, they end up asking for a salary and/or bonus 
increase as their motivation. A Thai manager illustrates this self-interest by 
stating: “no commission can be an issue because it is difficult to motivate sales 
managers without commissions… this may be a common issue at Japanese 
companies”. The fact that, in the past, one Thai director with a good amount of 
salary never did anything challenging is consistent with the contextual 
enactment of the market logic. He was so comfortable with a fixed salary that he 
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did not take proactive actions.  
Notwithstanding this, this self-interest can be mediated by the enactment 
of the religion logic. Theravada Buddhism is actually enacted through an attempt 
to increase others’ salary in order to solve the emerged competitive relationship 
between the ‘family’ and market logics. A Thai manager tends to insist on the 
increase of her subordinates’ salary, instead of her salary. A Japanese expatriate 
shares this story: 
 
There was a request that a Thai manager made for an increase in her 
men’s salary while rejecting an increase in her pay, stating that her 
salary had been raised enough… She reasoned that her men had 
worked very hard for her…   
 
This, albeit superficially looking ‘family’, sounds like self-sacrifice in order to do 
good in a religious context. He went on to connect this event to Theravada 
Buddhism. Unfortunately, I did not have the chance to interview her. Nonetheless, 
the manager is believed by the Japanese to have tried to gain religious merit for 
herself by sharing an increase in her salary with her men. Given the fact that she 
devotes herself to work in JTHAI by working late, another Thai manager 
characterises that ‘she must deeply love JapanCo (JTHAI)’. This demonstrates 
the specific geographical location in Asia where Japanese ‘family’ is accepted 




7.3.2 A sales incentive and promotion as an individual reward: 
self-interest and seniority 
The constellations of logics in the West can sharply contrast with those of Asia. 
In JUSA and JEU, the market logic strongly manifests sales incentives as a 
means of achieving one’s own self-interest on the basis of individual 
performance. Sales performance in JUSA is individually evaluated without 
connecting itself to corporate performance. Each customer is assigned to a 
respective salesperson so there is no space for salespersons to share collective 
sales goals and collaborate together. The Japanese VP understands that sales 
performance appraisals cannot be conducted without the number which reflects 
the amount of sales commission. So performance evaluation is based only on 
numbers. He explains:  
 
It is all about [sales] numbers so I can’t help but pay more [salary and 
sales commission] to the one who performs better [than agreed sales 
budget] because it will be trouble if he or she leaves [JUSA]… I 
cannot evaluate other than with [numbers]…  
 
The strong sense of self-interest is absolute in order to retain talented 
salespersons. This is quite different from JTHAI and JTAIW where performance 
is measured in a corporate context.    
 This self-interest has to be achieved through a series of performance 
appraisals, even for engineers. It means that a high individual evaluation has to 
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directly lead to promotion; a salary increase in other words. A Japanese 
expatriate supports the view that American individuals are separated from the 
organisations to which they belong. He commented that “here [USA], it is quite 
common for people to change their jobs for a better salary”. In the past, he 
actually conducted a performance appraisal for an American engineer, giving a 
high evaluation and no change in salary. The engineer was confused and 
demotivated, and finally left JUSA. He went on to point out the individual aspect 
of salary separated from the corporate performance: 
 
Japanese tend to say that you did perform well but our corporate did 
not. So, sorry to say, but the salary at this time is like this [no change] 
although I am evaluating you highly… Japanese will accept this but 
[Americans] here will not… nor will they be convinced of this… [they 
begin to ask] why don’t you raise my salary although my performance 
was highly evaluated?... it leads to rather ‘demotivation’…  
 
In particular, this ‘demotivation’ seems to be quite common in Japanese MNCs in 
the US (e.g., Sumihara, 1999). This sharply contrasts with the case in Japan 
where people tend to stay in the same corporation that they first entered 
because of the loyalty that they have for the corporation. The Japanese 
expatriate simply commented that “here, people do care about the salary more 
than Japanese do”. In other words, individual performance is evaluated 
separately to that of the corporation. Even the salary of American local 
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salespersons could be twice that of the Japanese VP and American president 
according to a simple scale of sales incentive.  
 Unlike the market logic manifesting self-interest in JUSA, promotion in 
other subsidiaries in Asia and the West is closely associated with seniority (the 
corporation logic). For example, in JEU, there is a mixture of the market and 
‘family’ logics. Here, sales incentives are planned to be replaced by a fixed 
salary in a current organisational change. The underlying assumption of this 
change is that “the salary scale is based on performance and seniority” 
according to a newly hired HR manager. She went on to imply that, although the 
salary needs to be raised when one performs better, salary and seniority in the 
corporation are to be balanced: “but we’re not obliged to [raise salary], it’s not a 
company rule or not a Belgium law if somebody is not performing well we can 
give him not a raise of his salary”. In line with the same assumption, in JTHAI, 
there were Thai two directors recently promoted: the elder one is a Director and 
the younger an Assistant Director. Granted, a Thai HR manager comments that 
“age is not clear criteria… we do not have clear criteria seniority, not the length of 
service”. In fact, there are also “some elders who work under supervision of the 
young” according to her. This promotion, however, is apparently the conventional 
notion of Japanese seniority to reward individual performance.  
 Likewise, promotion in JTAIW enacts a conventional notion of seniority 
and length of service (the corporation logic), thereby mediating self-interest (the 
market logic). A Japanese expatriate director describes that “Here in [Taiwan] 
where age is more concerned [than other] so the organisation where the young 
supervises the old does not really fit in”. So he tends to hire and assign the 
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positions of mangers and non-managerial employees in alignment with seniority. 
He confessed the importance of seniority: 
 
[People] have different jobs, different abilities, different ages, and 
different family structures, so I am sceptical if only numbers can be 
criteria [in performance appraisal]… I am by no means saying or 
intending to mean that Japanese seniority is good yet neither 
performance based salary nor sales incentive is compatible with our 
business… 
 
His business is in building equipment which needs teamwork and a long term 
relationship with customers. A Japanese MD has a slightly different view of 
seniority which may actually be outweighed by the length of service according to 
payment claims from Taiwanese employees. He has heard of requests for salary 
increases on the basis of the length of service, not seniority. He shared a 
conversation with a Taiwanese manager regarding the performance appraisal of 
its salesman. He stated that “well, this man is already 32 year old and has kids 
so said why don’t you raise his salary… but [the Taiwanese manager] told me it’s 
irrelevant”. For the Taiwanese, the corporation logic is implicated only in the 
length of service but for the Japanese it is implicated in seniority alongside 
Japanese ‘family. This indicates that self-interest (the market logic) enacted by 





7.4 Socialisation: Intensive and minimum socialisations 
Social occasions can enact competitive relationships between Japanese ‘family’ 
and market logics on an ongoing basis. There are meaningful distinctions 
between Asia and West. In Asian subsidiaries, such as JTHAI and JTAIW, the 
‘family’ logic enables actors to have frequent formal and informal social 
occasions, forming a ‘family’ norm among members. In contrast, in the West, 
such as JEU and JUSA, there are few social events, which enable actors to treat 
themselves as independent professionals. Here, ‘family’ norm is little identified 
and even negated by actors. The geographical locations do not entirely 
determine the competitive relationships, however. There are competitive 
relationships between the logics enacted by actors in their contexts. 
 
7.4.1 Intensive socialisation as opportunities for ‘family’ and religious 
merits 
In Asia, regular corporate events manifest a reciprocal ‘family’ logic. In JTHAI 
and JTAIW, there are company parties and company trips. Either a yearly 
company party or a company trip is sponsored and conducted by both 
subsidiaries. In particular, in JTHAI, there are further events such as dinners and 
lunches, even gym workouts together. In the company parties, there are pieces 
of music, dance, and games played by Thai employees. Some even brought 
specific costumes. A Japanese expatriate mentions that “they all seem to enjoy 
the socials… some well prepared for pieces of dances, songs, and comedies… 
these [many socials] are quite common in Thailand”. There is even a department 
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trip which is volunteered by each department members without the corporate 
support. In line with these socials, Thai employees tend to characterise 
themselves as ‘family’. Japanese ‘family’ is strongly manifested in frequent 
formal and informal social occasions.  
For the Japanese, these practices are all welcomed, being consistent 
with the ‘family’ logic operating in the JapanCo group However, for the Thais, 
these events can be the moments when they not only build a father and his child 
relationship between a manager and ones subordinates but also gain religious 
merits for themselves. These can also be occasions when they can gain 
religious merits by letting the Japanese pay for all dinners or lunches. For 
instance, a Japanese expatriate from the engineering department often goes out 
for meals with Thai employees. He shows frustration by saying:  
 
… I often went out for lunch and dinner with my subordinates (Thai 
employees) … I have always paid for meals for the last few years but I 
have never ever been thanked by them … NEVER! … well, I do not 
mean to stop going out with them but sometimes I am strongly 
discouraged by this …. 
 
This enacts the Theravada Buddhism merit, ‘Tam bum’ in Thai, while 
superficially looking like a typical practice of Japanese management enacting 
the family logic. One of the reasons behind the apparently unthankful attitude of 
the Thais is closely associated with gaining religious merits on the basis that the 
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‘haves’ help the ‘have-nots’. From the Thai’s view, Japanese’ behaviour in 
treating them to meals look like that of gaining a religious merit, helping others, 
and they therefore responding by not offering thanks. Agreeing with this religious 
behaviour that the researcher had pointed out in the interview, another Japanese 
manager argue that some Thais showed a thankful attitude to him after paying 
for their dinner. He shows:  
 
[Because of Buddhism, no thanks from a Thai] is quite normal but that 
also depends on his personality. My engineers sometime say “Thank 
you” to me when I take them out for lunch.  
 
He normally pays for all the lunch and dinner with Thai employees. He explains 
that, when Thais go out for lunch or dinner, the richest in the group has to pay for 
all the meals. A Japanese expatriate describes this in Thailand as “a religious 
culture where one who has more money than the others should pay all”. 
However, another Japanese expatriate shares some exceptional experience 
when going out for lunch with Thai. He describes:  
 
One time, when I dined out for lunch with one Thai who had just been 
promoted, I was told that ‘You do not need to take a bill today because 
I am promoted so I will pay for this, Thank you’. So it depends on ones’ 
moral position and etiquette. It further depends on if one can greet me 




This conflicting interpretation demonstrates that the practices superficially 
manifest ‘family’ but actually the religion logic, especially the importance of 
gaining religious merits in Theravada Buddhism. This supports the contention 
that it is actors who make competitive relationships between logics (Smets and 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). In this case, this religion logic may operate with the family 
in a distinctive manner. Even in social events, a small distinction between the 
family and religion logics often suffices. 
 This intensive socialisation enacting the family and religion logics is 
questioned by the Japanese president who asks if this is economically efficient. 
It often involves not only local employees but also several contacts of Japanese 
customers, thus incurring a hefty bill. The current Japanese president claims 
that:  
 
[Dinners] with the customers are fine. But what are these for? If it 
were for information exchange, [a Thai manager] should not have 
called a gorgeous dinner, inviting 7-8 persons from the customers and 
3-4 persons from us, spending a large amount of money on it… What 
is the purpose of it? It was just for eat and drink. He was just asked a 
dinner by a customer… Hey, you as a manager, think! He, as a leader, 
needs to see always balance [between its purpose and actions] 
 
This comment shows the president’s concern about economic efficiency in 
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socialisation. By contrast, Thai local managers simply organise dinners for 
benevolence to the Japanese customers while the Japanese president 
evaluates the efficiency return on investment by having dinners. These different 
interpretations in socialisation are a vivid example of competitive relationships 
between the ‘family’, religion and market logics. 
The Japanese ‘family’ logic enacted by intensive socialisation can be 
connected to actors’ daily work. There is an instrumental aspect of the Japanese 
‘family’ logic for economic efficiency. Certainly, a Thai director purposefully builds 
and uses the concept of ‘family’ in order to get his subordinates to take on some 
work for which they are not formally responsible. In order to deal with an 
overwhelming number of sales inquiries, he tries to share sales jobs with other 
sales support teams who are not responsible for these inquiries. In a sense, he 
finds an opportunity to utilise this notion of family for his own economic benefit 
and strategically uses the concept of family in order to execute job efficiency. He 
states:  
 
If some claim that this is not my job, then I have nothing to say. But a 
family relationship helps others to collaborate beyond their job 
descriptions. The job description is just a paper to know basic 
responsibilities. Then, the family could help with others. 
 
For him, maintaining a family-like relationship is a means to achieve the aim of 
sharing jobs efficiently and effectively for Japanese customers. He purposefully 
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creates and intentionally uses the family atmosphere in order to assign a job 
flexibly by communicating in a friendly manner with his subordinates. He went on 
to explain that “In order to set up intimate family relationship, I use informal and 
casual languages to my subordinates as to my brothers and sisters. For others 
outside of the division, I use more formal language. With this family-like 
relationship, my subordinates casually come to consult me”. In fact, by 
perceiving his communication style, some corporate staff describes his team, 
building automation as very much ‘Japanese one’; which seems to directly 
belong to JHQ, not to JTHAI. This instrumental aspect of the family relationship 
is reinforced in everyday practices through the language that is used in everyday 
practice.   
 
7.4.2 Minimum socialisation as opportunity for maintaining 
independent professionals  
In the other subsidiaries, the Japanese ‘family’ norm, as previously reviewed, is 
rarely identified and even strongly denied by actors through few socials events. 
Instead, independent economic professional relationships are implicated in 
social events in the remaining subsidiaries. In particular, in JUSA, there are very 
few social events. A few social events enact the norm of self-interest to keep 
professional relationships among employees to bare minimum. A female sales 
support describes its norm as “very professional” which echoes the comment by 
an American director who characterise JUSA as ‘American company’. She then 
went on to say: “[other employees] and myself actually go across the street at 
lunch hour and work out together so we try to keep it social as well so we’re not 
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always trying to kill each other”. After being asked if there is ‘family’ norm in 
social events, she is dead against the existence of ‘family’ as in JTHAI and went 
on to claim that: 
 
No it’s not like a family here. I will put my 40 hours in. I will work my 
8-5 and I will do everything I can to my best while I’m here, 5 o’clock 
I’m out that door, bye bye. Don’t call me. I don’t stay. I come in early 
maybe 15, 20 minutes but I can get a lot done while the phones are 
not ringing and if I don’t get everything done I will stay later to make 
sure everything is accomplished for that day, but I don’t feel like it’s a 
family at all no… I would say it’s quite professional. 
 
Here, the market logic, commoditising work time as price, is strongly manifested 
among local employees and in social events. This concept of investment and 
return echoes other American employees who characterise social events as 
‘professional’ to smooth interpersonal relationship, not for creating or 
maintaining ‘family’ relationship.  
 Notwithstanding this, there is another view which promotes social events, 
indirectly implicating the Japanese ‘family’. By admitting the fact of a few socials, 
an American VP expresses his feeling about socialisation in JUSA in comparison 
with that of the Japanese MNC in which he used to work. He describes:  
 
Not enough, in my opinion… Not like in Japan.  For example, when I 
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go to [another office] California , you know, I always just ask and I will 
always go out, you know, lunch or some dinner or something, some 
place, because that is quite common for us and we will have some 
discussion, but me and my President, never.  
 
Then, he confesses that the American president tends to always decline his 
invitation for meals so he never had a chance to go out the president. Indeed, 
there are no company trips or dinner except for a Christmas party.  
 Similarly, in JEU, there are now more social events which tend to enact 
economic efficiency (the market logic) through professional relationships. In the 
past, lay-offs occurred and a corporate norm here is not collaborative. Members 
do not trust each other, especially the former Japanese MD. He was actually 
treated as ‘an enemy’ by locals due to the fact that he conducted restructuring in 
a bad way. In previous social events, none of the locals wanted to be seated next 
to him. Now there is a new Japanese MD company meetings are conducted in a 
friendly atmosphere once again, according to the interviews. A Belgium sales 
lady states:  
 
We have every two months, we have our company meeting and then 
it’s two days and then on … then of course we have lunch together 
and then one evening we always go out to have dinner together. 
 
A Belgium director also explains the recent transition from the previous to the 
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current Japanese MD:  
 
I think the social events are much more because with Mr [the previous 
Japanese president] there were nearly no social events so I think Mr 
[the current Japanese president] is getting more like social events but 
I think that building a team or doing some team building activities are 
really necessary for the company because it is still not a fully complete 
team. It’s still quite isolated. It’s much better than two years ago but I 
think there’s still a lot to do.   
 
So these social events are now used to build JEU as a team. In line with JUSA, 
interpersonal relationships in social events in JEU are actually ‘professional’. 
Furthermore, a Belgian manager describes a Friday lunch, which was a newly 
organised social event by saying that:  
 
let’s say, 10 people at lunchtime, we sit all together and we eat 
together.  Then we can speak, okay how’s your family, how’s your 
kids, how’s your dog, how’s your weekend, how was the soccer game, 
how’s the weather.  You speak of everything.  So we already set 
every Friday we are going for a takeout, Chinese, Japanese, 
Taiwanese, French Fries, Pizza or whatever, but we sit together and 
we eat.  It’s no obligation.  People say, no, we don’t want to, no 




Despite the fact of these social events, unlike those in JTHAI, the Belgian 
employees rarely admit ‘family’ but rather emphasise ‘an extra relationship’ in 
addition to ‘professional’ work. However, these events in JEU are not ‘the 
backstage politics’ as discussed in Ybema and Byun (2012) according to the 
informants in JEU. These comments sharply contrast with those in the previous 
sub-section which demonstrate Japanese ‘family’ mediated by Thai religion, 
Theravada Buddhism. In these social events, Japanese ‘family’ is rarely enacted 
in the geographical locations of the West.  
 Likewise, the professional relationship is emphasised in terms of the 
market logic in JTAIW. Although there are social events like company parties and 
trips, Taiwanese tend to limit socialisation to a bare minimum. For instance, 
despite formal social events, company trips and parties, there seem to be few 
informal social events. A Taiwanese manager states:  
 
Social events such as dinners and lunches are not frequent: once in 
two or three months. Other members know my family but I do not 
know others through company trips. There are not many chances.  
 
Many of the local employees characterise the relationship among them as 
predominantly professional with few informal social events. A female 
administrator in JTAIW supports the few socials by saying that “[JTAIW] is 
professional… we go out for a dinner about once a year… I go out as my 
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department group [once a year] but not informally [for developing my private 
relationship]”. This may relate to the Chinese ‘family’ logic which locates their 
group of ‘family’ stake holders outside the corporation. Their social group does 
not overlap with the members of the corporation. This indicates ongoing 
constellations of logics which are reinforced in everyday practices.  
 
7.5 Discussions and conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to understand how the contested practices in 
work and employment are interpreted through low compatibility and high 
centrality in logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014). There is a finding identified in 
this chapter: the constellations of logics are ongoing and continuously formed in 
relation to geographical locations. This provides a dynamic view of situated 
logics and culture in different cultural and national contexts, which has hitherto 
been described only rarely (e.g., Värlander et al., 2016; McPherson and Sauder, 
2013). For example, both bonus and sales incentives enact multiple logics, 
continuously forming constellations of logics. In promotion in JTHAI, self-interest 
(the market) is emphasised by Taiwanese while mediated by the corporation 
logic in Taiwanese ‘Laopan’ (see 7.3.2). As another instance, in JTHAI, 
Japanese ‘family’ enacted by Thais asserting that ‘we are family’, conflicts with 
Theravada Buddhism at bill payment (see 7.4.1). In addition, it conflicts with the 
market efficiency expected by Japanese MD. This low compatibility in logics, 
which Besharov and Smith (2014) define as ‘contradictory prescriptions for 
action’, is not stable but dynamically constructed through the negotiation and 
conflict constantly played out by actors. This rather supports their concern 
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expressed in their discussion of their framework that distinctions between the 
ideal four types of organisations may not be clearly bounded because subunits 
of organisations may have different types of multiplicity logics.  
In a broad sense, the finding that the constellations of logics are, to 
some extent, different in Asia and the West advances the work of Värlander et al. 
(2016), demonstrating that each practice manifests different constellations of 
logics in each national context, China, India and the US. Värlander et al. (2016)  
illuminate that the constellations of logics are somewhat due to geographical 
locations, being consistent with the geographical communities in which specific 
logics are rooted (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Lounsbury, 2007). This chapter 
also shows the specificity of logics rooted in geographical locations. In Asia, the 
‘family’ logic is enacted through the practices of employment. In JTHAI and 
JTAIW, actors tend to treat bonuses as a collective reward (see 7.3.1), 
prioritising group performance over individual. In particular, a Thai manager 
insists on an increase in salary for her men by stating that her salary is raised 
enough, enacting the religious merit of Theravada Buddhism. Social events are 
quite active and there are even company trips and parties (see 7.4.1). This 
echoes the work of Abo (2015) who argues for geographical locations that may 
influence Japanese management practices. By contrast, in the West, the market 
logic is strongly enacted by performance appraisal and socialisation (see 7.3.2). 
Sales incentives and promotion are interpreted as individual rewards while no 
bonus is adopted. There are very few social events (see 7.4.2), thus 
professionals’ relationships are kept to a bare minimum, rather than building a 
‘family’ norm as in JTHAI. As a series of scholars (e.g., Värlander et al., 2016; 
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Abo, 2015; and Lounsbury, 2007) point out, the constellations of logics differ 
according to each geographical location. 
 This does not mean that the geographical locations in Asia and the West 
automatically determine the constellations of logics, however. This is because 
how actors enact logics differs in their contexts ‘on the ground’ (McPherson and 
Sauder, 2013) through interaction and negotiations within themselves. In JTAIW, 
despite company trips and parties, there seem to be very few informal social 
events: Taiwanese tend not to go out together as in JTHAI. In JTHAI, some Thai 
employees make an effort to argue for salary increases when assigned a job of 
sales development, acquiring new customers or projects. Furthermore, the 
American director, who had worked at large Japanese automotive 
manufacturers, insists that JUSA is “an American company’ now, but however is 
going to be Japanese company”. Actors’ willingness is also considered in terms 
of the enactments of logics in their contexts. This provides a dynamic view of 
how logics are enacted through actors’ negotiation within practices, thereby 
bringing about a multi-level analysis within practices, rather than either a macro 
level or micro level institutional analysis (e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; 
Värlander et al., 2016). 
This dynamic view of logics and culture directly responds to Giorgi et 
al.’s (2015) call for ‘contextual embeddedness’, closely examining contexts and 
culture. Cultural meanings of logics are not given but situated by actors in their 
organisational culture. Here, actors are situated in their contexts, so some see 
opportunities while others see constraints within the same practices on an 
ongoing basis. In terms of job delegation, Thai employees, for instance, tend to 
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find opportunities to engage with the religion logic when pursuing sales 
opportunities with Japanese expatriates. This also corresponds to the recent call 
for “situated cultural beliefs, norms and behaviours that reflect particular areas of 
life” (Giorgi et al., 2015, p36) by showing how actors enact logics through 
practices in different national contexts. Thus, actors in their contexts are deeply 
associated with the enactment of competitive logics, but the geographical 
locations do not determine the relationships between them as the situatedness 
of actors is discussed (e.g., Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Smets and 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). These practices can be due to ‘both intentional and 
unintentional outcomes’ in the ‘everyday getting by of individuals’ (Lawrence et 
al., 2011). After all, the contested practices are treated as a dynamic and 
ongoing process of enacting constellations of logics situated in organisational as 
well as international contexts ‘on the ground’ (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). 
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 Estranged Practices in Work Organisation: Ceremonial Chapter 8:
Aspects  
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to understand how the estranged practices in work 
organisations communicating with JHQ are interpreted through ceremonial 
aspects and how actors in turn are organised in terms of low compatibility and 
low centrality in logics. It also corresponds primarily, but not exclusively, to the 
third research question of how Japanese and locals are organised, in addition to 
the cultural meanings of practices (see 2.4). The chapter is organised into four 
sections. First, communication about expatriate evaluation is reviewed. Second, 
communication about business results is demonstrated. Third, communication 
about locals’ complaints is presented. In a summarising section, the boundaries 
of organisational communities are not ‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but 
constructed through actors’ profiles. 
 
8.2 Communicating expatriate evaluation: Separated organisational 
communities of Japanese expatriates 
Communication about expatriate evaluation manifests the corporation logic in 
terms of the organisational hierarchy of Japanese expatriates in their separation 
from local employees. The performance of Japanese expatriates is evaluated on 
the basis of JHQ’s view, not the subsidiaries’ view. Furthermore, in all the 
subsidiaries, the performance of Japanese expatriate managers, regardless of 
whether or not they are formally under a top Japanese expatriate in their site, is 




Figure 23: The organisational structures for Japanese and locals 
Japanese structure  Local structure 
      
 
Their formal organisational charts simply show who does what in each 
organisation, but not who manages and assesses what. The only exception is 
JEU where there is no Japanese expatriate except the Japanese MD. This 
causes ‘two management structures’ (Elger and Smith, 2005) in the subsidiaries. 
Two structures also allow the ‘family’ norm to be bounded to Japanese 
organisational communities.  
This ceremonial aspect emerges from a tension between the 
organisational hierarchy (the corporation logic) and an in group of ‘family’ (the 
‘family’ logic). For Japanese expatriate managers, their real bosses are not local 
director employees, albeit some are supposed to report to their local directors in 
their formal organisational charts. All the Japanese expatriate managers are 
controlled and managed by a top ranked Japanese expatriate in their site, 
regardless of whether or not they are directly underneath him in the formal 
organisational chart. A Japanese VP in JUSA claims that there is complete 













expatriates including me in the US … I am the only one who evaluates the 
performance of them … the American president does not“. The titles of the other 
Japanese expatriate who the Japanese VP has to manage range from managers 
to non-managerial expatriates. In brief, the formal organisational charts do not 
exactly reflect the positions of Japanese expatriates, and therefore can be seen 
as ceremonial. This rather elaborates the divide between Japanese and locals 
as an export of the two-tier system in Japan, of core and peripheral employees 
(seishain and non-seishain in Japanese) (Kopp, 1999). 
 This separation between Japanese and locals is closely associated with 
the term ‘localisation’ which is firmly believed by Japanese expatriates to be an 
economically efficient institutionalised rule. That is, each business in the 
overseas market should be developed and managed by local employees. There 
is no policy which explicitly articulates localisation. Neither is it measured or 
evaluated by JHQ or its subsidiaries as the formal organisational goal. 
Nonetheless, many Japanese expatriates take localisation for granted as the 
ideal picture in each subsidiary. Granted, a Japanese director in JTAIW picks up 
the comment which he has received from JHQ, saying that “What Japan [JHQ] is 
always saying is that Japanese jobs [by Japanese customers locally] will not last 
forever so it will be hopeless unless we expand the businesses to local 
customers in the future ….”. Thus, he has been pressed by JHQ to develop local 
non-Japanese customers and localise the management team to support the 
local customers in the future. Indeed, a Japanese MD in JTAIW, conforming to 
the institutionalised rule of localisation, asserts that his primary role is “to identify 
and train a next local leader” although nobody at JHQ actually articulates this 
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role explicitly. This pressure from JHQ, however, enables localisation to be 
institutionalised and eventually to function as a rationalised myth (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). 
Furthermore, there is a structural divide between Japanese expatriates’ 
performance and their subsidiaries’ performance. Japanese expatriates’ salary 
and bonus are evaluated in line with JapanCo group’s performance separate 
from their subsidiaries’ performance. Furthermore, a Japanese expatriate, the 
president of JTAIW, adds that his performance and bonus are not linked to the 
performance in Taiwan. He confesses:  
 
Unfortunately, my salary is not connected to business performance 
here … I submit my performance assessment sheet to the 
headquarters including the total performance of this subsidiary … but 
the assessment of the bonus, the amount of the bonus is based on 
the performance of JapanCo as a whole, according to the 
consolidated financial performance of JapanCo group… it is not 
related to the performance of JTAIW …  
 
The salary of Japanese expatriates is basically being provided from the pocket 
of JHQ, not that of the subsidiary. He sees this as a problem, potentially making 
Japanese expatriates not responsible for local performance. His bonus would go 
up when JapanCo group’s performance is good, and go down when bad. In this 
process of assessment, they are supposed to be evaluated by the top ranked 
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Japanese expatriate in each site despite their titles and positions. Because of 
this evaluation system, Japanese expatriates are expected to work for, not local 
business, but the top Japanese expatriate in each site. The line of assessment is 
invisible yet recognised by local employees. A local employee tends to say that 
“[a Japanese expatriate] is different from local … he is from Japan”. 
Assessments by the top Japanese expatriate in each site go back to the 
companies, the divisions who are responsible for these expatriate managers. 
This strongly echoes the centralised decision making in Japanese MNCs pointed 
out by Westney (1987; 1999). 
Granted, the way of assessing the performance of Japanese expatriates 
derives from the company’s strong focus on the domestic market in Japan. 
JapanCo group has still only 10% of total revenue from overseas market, being 
in the initial stage of internationalization. In actual expatriate evaluation, 
Japanese expatriates are likely to be aligned with and compared to other 
Japanese managers working in Japan, despite the fact that the business 
environments between Japan and overseas are fundamentally different. That is, 
Japanese expatriates cannot be promoted on the basis of their performance but 
only relative to other managers’ performance in Japan. This may give a 
disadvantage to Japanese expatriate managers by limiting their opportunities for 
promotion. A Japanese director in Taiwan illustrates how difficult Japanese 
expatriates can find it to be promoted as a manager while in overseas 
subsidiaries, commenting:    
 
For example, a subsidiary wants me to be promoted as a manager, 
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and gives me a good mark … at the headquarters, the company in 
Japan gets candidate managers lined up in front and then may say, 
this man is not really as good as others so he needs to wait [to 
become a manager] … in this sense, the division decides when I can 
become a manager … it has a full authority in respect to personnel 
affairs across Japan and overseas, and even of where it can allocate 
and assign managers …  
 
This central authority in JHQ creates a divide between Japanese expatriates and 
local employees. Most Japanese expatriate managers who are dispatched from 
the division of the in-house company in JHQ are entitled to be promoted in line 
with other managers by the division in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese 
expatriates are temporary managers who are supposed to be transferred to 
somewhere normally every few years or 5-6 years at a maximum. This strong 
focus on the authority of JHQ highlights the dominant yet separated positions of 
Japanese expatriates (Kopp, 1999). The domestic market oriented view 
underlies the expatriate evaluation system and in turn there are two 
management structures for Japanese and local communities. 
In addition to the performance evaluation of Japanese expatriates 
separate from that of their subsidiaries, their perceived limitations in 
understanding local culture and customs parallel two management structures. 
One of the largest barriers which many Japanese expatriates agree about is 
language. Across all the four subsidiaries, local languages are very different 
from Japanese, the first language of all the Japanese expatriates. The Japanese 
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VP in JUSA claims that Japanese could not understand American thoroughly 
because of cultural and linguistic differences. He comments that “having said 
cultural differences, I think that we Japanese have difficulties understanding 
everything American think”. He firmly believes that the languages, cultures, 
conditions where Japanese and American are born and raised are 
fundamentally different and the gaps between them, therefore, cannot easily be 
filled.  
Actors’ interpretations go along with Japanese communities in two 
management structures. A Japanese expatriate in JTHAI is also very aware of 
these two structures and intentionally keeps a distance from local employees, 
drawing the boundary of ‘family’ with only Japanese. As a leader developing 
Japanese customers in Thailand, he continues to locate himself as a role model 
for local employees by separating himself from the locals. He implies two 
distinctive groups of actors, Japanese and locals by commenting  
 
Personally, I try not to get along with local employees too much … I do 
not mind that Japanese get along together …because I want to form 
the impression that Japanese do work hard …. I am also close to 
management positions … if I am so friendly with locals, others might 
see me, I think, as no good …  
 
The sense of becoming a role model for local employees remains stronger in 
Thailand where many Japanese customers demand a leadership role for 
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Japanese expatriates. The Japanese expatriates become organisational 
communities spanning boundaries between their subsidiaries, JHQ, and, if any, 
Japanese customers. 
Indeed Japanese expatriates are considered as separated 
organisational communities from their subsidiaries by local employees. A 
Taiwanese secretary at JTAIW makes a remark implying the cultural hierarchy 
behind communication with JHQ. She states:  
 
I have been to JHQ several times. At JHQ, Japanese seem to believe 
only Japanese. In exchanging emails, although I am the contact 
person, JHQ rather comes in contact with my [Japanese] director via 
email. It passes through me.  
 
Communicating with only Japanese between JHQ and their subsidiaries 
reinforces two management structures. The trusted relationship only among 
Japanese echoes Japanese organisational communities reinforced by their 
particular HR system, benefits and cultural understanding of Japan. Furthermore, 
the comment of the American president echoes these trusted relationships 
between Japanese. He states: 
 
Having seen reports [of JapanCo group]… that I have seen within 
JapanCo, at this point still, is that local staff were, I’ve even seen it 
reported on some forms, they call employees at the subsidiaries local 
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stuff. I’m sure they meant local staff and the translation was wrong, 
but I’ve seen things where JapanCo employees were almost not 
considered part of the JapanCo group… It just gives the impression 
that either we’re not trusted or it’s kind of difficult to explain. 
 
This articulation of ‘stuff’, albeit miswritten, manifests mental separation between 
Japanese and locals. He did not forget to remind me of correct phrases of local 
stuff: “I think it should be JapanCo Group Employee”. This strongly implies not 
only structural but also mental separation between Japanese expatriates and 
local employees.  
This separation between Japanese and locals is quite consistent across 
all the subsidiaries. Upon reflection, it is true that I, as a researcher, go out for 
lunches and dinners while in the various sites but never had these with local 
employees. It seems that Japanese expatriates get along with only Japanese, 
and are separated from local employees. In a sense, the ‘family’ norm does not 
prevail in the same manner for Japanese and locals. This supports the comment 
of Kopp (1999), who asserts that this divide sounds like the exportation of the 
two-tier HRM system in Japan between seishain and non-seishain, core and 
peripheral Japanese employees. In Japan, core employees are in a permanent 
contract and thus receive long term benefits, such as lifetime and long term 
employment, seniority based compensation, and high investment in trainings, 
while peripheral employees are on a temporary contract and thus gain little 
benefits. Likewise this is replicated between Japanese expatriates and local 
employees: Japanese are seishain while local employees are non-seishain. My 
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initial hunch on this division was actually confirmed as in next two sections.  
 
8.3 Communicating business results: Contested boundaries of 
organisational communities  
Communication about business results manifests actors’ interpretations of the 
corporation logic with other logics, making work organisation ceremonial. 
Localisation as the institutionalised rule is well adopted in JUSA in terms of an 
American being appointed as the president. Unlike JUSA, however, the 
remaining subsidiaries, such as JTHAI, JTAIW and JEU are not yet localised and 
thus managed by the group of Japanese expatriates. There is no official chance 
for local employees to be involved with communicating business results with 
JHQ, bringing about the manifestation of the corporation logic.  
For example, in JEU, there is only one Japanese expatriate, the 
managing director, and the rest are the local employees, his subordinates. Both 
Japanese and the locals are expected to communicate business results. Indeed 
communicating with JHQ is not easy because of their cultural and social 
differences. A Belgian manager, who often communicates their products and 
services with JHQ, characterises the relationship between JapanCo and JEU as 
two different corporations by saying “we are two different worlds, almost two 
different companies”. According to him, slow communication with JHQ seems 
like “every day they need to take a bottle, put a paper on it and throw it”. This is 
mainly due to cultural and organisational differences between both companies 




I said if you look to JapanCo in Japan, it is like a big ocean steamer, 
big boat, big ship and you are on the ocean and storm or wind if you 
are such a big boat, you don’t feel it. That’s JapanCo (JHQ). But 
there’s a small, tiny boat, even a rubber boat, you have to blow up 
yourself, with only two small guys, that’s JEU. 
 
It is important for JEU to make JapanCo hear them. Despite the cultural and 
organisational distance, communication with JHQ is enhanced in JEU: the 
Japanese managing director, unlike the previous one who formally ordered the 
locals ‘not to annoy Japanese’ in JHQ, proactively delegates the role of 
communicating with JHQ. At first sight, this is contradicts the work of Ybema and 
Byun (2012) and Sedgwick (2007) who assert the organisational boundaries of 
Japanese expatriates as excluding non-Japanese, European employees. This is 
why French managers were pressured to be either active ‘cultural brokers’ 
between French and Japanese expatriates or simply non-participants in 
communicating with Japanese expatriates (Sedgwick, 2007). In the case of JEU, 
however, this communication with JHQ is always checked and monitored by the 
Japanese MD, saying that “communicating in a right manner” including right 
contents and contacts to get the message from the local employees across 
within JHQ.  
In JTAIW, however, only a Japanese MD is formally entitled to 
communicate business results. Not only does this bring organisational hierarchy 
(the corporation logic), but it underpins self-interest (the market logic). He 
intentionally manages double management objectives, meaning one objective 
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for JHQ and the other for his local employees. He explains how this works by 
saying:  
 
Sales quota to which I committed with JHQ is my promise, not 
employees. Very often do I have to accept unreasonable sales 
objective by JHQ which is almost impossible to achieve. … this is 
totally irrelevant for them so I have two sales objectives for JHQ and 
my [Taiwanese] employees and always adjusts both numbers 
according to business situation.  
 
This means that he has two commitments for both JHQ and his employees with 
the same sales activities. As an example of unreasonably given sales objective, 
JHQ said to him in the meeting: “this year, the Malaysian subsidiary is not doing 
well and thus will not reach their objective, so why don’t you [MD in JEU] 
increase your sales objective by three million JPY”. He emphasises this kind of 
sales objective as meaningless for local employees who are basically 
responsible for the Taiwanese market only. This manifests both self-interest (the 
market logic) as well as organisational hierarchy (the corporation logic). 
In JUSA, however, localisation becomes a rationalised myth in the sense 
that the contact person in charge with communicating with JHQ is not the 
American president but the Japanese VP. The Japanese VP made a remark on 
the odd roles and responsibilities between him and American president, insisting 




The reasons why a local president is assigned [JUSA] is to build and 
sustain local business adapting it to local regulations … so there is a 
local president, but from the views of the headquarters I become the 
president who is accountable for all the businesses here … so this 
has nothing to do with formal organizational chart …who is 
responsible for reporting local businesses to the headquarters is me 
…  
 
It sounds as if the American president is superficially in charge and, nonetheless, 
the Japanese VP is essentially in charge of managing the local business in the 
US. Localisation here functions as a rationalised myth that locals need to be top 
managers even if they are not capable of communicating in Japanese well.  
 Actors’ linguistic skills of communicating in Japanese are required in 
communication with JHQ. For example, the Japanese VP, albeit not the top, has 
far better access to, connection to, and knowledge of JHQ than the American 
president does. The Japanese VP discloses the form of communication with the 
headquarters:  
 
There is much information from Japan which does not actually come 
to [the American president] … in a nutshell it is all Japanese 
[language] … personnel affairs, requests to write management reports, 
customer information, strategic information from sales and marketing 
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departments, and newly appointed executives and directors in Japan 
… this information will not reach him unless I translate it into English 
… it will not be communicated to him [until it is translated] …  
 
In practice, the American president owns the managerial information far less 
than the Japanese VP does, because all the incoming information from Japan is 
usually articulated in Japanese. This makes the American president totally 
powerless and just a ceremonial president. This highlights ethnocentric features, 
as Westney (1987; 1999) points out, in which Japanese expatriates tend to be 
dominant in decision-making in their subsidiaries. The Japanese VP actively 
gets the American president involved in this variety of information from JHQ by 
translating it into English to facilitate ‘active participation’ (Kondo, 1990) from the 
American president. 
 Despite the fact that “the American president is incapable”, as they say, 
of doing management jobs except for finance, both Japanese and American 
actors tend to share the collective responsibility as a feature of ‘family’ members, 
thus maintaining this ceremonial organisational structure (the corporation logic). 









Figure 24: Three interpretations of the positions of the Japanese expatriate 
Interpretation 1  Interpretation 2  Interpretation 3 
     
 
Interpretation 1 is based on the formal organisational structure: the Japanese VP 
underneath the American president. Interpretation 2 reflects the JHQ’s 
perspective: the point of contact at JUSA is the Japanese VP, not the American 
president. Indeed, the American president constantly needs help from the 
Japanese VP in order to communicate with JHQ. Interpretation 3 recognises that 
the Japanese and American leaders have to collaborate together. The Japanese 
and American act as a pair in communicating with JHQ; although the Japanese 
VP has more access to JHQ. This is not quite economically efficient but is, at 
least, consistent with the current organisational hierarchy. Both actors are 
considered to share the same responsibility.  
A good illustration of interpretation 3 is the country managers’ meeting at 
JHQ, at Tokyo, Japan. All the country managers and all the presidents get 
together quarterly at JHQ in order to formally report on their business. In the 
case of JUSA, a pair of American and Japanese leaders attends this quarterly 
presentation. The Japanese VP lets the American president present in the 













the American president turns into a ceremonial person who makes the formal 
presentation only but does not know its contents. The fact that the American 
president cannot speak Japanese at all or understand what the business is 
about enforces his position as ceremonial. In the formal organisational chart, it is 
obvious that the American president is at the top and the Japanese VP is located 
right underneath the president (see 5.3.4.2).  
 The ceremonial aspects constructed by localisation as a rationalised 
myth are also due to actors’ interpretation of a hierarchy (corporation) in their 
minds between Japan and the West. While admitting that the position of the 
American president is ceremonial in JUSA, the Japanese VP emphasised that 
this structure has considerable benefits in terms of its functionality and 
impression. This supports the culturally interpreted hierarchy in his mind 
between the Americans and the Japanese, meaning that the American is 
superior to the Japanese. 
In America… given the categories West and Asia, the Japanese are 
underneath the Americans [the US]… for sure, we are underneath so 
it would cause conflicts when Japanese try to take a leadership role, 
however, it would go well when an American is assigned as a leader... 
this does not mean I let him do whatever he wants. Therefore, I 
always need to remind him about JapanCo’s business and how to 
coordinate with others and to report to JHQ… [Behind the American] I 
still need to coordinate with surrounding activities in order to receive 




This indicates the Japanese cultural interpretation of Americans which have 
historically been established by the relationships between the US and Japan. 
Here, he rather utilises the idea of American leadership in the formal 
organisational chart but, in practice, he plays a central role in coordinating 
resources and communicating with JHQ. In line with this cultural interpretation, 
as well as functional necessity, both actors actively share collective responsibility 
and in turn collaborate with each other and keep this ceremonial structure.  
This ceremonial aspect may be deeply associated with the notion of the 
West in Japanese minds. For Japanese expatriates, the Western regions, 
including Europe, are more respected than Japan, possibly generating a 
different response to the local employees. A Japanese expatriate MD who used 
to work in Asia and Europe shares his impression about the cultural hierarchy 
between Japan, Asia, and the West. Reflecting upon his appointment of a 
director at JEU, he comments that: 
 
I did not think that European have ears to listen to a stranger coming 
from Asia. It was surprising to hear that some Europeans seem to 
believe that Europe is the centre of the world! [Laugh] Indeed, they do 
have rich history, industrial civilisation, intellectual culture, and pride ... 
they are superior to us, indeed. It would be good to facilitate business 
environments and motivate them to work as a team rather than to 




During his tenancy, he tends to delegate his authority as much as possible to 
European employees. This strongly echoes the current Japanese MD in JEU 
who comments that “Europe has historically been above us [Japan]”. This also 
echoes the comment of the Japanese VP in JUSA saying that “given the 
categories the West and Asia, the Japanese are underneath the Americans”.  
This notion of sharing the same work and thus responsibilities is evident 
when communicating with JHQ. In practice, the ceremonial aspects are 
mediated by the Japanese ‘family’ logic which enables actors to share the same 
responsibilities. The current Japanese VP clarifies that both the American 
president and himself share the same responsibilities in the profits and losses of 
the business by saying that: 
 
[our] responsibilities, a very difficult term to explain … it is obvious that 
a president is accountable for its businesses … the American 
president, of course, needs to report the business performance to 
Japan on a formal report line … but when it comes to the contents of 
the businesses … when you look at numbers, the numbers are just 
numbers and will not tell more than the numbers … I [as the VP] 
writes its contents [behind the numbers] … which types of customers 
were approached and what types of businesses were acquired, why 




This indicates sharing the same responsibilities to sustain and eventually 
mediate the ceremonial aspect. This structure does not only rest on a linguistic 
problem that the American president could not understand Japanese, but also 
depends on his limited knowledge and experience of business. As a result, the 
collective responsibility and authority are shared by the American and the 
Japanese. In fact, the Japanese VP has extensive experience at JapanCo 
group: He began his career with JapanCo in Japan, and has a well-developed 
network within JapanCo group due to his career around twenty years. This 
manifests the extended boundaries of ‘family’ members on the assumption that 
the American president actively participates in ‘family’ matters. 
In communicating business results with JHQ, the American president 
often ends up lacking responsibility, although he is held accountable. As a 
collaborator, the Japanese VP actively supports the formal position of the 
American president by playing a leadership role in communicating with JHQ. 
During the meetings, he complained to the Japanese VP that “this is not 
something I made though” during the presentation. The Japanese VP is quite 
unhappy with this comment by claiming that “that is not right”. He reveals:  
 
That is not right… that’s why I sent him the presentation deck in 
advance by telling him, please present it, and let me know if you are 
happy with it or not… you present it, meaning this is your 
presentation… I would not tell others that I did it although everybody 




He tries completely to delegate the formal authority to report to JHQ so that both 
can share the same responsibilities in practice. In the formal presentation, the 
Japanese VP does not present any part of the material and keeps being an 
observer. He, of course answers questions about the business, parts of the 
materials for which he is responsible. What frustrates him is the lack of active 
participation on the part of the American president, echoing his cultural 
interpretation of Japan and North America. 
 The American president is very aware of his ceremonial position. He, in 
fact, consulted the American VP about this ‘odd’ thing and understood that this is 
a typical practice of Japanese management. Responding to a question about his 
role, he notes his weakness in understanding Japanese management practices, 
commenting:  
 
In my role as President and from my background in Finance and 
Administration, I understand fairly well my weakness in certain areas 
of the business. This is why when I took the position as President 
back in 2008 – I expressed my need to have strong people in key 
roles within the company, especially in the sales and marketing areas 
for product sales/strategy, and in operations/quality for product 
production in the US. 
 
This comment demonstrates that he is aware of a lack of sales and marketing 
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experience in order to become a president in JUSA. He actually could not 
communicate in Japanese so this automatically means that Japanese 
expatriates need to take the role of communicating with JHQ and with the 
Japanese contacts at Japanese customers’ sites. Indeed, before JUSA, he had 
never worked or dealt with Japanese MNCs. He had formerly worked as an 
accountant at an American accounting firm and as a management controller at 
several American corporations. Thus, it is understandable, as he murmured in 
the interview, that “I am not like [the current Japanese VP], nor am I an 
expatriate from JHQ”. His ceremonial position is closely associated with his 
profile of not only inability to communicate in Japanese but also lack of prior 
experience of working with Japanese MNCs. 
 In response to the American president who is unfamiliar with Japanese 
management practices, the American VP plays an important role as a member of 
organisational communities spanning boundaries between the Japanese ‘family’ 
and Western market logics. Reflecting upon his long working experience in 
several large Japanese manufacturers in the US, he often helps the American 
president by filling gaps between Japanese and American corporations. He 
characterised his American president:  
 
The President that we have is really an accountant person and he was 
made President because there was no one else to be made President 
a long time ago and he says that himself. So I'm not saying a bad 
thing about him, he realizes his gap. But he also realizes that he does 




According to him, the American president lacks the capability of not only sales 
and marketing functions but also understanding of Japanese management 
practices. Thus, the American VP asserts that “I am being Japanese to my 
American boss” in order to span the boundaries between Japanese and 
American corporations. For example, in response to a question a symbolic role 
of Japanese expatriates, he advised the American president by drawing on his 
first-hand experience in several Japanese MNCs. He characterises the role of 
Japanese expatriates as a coordinator by saying “[the headquarters in Japanese 
MNCs, in general] tend to have somebody from Japan assigned to the president, 
kind of like a co-ordinator”. Indeed he plays a role of the organisational 
communities by “being Japanese” despite the fact that he of is not an expatriate 
from JHQ but a local employee.  
 The American VP seems to be a strong believer in a philosophical 
aspect of Japanese management practices. In fact, in his private room, he posts 
his motto for business operations which he got in working at the former 














It is translated into English as:  
 
Targets: 
-Hope is not results but wishful thinking, and therefore needs to be 
examined 
-Hope is not action 
-Refrain from putting hope into action but move to planned actions 
 




He says to me that he strongly believes the idea of putting wishful thinking into 
planned actions instead of simply having it. Thus, he tends to be very cautious 
when putting hoped for business goals into concreate actions in order to achieve 
these goals. 
In line with his belief in Japanese management practices, he plays a key 
role of spanning boundaries. He occasionally has to convince the American 
president of their importance because the president tends to be dead against 
sharing management information with those ‘lower down on the totem pole’, as 
American internal sales operator characterises. The American VP recalls the 
president’s attitude ‘American way, to me, no good reason’. He describes: 
 
Gross profit, so, our cost versus our pricing. [the American president 
is] concerned about that and I understand everyone who we share 
data with must control. So I understand his side for that, but I am 
convincing him that, you know, I expect managers at lower levels from 
me to control and have power and if I see something already too late 
that they should have seen first…  
 
The American VP has worked at Japanese manufacturers in the US for more 
than twelve years, so is quite familiar with the ‘family’ norm. In the interviews with 
local employees, it was only he that answered “[JUSA] is an American 
company…But it is transitioning to a Japanese company… that is my view”. 
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When characterising Japanese MNCs, he always refers back to his personal 
experience in the past at two large Japanese automotive manufacturers. He 
rather helps to resolve potential conflict between the ‘family’ and market logics 
through his career profile constructed within Japanese MNCs and American 
corporations, manifesting possible institutional reflexivity (Suddaby et al., 2012). 
In fact, this sharing of information goes along well with the intimate ‘family’ 
relationship of Japanese management (e.g., Keys and Miller, 1984; Hatvany and 
Pucik, 1981). This adds the importance of actors’ profile to actors’ positions, as 
McPherson and Sauder (2013) argue.  
 
8.4 Communicating locals’ complaints: Extended boundaries of 
organisational communities  
Communication about locals’ complaints creates an extended ‘family’ to local 
employees, making the work organisation ceremonial. In JapanCo group, it has 
not been uncommon for some locals to communicate their complaints to top 
management in JHQ bypassing their direct managers or directors. In general, 
the complaint is first made over the heads of subsidiaries to management 
executives at JHQ, with whom local actors got along. Here, the boundaries of 
‘family’ are considered to be extended to the JapanCo group as a whole, as in a 
Japanese small firm (Kondo, 1990). 
Here, the Japanese ‘family’ logic shapes the sharing of the same 
information and responsibilities beyond the hierarchy. This refers to a 
communication style rooted in JHQ, Japan. Sharing the same information and 
responsibilities is common in JHQ in which the employee’s voice is constantly 
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gathered. There is a voice gathering system in JHQ; a suggestion box, ‘Ryoshin 
No Koe’ in Japanese, (‘voice of conscience’ directly translated in English). It 
functions as a contact point for employee' opinions, possibly disrupting the 
organisational hierarchy, as in the subsidiaries. This is an email box located in 
the intra website in Japan and written in Japanese, and directly leads to the CEO 
of JapanCo group. This is expected to incorporate whistleblowing from inside 
JHQ, although it isn’t paralleled in the subsidiaries. It also represents ‘active 
participation’ in all matters, however. This promotes employees’ participation as 
family member engagement, whilst at the same time allowing the indictment of 
workplace issues. This enacts collective responsibility and the active 
participation of the ‘family’ logic as opposed to the organisational hierarchy (the 
corporation logic). 
In the subsidiaries, this is strongly echoed in local complaints directly 
communicated with JHQ. Apparently, the local employees are often encouraged 
to make contact with JHQ. When visiting the subsidiaries, the top management 
from JHQ tend to actively make remarks that local employees are allowed to 
contact them directly over the heads of subsidiaries. A Japanese manager in 
JTHAI comments 
 
This engineering director and another [from JHQ], visiting [JapanCo 
Thailand], told the locals to possibly contact themselves by 
themselves when necessary. In short, it means that it is possible for 




For Japanese, this does not mean that local employees can ignore the line of 
command and control, however. Contacting JHQ can be allowed for reporting 
important and urgent issues regarding sales activities only, such as adjusting 
delivery dates and quality problems. For non-Japanese, the comment of the 
engineering director is interpreted as it is. This results in unintentionally 
encouraging local employees to communicate complaints with JHQ beyond their 
direct Japanese managers. He elaborates this:  
 
It did not mean that they can disrupt or ignore the chain of command 
within their subsidiaries. For instance, a case can be that a customer’s 
delivery date is severe so there is a need to help to shorten deliver 
time. Normally, Japanese would understand that this contact [with 
directors] can be used only for operational purpose but locals would 
not … they would say, as they were told [to make contact with JHQ 
whenever they think necessary], and this is why they did it [contacted 
JHQ]. 
 
For Japanese, contacting JHQ manifests the Japanese ‘family’ logic, of sharing 
information for business purposes. This also implies actors’ ‘active participation’ 
in order to gain and maintain the ‘family’ membership (Kondo, 1990). Meanwhile, 
the local employees tend to feel encouraged to contact JHQ whatsoever, 
eventually becoming members of organisational communities. This results in 
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making Japanese expatriates ceremonial managers in the subsidiaries because 
the locals contacted JHQ over the heads of Japanese expatriates.  
 In JEU, for example, there was a case when a local manager directly 
made contact with one of management executives in JHQ. He complained about 
a previous Japanese MD’s ‘authoritarian’ way of restructuring the business, after 
the financial crisis. The way he restructured was described as ‘inhumane’ by an 
informant because he fired one employee on sick leave by just sending a 
dismissal notice via mail without directly meeting them. A Belgian director 
characterises the previous restructuring by saying:  
 
It was quite a shock for everybody, because with the previous MD 
everything was very open and there was always room for 
negotiation… if you compare, his style is American management style 
 
The Belgian director emphasised that the command and control exercised by the 
previous MD’s ‘American style’ was not welcomed and thus, some managers left. 
Some German employees in JEU made a direct complaint to JHQ regarding the 
former MD. After the complaint, the former MD was finally relocated because of 
this way of restructuring and managing the business. According to some 
informants, he was, in fact, ‘executed’ by JHQ because he did not generate 
profits or gain trusted relationships with local employees.  




He didn’t follow our advice and after all we are the European people, 
we know how the European market works and he had his own way of 
doing things…  
 
According to her, he was not ready to hear what local employees were saying 
and eventually did whatever he wanted to do: restructuring and making sudden 
changes in marketing strategy without explanation. This kind of changes echoes 
the work of Ybema and Byun (2012) and Sedgwick (2007) in which they 
describe that some local employees left their Japanese subsidiaries due to 
cultural difference between Japanese and European ways of doing things, and 
organisational change in the subsidiaries. The complaint discussed above, 
however, manifests the extended boundaries of ‘family’ members 
communicating with JHQ, making the Japanese MD ceremonial in JEU. 
 Likewise, in JTAIW, a Taiwanese accounting manager communicated 
her concern about an accounting practice problem directly with JHQ, bypassing 
their former Taiwanese Japanese MD. The practice problem was that the cost of 
feng shui, Chinese geomancy used in rearranging office layout, was added up 
without a legitimate voucher payment. This complaint, however, stems not from 
the accounting problem itself but from an untrusting interpersonal relationship 
between the former MD and others. It is quite common to issue no voucher 
payment from feng shui service but the former MD created a voucher payment 
by himself. A current Japanese MD describes the former one as “an authoritarian 
leader” who gives orders and commands, rather than allowing space for 
participating in discussion. He states “[the former MD] is an ego driven man, thus 
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ruining interpersonal relationship with other local employees. A little thing is 
communicated as a fraud practice with JHQ. This was a mere communication 
issue. It should have been no big deal.” Later on, however, both the former MD 
and the accounting manager resigned because of this problem.  
Both the cases of JEU and JTAIW illustrate how an issue in a subsidiary 
is shared and communicated with JHQ, making local employees members of the 
wider organisational community. In addition, these overhead diplomacies with 
JHQ also make the existing Japanese expatriate managers, directors, MD, and 
president useless and thus ceremonial. Not only are both local complaints to 
JHQ well heard by JHQ, but they are also accepted and investigated by the 
managements at JHQ. In both cases, the concerned Japanese MDs are either 
taken back to JHQ and later fired in the case of JTAIW. The organisational 
hierarchy between Japanese expatriates and their local employees (the 
corporation logic) is mediated and even disrupted by the locals sharing 
information and responsibilities (the Japanese ‘family’ logic) as the members of 
the organisational communities.  
Another good illustration of local complaints to JHQ is JHTAI. Both a 
Thai male director and a female manager resisted the authoritative and directive 
actions of a Japanese expatriate by claiming that they suffered ‘power 
harassment’ and ‘sexual harassment’. Their request was to replace him with 
another Japanese expatriate as well as to prevent him coming to one of offices. 
They directly sent email over the heads of the subsidiaries to the division director 
at the headquarters who seemed to manage the Japanese expatriate by whom 
they are harassed. They have known the contact in JHQ for a long time, since 
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they joined JTHAI. As a researcher, I had difficulties conducting in-depth 
interviews about this event with the Thai manager and director in question 
because they were not prone to talk about the event. A large part of the 
interpretation of complaints rests on the Japanese manager who was 
complained about. His account was:  
 
Hearing about the detailed claim of email later, I found that I seem to 
have been so hard on local sales, and was told not to come again [the 
office in] Rayong, although I had regularly visited the office by week 
before. So their request to the headquarters was not to let me come to 
Rayong anymore. I was not mad in front of them but, well, actually 
was a little bit. More than that, I said, when a local salespersons gave 
a lousy and poor excuse of losing sales opportunity, it is wrong and 
unacceptable. I was not convinced of the excuse so I told them that I 
need to interview with him. I was told not to do so by them. 
 
The compliant manifests a conflict between ‘family’ responsibilities of raising 
subordinates and the benevolence of leaders believed in Theravada Buddhism. 
The Japanese expatriate interprets his role as to show anger in order to correct 
his employee’s shortcomings, while the Thais rather prioritises the religious 
mind-set to forgive them (see 7.2). The contacts at JHQ are normally 
management executives who recognised the local employees. According to the 
Japanese expatriate, the source of the complaint concerns religious merits of 
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forgiveness which has to be shared among JHQ for their own interest. That is, 
he got angry with a Thai salesman who did not seriously pursue sales 
opportunities. In front of members in a meeting, he got angry although he knew 
that showing anger in public is not accepted in Thai society. He even commented 
in Japanese that “someone needs to scold local employees so that the Thais 
can get better… so I am taking this role of showing anger”. He expects to, raise 
his Thais as he did in Japan. 
 Actually, the Japanese expatriate firmly believes that anger is somewhat 
necessary to raise his Thai subordinates through the ‘family’ logic (see 7.2). For 
his view, he may have seen opportunities to treat and raise his men as his ‘child’. 
Nonetheless, Thai employees rather see constraints on this in terms of their 
religious belief in benevolence derived from Theravada Buddhism. Both actors’ 
view a manifest competitive relationship between Japanese ‘family’ and Thai 
Buddhism. This complaint, however, is somewhat puzzling for him because this 
was not the first time he got angry. He explains the source of embarrassment: 
 
In the email, I am supposed to have sexually harassed her. I have 
known her for 10 years and invited her to my home party. I have 
gotten in with her for long term but I did not understand why she 
suddenly claimed this. … Never until this time had I been complained 
by them although I have been working with them for 7 years. This is 
the first time that they resisted. I really do not understand. Anger? 




Reacting with surprise to this unexpected complaint, he reflects on what he has 
done with Thais and realised that his display of anger seemed to cause their 
resistance. Showing anger is against religious merit, benevolence and 
forgiveness, thereby provoking locals’ complaints.  
The profile of the Japanese expatriate is closely linked to JapanCo 
group. He began his career with JapanCo in Japan and has worked around thirty 
years. He has worked at JTHAI for seven years, which is his first experience of 
being an expatriate. He further comments that “Japanese in Asia tend to be 
respected” because of their outstanding historical and economic development in 
comparison with Asian countries. Thailand has been invested in by Japanese 
manufacturers as the hub in Asia. Taiwan, as another example, had been under 
Japan rule and thus “Japanese tend to be welcomed” as a Japanese expatriate 
in JTAIW mentions. In addition, a series of his comments parallels the notion of 
Asia in Japanese minds as the former Japanese expatriate MD in Asia and 
Europe comments that: 
 
[in my tenancy at subsidiaries] I found Japanese expatriates tend to 
communicate very differently with local employees, according to the 
employees, either Western or Asian... With Asians, a terrible attitude, 
they look down [Asians] and say like, why don’t you listen to me?... I 




For Japanese expatriates, the hierarchy means that Japan is above Asia yet 
below the West. This notion of Asia is consistent with what the Japanese 
expatriate in JTHAI says. He rather justifies why Japanese expatriates, including 
himself, are necessary in JTHAI by mentioning that “Japanese expatriates need 
to be here, as change leaders”. He referred back to the historical fact that a 
Japanese soldier, ‘Yamada Nagamasa’ became a governor during the 17th 
century in Thailand. He reasoned that talented foreigners like Japanese, 
therefore, are always crucial in order to maintain a good Thai society. 
 In the case here, the ‘family’ norm may have been instrumental by the 
Thais raising their complaints to JHQ. After the complaint ended, the Japanese 
manager, resisted by locals through the headquarters, laments that there is no 
rule of communication between the headquarters and local employees. He 
continues to describe how JHQ tends to react to this resistance. 
 
The Japan side, while not knowing locals much, tends to take all the 
credits for local employees without questioning. It tends to have great 
affection for the locals, and then, and goes on to criticize Japanese 
expatriates by saying ‘what are you doing?’ This makes all the 
expatriates working hard overseas useless.  
 
The contacts in JHQ are top management directors and vice presidents. When 
receiving complaints from local employees, who are mostly young, they tend to 
take for granted locals’ complaints without scrutiny. The ‘family’ norm may have 
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been utilised for bringing the Thais’ complaint. Both the Thai director and 
manager have worked at JTHAI for more than ten years yet had no prior working 
experience with Japanese MNCs. Neither have they worked outside Thailand. 
Their positions, as McPherson and Sauder (2013) argue, are somewhat relevant 
to the directors’ direct complaints with JHQ since because of their titles, they 
may be allowed to contact JHQ directly. Their long career profiles in JTHAI also 
helped them to communicate directly with the contact at JHQ whom they have 
long known. Their profiles strongly imply that the Thais strategically deploy the 
boundary of a whole ‘family’ including the subsidiaries through their active 
participation while downplaying the organisational hierarchy.  
 
8.5 Discussions and conclusion 
This chapter aims to understand how estranged practices in work organisation 
are interpreted through ceremonial aspects and how actors in turn are organised 
in terms of low compatibility and low centrality (Besharov and Smith, 2014). The 
finding of this chapter is: the boundaries of the organisational communities are 
not simply ‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but constructed through actors’ 
profiles. The finding further elaborates on the receptivity of ‘intraorganisational 
communities’ which is supposed to greatly affect the given meaning of logics in 
the subsidiaries. Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that the receptivity may be 
strongly affected by ‘the thickness of ties’ of organisational communities to their 
organisational fields. At first sight, this seems to support Japanese 
organisational communities. Japanese expatriates are structured as the 
dominant organisational community, manifesting uchi, the inside group of the 
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ethnocentric ‘family’ (Kondo, 1990). Indeed different HR management systems 
between Japanese expatriates and locals strongly support this Japanese 
organisational community (see 8.3.1). The dominant Japanese community can 
play a role in spanning the boundaries of ‘family’ members within JapanCo group 
and its subsidiaries, manifesting the uncontested boundaries of organisational 
communities. This indeed parallels the intimate relations between logics and 
types of actors, geographical communities, and organisations which are 
supposed to be segmented (Goodrick and Reay, 2011). 
The receptivity of organisational communities is, however, further 
constructed by actors’ personal profiles, rather than actors’ positions as 
structurally defined. McPherson and Sauder (2013) assert that actors are 
structurally constrained to manifest constellations of logics in threefold: 
procedural, definitional, and positional constraints. Despite the importance of 
actors’ positions, actors’ profiles also help to expand the membership of the 
organisational communities communicating with JHQ. This supports the 
significance of actors’ profiles as institutional reflexivity, indicated by Suddaby et 
al. (2012). In JUSA, the boundaries of the organisational communities are 
extended to the American VP, not the American president, owing to his career 
profile of working at several Japanese manufactures in the past. The American 
president, despite his leadership position, is rather separated from 
organisational communities according to a lack of ‘active participation’ (Kondo, 
1990) (see 8.3). In fact, both American president and VP have different profiles: 
the former had no working experience with Japanese MNCs while the latter has 
extensive experience over a number of decades. The American VP, as he says 
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himself, tends to play a role of being Japanese toward the American president. 
In JTHAI, the Thai director and manager who has worked at JTHAI for a long 
time are very aware of the Japanese ‘family’ within JapanCo group through their 
length of service in JHTAI. Their experience of working at other Japanese MNCs 
turns out to be a key element in playing the role of organisational communities 
spanning the manifested boundaries between the Japanese ‘family’ and the 
Western market logics. Indeed, they actually play a role of the organisational 
communities spanning the boundaries between Japanese ‘family’ and Thai 
Theravada Buddhism. This indicates the significance of actors’ career profile, of 
working at Japanese MNCs in this case, which potentially defines a member of 
organisational communities. This does not deny the three constraints that 
McPherson and Sauder (2013) present, especially that actors’ positions possibly 
restrict the constellations of logics. This rather confirms that the receptivity of 
organisational communities (Greenwood et al., 2011) can be constructed most 
through actors’ career profiles, especially in terms of experiencing different 
Japanese MNCs in this case. 
Perhaps, in the cases examined here, actors with their career profiles of 
working at only one corporation can be rather deeply embedded in their original 
environments. McPherson and Sauder (2013) remind us that the more varied 
institutional experience actors have, the greater institutional complexity there is. 
Here, both the Japanese VP in JUSA and the Japanese expatriate in JTHAI are 
examples of this. The Japanese VP in JUSA, who began his career and never 
had an expatriate experience before, firmly believes that Americans needs to be 
above Japanese expatriates because of historical development in respect to 
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Japan that “we [Japanese] are underneath [the US] so it would cause conflicts 
when Japanese try to take a leadership role, however, it would go well when an 
American is assigned as a leader”. Furthermore, the Japanese expatriate in 
JTHAI, who had spent his whole career in JapanCo, firmly believes that he 
needs to be a leader towards his Thai subordinates whenever necessary. He is 
actively taking a role of scolding his Thais whenever necessary by saying that 
“Japanese expatriates need to be here, as change leaders” referencing the 
historical figure, Yamada Nagamasa, who was a successful Japanese governor 
in 17th century Thailand. This further implies that actors’ profiles of having 
worked at one institutional environment manifests a particular logic that may be 
further embedded in their ‘life history’ rather than having institutional reflexivity 
(Suddaby et al., 2012; Battilana and Dorado, 2010).  
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 Discussion and Conclusion Chapter 9:
9.1 Summary of the findings  
The purpose of this research is to explore how practices are interpreted 
differently across the foreign subsidiaries of a Japanese MNC. An institutional 
logic approach is adopted, with a focus upon constellations of logics through the 
compatibility and centrality framework. Categories of practices across the 
subsidiaries of JapanCo emerged inductively through a quasi-ethnographic 
study. These practices relate to customer development, work and employment, 
and work organisation. The key findings of the study concern the relevance of 
culture, amplified logics, context, and ceremonial features for the operation of 
institutional logics. The significance of culture is appreciated through the aligned 
practices of Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism. The significance 
of amplified logics is examined, chiefly through the ‘family’ and religion logics. 
The significance of context is assessed through the contested practices enacting 
logics. Finally, the ceremonial aspects are illuminated through the estranged 
practices. Each finding is elaborated as follows.  
 
9.1.1 Significance of culture on logics 
The significance of a national culture is assessed through the constellations of 
logics enacted in the aligned practices (see chapter 6). An identified finding is 
that the ‘family’ and religion logics themselves manifest national cultures, such 
as aspects of Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism, through 
practices in customer development. The table below compares the legitimacies 




Table 13: Comparison of legitimacies of logics (Thornton et al., 2012) and cultural 
interpretations 
Logics Its legitimacies  (Thornton 
et al., 2012)  
Cultural interpretations  
‘Family’ logic  Unconditional loyalty  Reciprocity and obligation 
(‘ko’ and ‘on’ relationship) 
Religion logic  Sacredness in economy Religious merit (Tam bun 
and Mai pen rai in Thai) 
 
Here, the Japanese ‘family’ is governed by a reciprocal ‘ko’ and ‘on’ 
relationship, ‘reciprocity and obligation’ (Kondo, 1990; Bhappu, 2000), sharply 
contrasting with the ‘unconditional loyalty’ which legitimises the Western ‘family’ 
(Thornton et al., 2012). ‘Oyabun Kobun’, ‘Senpai Kohai’, ‘Ongaeshi’, ‘Shiltuta 
Gekirei’ are all expressed as the burden of Japanese ‘family’ members. 
‘Ongaeshi’ is the repayment to those whom one thinks is owed it (see 6.4; 7.3.1; 
7.3.2). The child, especially after maturing, is obligated to return favours to its 
parents. This meaning of ‘family’ is also influenced by Japan’s collectivistic 
society (Hofstede, 2010). This has little to do with ‘unconditional loyalty’ as such, 
prioritizing more “reciprocity and obligation rather than obedience” (Bhappu, 
2000). It is also not consistent with the parental altruism which is manifested in 
Western ‘family’ firms (e.g., Nordqvist and Melin, 2010; Karra et al., 2006). 
‘Unconditional loyalty in the Western ‘family’ logic is in general consistent with 
Western ‘family’ firms (e.g., Karra et al., 2006). The concept of ‘family’ of both 
Western and Japanese, however, originates from the importance of 
‘reproduction of ‘family’ members’ as Friedland and Alford (1991) state.  
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 Moreover, Theravada Buddhism is strongly manifested through culturally 
interpretation of religious merits. ‘Tam bun’ and ‘Mai pen rai’, in Thai, 
symbolically represent the essence of religious merits, such as helping, forgiving, 
and being benevolent. A leader in Theravada Buddhism is expected to be a 
‘benevolent’ father. This contrasts with the religion logic based on Christianity’s 
governed ‘sacredness’ (Thornton et al., 2012). Although Thornton et al.(2012) 
reworked the religion logic to be universal rather than Christian, their definition is 
still a residue from Christianity, rather than incorporating other religious 
viewpoints such as Theravada Buddhism. ‘Tam bun’ and ‘mai pen rai’ in Thai, for 
example, manifest the true significance of gaining religious merits, leading to 
forgiving others and not showing anger. This implies potential limitations, as 
pointed out by Friedland and Alford (1991), who reminded us of the importance 
of the differences between Western and non-Western societies. The ‘family’ and 
religion logics are deeply rooted in national cultures in Japan and Thailand. This 
also strongly echoes the ‘cultural space’ for which categorical elements of logics 
may compete when Thornton et al. (2012) present the organisational field 
structure as the conditions favouring particular logics. The finding of this thesis 
rather illuminates that new ‘cultural space’ in non-Western society, such as Asia, 
is possibly composed of fundamentally different elements of the ‘family’ and 
religion logics which have been rooted in national cultures.  
 
9.1.2 Significance of amplified logics 
The significance of amplified logics is examined through the constellations of 
logics enacted in the aligned practices (see chapter 6). The finding is that both 
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the Japanese ‘family’ and Theravada Buddhism strengthen each other. In JTHAI, 
both the Japanese ‘family’ norm and Theravada Buddhism are amplifying each 
other (see 6.3, 6.4). Here, the Thai employees in JTHAI are motivated to be 
‘family’ members who cooperate through seniority (the corporation), helping 
each other so as to ultimately gain religious merit (religion) as well as improved 
economic results (market). For the Thai employees, ‘company as ‘family’’ is 
expressed through their identification with JTHAI, showing their benevolence in 
Theravada Buddhism by helping others and forgiving others’ mistakes. The Thai 
managers and directors spend their non-working hours instructing their 
employees. They volunteer to form study groups to teach their employees how 
to deal with Japanese customers. The relationships among logics are 
strengthened as well as facilitated, manifesting amplified relationships. 
 This demonstrate how logics are amplified (Greenwood et al., 2010; 
2011) ‘on the ground’ (McPherson and Sauder, 2013) in reference to high 
compatibility (Besharov and Smith, 2014). Conducting a macro analysis of 
Spanish firms, Greenwood et al. (2011) demonstrate a close correlation between 
Spanish family firms, regions in which Catholicism is dominant, and the extent of 
firms’ restructuring. Here, unlike their macro analysis, the thesis focuses on 
practice to show how multiple logics are not only enacted but also amplified 
within the aligned practices in customer development on the ground (see 
chapter 6). Thais characterise themselves as ‘family’ members (the family logic) 
for economic purposes (the market logic) as well as seeking religious merits (the 
religion logic) within their hierarchy (the corporation logic). Helping behaviours 
(the religion logic), such as spending non-working hours supervising their 
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subordinates, helps to retain their ‘family’ members as well as achieve economic 
benefit. Furthermore, delivering economic benefits, such as generating 
additional revenue from customers, is also a necessary condition for retaining 
family members as well as religious members. The aligned practices elaborate 
how logics are amplified on the ground without a clear hierarchy among them.  
 
9.1.3 Significance of context of logics 
The significance of context is assessed through the constellations of logics 
enacted in the contested practices (see chapter 7). A finding is identified: the 
constellations of logics are ongoing and continuously formed in relation to 
geographical locations. Actors’ negotiations and conflicts continue in order to 
solve competitive relationships among logics. Both bonus and sales incentives 
enact multiple logics, eventually generating competitive relationships among 
logics. In JTHAI, for example, Thai employees tend to find opportunities to 
manifest religious merit by forgiving others’ mistakes when pursuing sales 
opportunities with Japanese expatriates, manifesting a tension between the 
religion and market logics (see 7.2). Job delegation enacts a tension between 
self-improvement (family), self-acceptance (religion) and self-interest (market). 
In JTAIW, JUSA and JEU, however, the market logic manifests itself in job 
delegation for the sake of managers’ self-interests. This demonstrates the 
situatedness of actors, because some see opportunities while others see 
constraints within the same practices. In addition, in JTHAI, the Japanese 
‘family’, enacted by Thais asserting that ‘we are family’, conflicts with Theravada 
Buddhism in respect to bill payment (see 7.4.1) while in JTAIW, JUSA, JEU, the 
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market and ‘family’ logic are in conflict according to actors conducting practices 
(see 7.4.2). In addition, the ‘family’ logic in JTHAI conflicts with the market 
efficiency expected by the Japanese MD. This stems from the notion that 
constellations of logics are dynamic and ongoing process of enacting logics. 
Moreover, the constellations of logics are to some extent, different in 
Asia and the West. For example, in Asia, like JTHAI and JTAIW, ‘family’ logic is 
enacted through the employment practices (see 7.3.1; 7.4.1): the local 
employees tend to treat bonuses as a collective reward, prioritising group 
performance over individual. In particular, company trips and parties in both 
JTHAI and JTAIW manifest the ‘family’ logic, while other social events are quite 
active in JTHAI but not JTAIW, bringing about different manifestations of the 
‘family’ logic. By contrast, the market logic in JUSA and JEU is strongly enacted 
by performance appraisal and socialisation (see 7.3.2; 7.4.2) where sales 
incentives and promotion are interpreted as individual rewards, and no bonus is 
adopted. In JUSA, JEU, and partially in JTAIW, there are very few social events, 
which are considered means to keep independent professionals relationships to 
a bare minimum, rather than building a ‘family’ norm as in JTHAI.  
This does not mean that the geographical location solely determines the 
constellations of logics, however. In JTHAI and JTAIW, there are some Thai and 
Taiwanese who tend to insist on an increase in individual salary (see 7.3.1), and 
there is an American director who wants JUSA to become a Japanese company. 
These demonstrate nuanced articulations of constellations of logics in their 
geographical locations. As Abo (2015) and Lounsbury (2007) point out, 
geographical locations matter. This finding also highlights the significance of 
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context, such as surrounding environments as well as the geographical locations 
where practices are conducted, as other institutionalists have recently argued 
(e.g., Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013).  
 
9.1.4 Significance of actors’ profile  
The ceremonial aspects are assessed through the constellations of logics 
enacted in the estranged practices (see chapter 8). Indeed, the boundaries of 
organisational communities are not ‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but 
extended through actors’ profile. This raises the significance of actors’ profile in 
having institutional reflexivity (Suddaby et al., 2012) and echoes the contested 
meanings of ‘family’, as Kondo (1990) asserts. This also adds the importance of 
actors’ profile to their positions manifesting the constellations of logics. At first 
sight, Japanese expatriates are structurally constructed as the dominant 
organisational community by the organisational field (Greenwood et al., 2011), 
manifesting uchi, the inside group of the ethnocentric ‘family’. The different HR 
management systems between Japanese expatriates and the locals strongly 
support this Japanese organisational community, echoing ‘two management 
structures’ (Elger and Smith, 2005) (see 8.2). Indeed, the dominant Japanese 
community plays a role spanning the boundaries of ‘family’ members within 
JapanCo group and its subsidiaries.  
In practice, however, the boundaries of the organisational communities 
are due largely to actors’ profiles of whether actors have intensive working 
experience at Japanese MNCs. In particular, in JUSA, the American president 
has little working experience with Japanese MNCs in the past while the 
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American VP has intensive experience over several decades (see 8.3). The 
American VP says that he plays the role of ‘being Japanese’ towards the 
American president by promoting Japanese management practices, such as 
sharing information in the QC Circle. He has extensive work experience at 
several large Japanese MNCs and expertise in Japanese management 
practices, especially on the manufacturing side. His career profile, albeit not a 
Japanese expatriate in JUSA, allows himself actively to play a role of 
organisational communities which connect to Japanese management practices 
possibly conduced in JHQ. Being Japanese, he often convinces the American 
VP of how the headquarters in Japanese MNCs manage to establish 
subsidiaries by despatching Japanese expatriates who are expected to play the 
role of coordinator. Based on extensive working experience at Japanese MNCs, 
the actors’ profiles help to play the role of organisational communities which 
construct and conduct Japanese management practices manifesting the ‘family’ 
logic. In contrast, the American president stays separated from the 
organisational communities due to his lack of ‘active participation’ (Kondo, 1990) 
(see 8.2). These accounts elaborate on the simple notion of having dominant 
Japanese expatriates (Westney, 1987; 1999). Here, the boundaries of the 
organisational communities are constructed through actors’ profiles in addition to 
their ‘active participation’. 
  
9.2 Theoretical contributions 
Drawing on the findings previously reviewed, four main theoretical contributions 
are identified: the significance of culture on logics clarifies the relationship 
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between culture and logics; the significance of amplified logics elaborates the 
compatibility and centrality framework; the significance of context illuminates the 
relationality of logics; and the ceremonial aspects reveal complex relations 
between logics and ceremonial aspects. 
 
9.2.1 Clarifying the relationship between national cultures and logics  
The finding that ‘family’ and religion logics themselves manifest national cultures, 
such as aspects of Japanese ‘family’ and Thai Theravada Buddhism, through 
the aligned practices in customer development questions a distinction between 
logics and national cultures implicitly made by the existing literature (i.e., 
Värlander et al., 2016; Giorgi et al., 2015). Here, not only are constellations of 
logics affected by national cultures, but logics themselves manifest the national 
cultures to which actors attribute practices. This further advances the theoretical 
contribution of Värlander et al. (2016) who point out that institutional logics 
themselves might be different according to national culture. They raised a 
concern that the market logic across the US, China and India may not be 
identical by describing that the market logic in China with its state controlled 
market is different from the one in the US. As a main contribution of Värlander et 
al. (2016), national cultural influence on institutional logics through transferring 
practices responds to a recent call to “explain how and why culture influences a 
range of organizational processes” (Giorgi et al., 2015, p30). Indeed Giorgi et al. 
(2015) argue for the importance of culture as a variable by classifying the 
existing literature into the two categories of ‘institutions’ effect on culture’ as well 
as ‘culture’s effect on institutions’ on the assumption that both logics and culture 
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are separable. Here, the cultural aspect of ‘reciprocity and obligation’ is strongly 
manifested as the Japanese ‘family’ logic among ‘family’ members, bringing 
about the intertwined relationship between cultures and logics. National cultures 
are already incorporated in depth in institutional logics.  
This leads to a further series of questions about the fundamental 
relationship between culture and logic assumed by a series of studies in Journal 
of Management Inquiry 2012 by asking, for example, whether both culture and 
logics can be separable in the first place. Many scholars in this edition, such as 
Schultz (2012) Aten and Howard-Grenville (2012), and Hatch (2012), implicitly 
assumes a distinction between culture and institutional theory. Some argue that 
while institutional theory is conducted at the field and organisational level of 
analysis, cultural theory concerns individual level analysis. According to them, as 
a variable, a national culture is supposed to only influence the process and 
enactment of logics. In fact, however, institutional logics perspectives are found 
to offer their potential most especially in different national contexts, and 
especially in non-Western countries, such as in Asia, Africa and South America 
because the study of institutional logics in cross cultural settings is relatively less 
focused (Thornton et al., 2012). In the current literature, the universality of logics 
is implicitly assumed even in different national contexts (e.g., Thornton et al., 
2012; Värlander et al., 2016). Given the meanings of logics themselves 
manifesting the national cultures with which actors are associated, then 
institutional logics perspectives can play an important role in how culture and 
logics are both incorporated and intertwined in different national contexts. Thus, 




9.2.2 Amplification of logics is not equal to compatibility 
The finding that both Japanese ‘family’ and Theravada Buddhism strengthen 
each other elaborates the concept of compatibility in logic multiplicity that 
Besharov and Smith (2014) argue for, while directly supporting the 
presupposition of amplification itself (Greenwood et al., 2010; 2011). It 
demonstrates that amplification is not limited to just compatible (Besharov and 
Smith, 2014) or facilitative logics (Goodrick and Reay, 2011) because logics not 
only coexist without conflicts but also strengthen each other. This does not 
exactly echo a hybrid logic (Thornton et al., 2005) or a facilitative relationship 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011), which simply indicates the coexistence of logics. Nor 
is it a blending logic (Thornton et al., 2012) which is supposed to create new 
logic by blending multiple logics. The compatibility is primarily given on the 
assumption of clear hierarchies of compatible logics at the organisational level 
by arguing that “compatibility is lower when there are inconsistencies regarding 
the goals of organizational action than when there are inconsistencies involving 
only the means by which goals are achieved (Besharov and Smith, 2014, p367).” 
In this thesis, the Thai employees in JTHAI are motivated to be ‘family’ members 
(the ‘family’) who cooperate through seniority (the corporation) and help each 
other (the religion) ultimately to gain economic results (the market). All these 
logics are not only facilitating or compatible but also amplifying and 
strengthening, without a clear hierarchy between them: they are all 
interdependent according to actors’ attributed meanings to practices.  
Furthermore, amplified logics elaborate how logics are strengthened ‘on 
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the ground’ (McPherson and Sauder, 2013) at a micro level, further advancing 
the work of Greenwood et al. (2010) who showed the macro relationship 
between Spanish ‘family’ owned firms and Catholicism. Greenwood et al. (2010) 
basically conducted a quantitative analysis that showed a correlation among 
family firms and Catholicism by regions in Spain, although they do not directly 
touch upon how logics are amplified in practices nor how logics are interrelated. 
This also confirms the older Japanese management literature, such as Bhappu 
(2000)’s identification of the ‘family’ and religion logics within Japanese MNCs. 
She demonstrates the existence of ‘family’ and religion logics simply operating 
within Japanese MNCs, but fails to point out how these logics coexist and 
cooperate. Logics are likely to amplify each other through the meanings of 
‘reciprocity’. At the same time, this amplified relationship proves to be distinctive 
from the facilitative relationship in the sense of strengthening logics although 
Waldorff, Reay, and Goodrick (2013) treat the amplified relationship as the 
facilitative. This further implies that a possible condition favouring amplified 
relationships may be deeply concerned with actors’ cultural interpretation.  
Similarly, this casts further doubt on the current literature of Japanisation 
which examines how practices are executed and interpreted through the norm of 
‘family’. It might be amplification with other logics rather than simple 
‘Japanisation’ which intensifies the ‘family’ norm. Reflecting on the current 
literature which focuses on the industry level analysis (e.g., Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1992), Japanese management scholars may have failed to articulate the 
amplified effects of the ‘family’ and other logics, in favour of a simplistically 
dominant ‘family’ logic. In the compatibility and centrality framework, their studies 
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are likely to fall into the category of dominant practices where a single logic 
dominates other peripheral logics without conflicts: the box of high compatibility 
and low centrality in the compatibility and centrality framework (Besharov and 
Smith, 2014). In particular, this applies to some Japanese MNCs in Thailand in 
the sense that “Thai workers were seen to be more familiar and comfortable with 
the collectivist orientation of Japanese managers” (Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 
2003, p238) than with that of the mangers in the Western MNCs. This has 
actually been initially recognised as Japanisation enacted by dominant ‘family’ 
yet, on closer examination, the ‘family’ norm might have simply been amplified 
by multiple plural logics through cultural interpretations as demonstrated in 
chapter 6. This stems from a macro level analysis of Japanisation, neglecting the 
meanings actors attributed to practices.  
 
9.2.3 Ongoing constellations of logics in different geographical 
locations 
There is a theoretical significance of the identified finding in chapter 7: that the 
ongoing and continuously formed constellations of logics in relation to 
geographical locations demonstrate the notion of contextual embeddedness 
proposed by other institutionalists (e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; 
Värlander et al., 2016; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 
2013). This corresponds to the recent call to reveal nationally and 
organisationally “situated cultural beliefs, norms, and behaviors” (Giorgi et al., 
2015, p36) in a more nuanced manner, echoing the situatedness of actors (e.g., 
Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). Through actors’ 
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negotiation and interaction within the practices, as the negotiation and 
interactions at court (McPherson and Sauder, 2013), the finding provides a 
dynamic view of how logic and cultures, including organisational as well as 
national culture, are enacted according to actors’ contexts. Here, actors are 
rather situated in their contexts so some see opportunities while others see 
constraints within the same practices on an ongoing basis.  
Moreover, the finding that the constellations of logics are different in Asia 
and the West highlights the importance of geographical locations enabling 
specific constellations (Värlander et al., 2016) and of ‘geographical communities’ 
where logics are rooted (Lounsbury, 2007). Värlander et al. (2016) explain how 
an ‘open space’ practice through entrepreneurial logic in the US is transferred 
and manifests an engineering logic in China and market and community logics in 
India. Here, the ‘family’ logic is enacted through employment practices in Asia. In 
JTHAI and JTAIW, actors tend to treat bonuses as a collective reward. This 
echoes the work of Abo (2015) who argues for how geographical locations may 
influence Japanese management practice. In contrast, in the West, the market 
logic is strongly enacted by performance appraisal and socialisation. A sales 
incentive and promotion are interpreted as individual reward while no bonus is 
adopted. This rather explains the work of Elger and Smith (1994; 2005), 
illuminating how Japanese management practices are rejected and resisted.  
Although the geographical locations are deeply associated with 
enactment of low compatibility in logics, these never determine the relationships 
among them as the situatedness of actors is discussed (e.g., Delbridge and 
Edwards, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). Actors’ willingness is also 
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considered as in McPherson and Smith (2013) because here, the ‘family’ norm is 
strategically utilised by the Thai director who want to share jobs efficiently. This 
dynamic view of logics and culture, in response to the call for ‘contextual 
embeddedness’ raised by Giorgi et al. (2015), shows the importance of 
organisational contexts and culture. The cultural meanings of logics are not 
given but situated by actors in geographical locations where national and 
organisational contexts are embedded. Practices are employed as a micro 
cosmos where multiple logics operate at multiple levels. This is due to ‘both 
intentional and unintentional outcomes’ in the ‘everyday getting by of individuals’ 
(Lawrence et al., 2011) according to the relational contexts in which actors 
conduct practices. After all, the constellations of logics in the compatibility and 
centrality framework need to be treated as a dynamic and ongoing process of 
enacting institutional logics as well as other constellations of logics. 
 
9.2.4 Actors’ profiles in organisational communities 
There is one theoretical significance of the finding in chapter 8: the boundaries of 
the organisational communities are not ‘segmented’ to Japanese expatriates but 
constructed through actors’ profiles. This finding raises the importance of actors’ 
profiles supporting a possible institutional reflexivity, as Suddaby et al. (2012) 
point out. They raise the significance of ‘variations in one’s personal biography’ 
which is composed of ‘their social position, their educational history, their 
network relationships (Suddaby et al., 2012, p13)’. These ‘substantial individual 
differences’ among actors are shown to be quite important in this research, 
especially in the Japanese MNCs examined here. Indeed the American VP, 
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albeit not the president, is ‘being Japanese’ towards the American boss. His 
career profile in several Japanese MNCs greatly influences his capability to 
reflect his institutional environments in JTHAI. The American president, however, 
tends to be in a ceremonial position due to a lack of active participation. In this 
case, these differences can be made by actors’ profiles in respect to their work 
experience at Japanese MNCs enacting the Japanese ‘family’ logic. This echoes 
the work of Battilana and Dorado (2010) who raise the importance of actors’ 
profiles exposed to some practices enacting a particular logic. They indicate that 
actors’ life history’ may be fundamental to playing the role of organisational 
community members. The institutionalists’ normally focus on the macro and 
meso level studies adopting quantitative methods, eventually failing to grasp 
(e.g., Thornton et al., 2012) ‘substantial individual differences’ among actors 
(Suddaby et al., 2012). This also questions a simple articulation of the receptivity 
of organisational communities which can be strongly affected by ‘the thickness of 
ties’ to their organisational fields (Greenwood et al., 2011). With actors’ suitable 
career profile, they can play a role of organisational communities regardless of 
whether or not they are structurally defined as members of organisational 
communities connecting their organisational fields. 
 At the same time, this responds to a call made by McPherson and 
Sauder (2013) to elaborate actors’ capability to ‘use’ institutional logics. 
Assuming actors’ capability to use logics as a cultural ‘repertoire’ in reference to 
a cultural toolkit approach (Swidler, 1986), their research generated several 
questions, such as “Are the tools of all the institutions available for use? Are 
actors able to use these tools effectively? Which actors are most dexterous in 
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the use of these tools?” (McPherson and Sauder, 2013, p187). In this thesis, 
chapter 8 demonstrates how actors can and cannot enact constellations of 
logics in reference to actors’ profile. A Japanese expatriate seems to be deeply 
embedded in the institutional environment in Japan by saying that the Japanese 
need to lead the Thais, while other local employees in JTHAI, JEU, and JUSA 
tend to make direct complaints with JHQ. These local employees have 
experienced the institutional environment in Japan for a lengthy period of time in 
their career. This actors’ profile may enable or constrain the enacting of specific 
constellations of logics. Following McPherson and Sauder (2013), chapter 8 
demonstrates ‘everyday manifestations of logics’ through ceremonial aspects 
with actors’ profile by examples of different actors’ actions and profiles.  
 In addition, the finding further questions organisational communities 
structurally defined by their organisational fields as Greenwood et al.(2011) 
argue. The boundaries of ‘family’ can be contested with actors’ ‘active 
participation’ (Kondo, 1990) in addition to their profile. In theory, Japanese 
expatriates can be structurally entitled to be the organisational community to 
connect themselves to JHQ, as Greenwood et al, (2011) argue that the 
‘intraorganisational communities’ are supposed to be structurally defined by 
connecting themselves to the organisational fields. In practice, however, like the 
American VP being Japanese and the Thai director and manager, actors are 
able to play a role of organisational communities connecting to JHQ; their fields 
in other words. Active participation is therefore necessary in addition to 
appropriate actors’ profiles. This also throws doubt on the intimate relationship 
between logics and types of actors, geographical communities and 
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organisations (Goodrick and Reay, 2011) and on the assumption of complete 
actor autonomy to use logics as a repertoire. The boundaries of organisational 
communities are dynamically constructed rather than defined by their fields. 
These accounts develop a more nuanced articulation of the contested 
boundaries of organisational communities (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
 
9.3 Implications for managers 
This research provides several practical implications for managers, regardless of 
whether they are Japanese working especially at Japanese MNCs. Managers 
should understand actors’ cross-cultural interpretations of practices; they should 
pay attention to contexts of tensions between Japanese and locals; they should 
be aware of ceremonial aspects in two management structures; and they should 
understand the significance of actors’ profile of boundary spanners. 
 
9.3.1 Cross-cultural interpretations on practices  
Managers should understand the cross-cultural interpretations of practices with 
a host country culture (see chapter 6;7;8). The same practice can be interpreted 
differently through actors’ cultural interpretations of a host and home country 
culture. In this research, typical practices for Japanese MNCs are identified: 
on-the-job trainings, study group, sales follow up, job delegation, performance 
appraisal, socialisation, and communication with JHQ and customers locally. 
Through these practices, actors differentially ‘inhabit’ meanings of logics and 
culture. In JTHAI, the Thai employees tend to characterise ‘company as family’ 
while gaining religious merit by helping others (see 6.3, 6.4, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 8.4). 
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Both the ‘family’ norm and Theravada Buddhism can be intertwined, thus 
enabling the same actions on the part of actors: helping others and forgiving 
others’ mistakes (see 6.4). Indeed, some Japanese expatriates particularly 
admire the Thais for these actions; recognising them to those of the Japanese 
‘family’. Others attribute them to Thai religion, Theravada Buddhism, thus 
denying the existence of Japanese ‘family’. Even if actors’ actions are 
superficially similar to those of the Japanese, cultural meanings are not 
necessarily the same as a Japanese observer might think.  
Furthermore, this cross-cultural interpretation does not simply mean that 
Japanese do things one way while locals act in another fixed manner. In JTHAI, 
some locals express the importance of the ‘family’ norm while some Japanese 
do not at all. In addition, there can be local employees who act like Japanese 
expatriates. For example, in JTHAI, there is a Thai manager who speaks 
Japanese and emphasises the Oyabun and Kobun paternal relationship (see 
6.3). In JUSA, an American director is passionate about changing the status of 
JUSA as American company into a Japanese company where the ‘family’ logic 
can operate (see 8.4). Here, there is no simple formula as to how Japanese 
expatriates might act and how local employees in turn react.  
 
9.3.2 Contexts of tensions between Japanese and locals 
Managers should pay attention to tensions and some conflicts between 
Japanese and locals through logics (see chapter 7). These tensions and 
conflicts can be different according to the relational contexts of actors in a 
geographical location. In Asia, a collectivistic orientation based on ‘family’ can be 
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enhanced. A bonus manifests a collective reward in relation to their collectivistic 
orientations. In particular, a Thai manager insists on an increase in salary for her 
employees by stating that her salary has been raised enough, thus gaining 
religious merit in respect to Theravada Buddhism. Social events are quite active 
and there are even company trips and parties. In contrast, in the West, 
individualistic economic efficiency based on the market is strongly emphasised 
by performance appraisal and socialisation. Sales incentives and promotion are 
interpreted as individual rewards while no bonus is adopted (see 7.3). There are 
very few socials, which are considered as a means to keep independent 
professional relationships to the bare minimum, rather than building ‘family’ norm 
as in JTHAI (see 7.4). In Asia and West, therefore, the different types of tensions 
and conflicts may be different. 
 The geographical and cultural contexts of Asia and the West do not 
always determine the competitive relationships among logics. In JTAIW, despite 
company trips and parties, there seem to be very few informal social events: 
Taiwanese tend not to go out together as in JTHAI. In JTHAI, meanwhile, some 
Thai employees make an effort to argue for salary increases when assigned 
sales development jobs acquiring new customers or projects. Furthermore, the 
American director who had previously worked at large Japanese automotive 
manufacturers insists that JUSA is an ‘American company’ now, but that it is 
going to be Japanese company. Thus, the geographical and cultural contexts are 
deeply associated with enactment of competitive logics, but do not however 




9.3.3 Ceremonial aspects in two management structures  
Managers have to be aware of ceremonial aspects in two management 
structures within subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs (see chapter 8). This research 
shows how ‘two management structures’ (Elger and Smith, 2005) are 
constructed through actors’ cultural interpretation and contextual enactment of 
logics. At first sight, this has been reinforced by the dominant role of Japanese 
expatriates (Westney, 1987; 1999). In communicating expatriate evaluation, two 
structures are reinforced by the separation between Japanese expatriates and 
local employees. There are different HR management systems for Japanese 
expatriates and locals. This causes tensions in communicating business results 
by the American president, bringing about competition between the corporation 
and market logics. These negate the simple notion of having dominant Japanese 
expatriates (Westney, 1987; 1999), however, and instead support a more 
nuanced articulation of ceremonial aspects according to actors in their contexts. 
Eventually, the two structures are sustained as ceremonial work organisation 
norm which is mediated through the collective responsibility of ‘family’. 
 Furthermore, these ceremonial aspects are partially influenced by 
Japanese cultural interpretations of the hierarchy between Asia and the West 
(see 8.3). Although some Thais in JTHAI are promoted as directors above the 
Japanese, some Thais still consider the Japanese expatriate manager as the 
boss of the Thai directors because he is ‘Japanese’. In the West, the American 
president was appointed although the Japanese VP is the main contact with 
JHQ. The Japanese VP firmly believes that, in JUSA, the American president is 
simply better than the Japanese owing to the US hierarchical position in 
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Japanese mentality. These cultural interpretations may shape these ceremonial 
aspects. 
 
9.3.4 Actors’ profiles of boundary spanners  
Managers should understand the significance of actors’ profile of boundary 
spanners between different geographical locations (Suddaby, et al., 2012). The 
American VP in JUSA has extensive work experience at several large Japanese 
MNCs over a number of decades. The American VP, as he says himself, tends to 
play a role of being Japanese toward the American president, eventually playing 
a role of spanning boundaries between the Japanese ‘family’ and Western 
market logics. His career profile helps him to understand and span the possible 
boundaries within MNCs, possibly connecting the foreign subsidiaries to their 
headquarters. By contrast, the Japanese VP in JUSA is rather deeply embedded 
in their original environments in Japan. He began his career and never had an 
expatriate experience before. This strongly implicates the significance of actors’ 
career profile, of working at Japanese MNCs in this case, which potentially 
defines a member of organisational communities. 
 
9.4 Limitations and future research questions  
9.4.1 An issue of generalisability  
As with all the institutional studies, this research has several limitations. First, an 
issue of generalisability may arise because of the comparative ethnographic 
case studies. Although JapanCo has a long history and has operated for more 
than a hundred years since its incorporation in Japan, it is just one of many 
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Japanese MNCs, and thus this case may neither represent nor be generalised to 
the population of Japanese MNCs. It does not help at all to ‘enumerate 
frequencies’ which generalise as ‘statistical generalisation’. It does, however, 
possibly expand the institutional logics approach as ‘analytic generalisation’ (Yin, 
2003), linking findings in specific cases to a theory, which allows the 
ethnographic approach. Thus, the issue may remain but can be solved by 
focusing on aspects of expanding theories.  
 
9.4.2 An issue of reliability  
An issue of reliability may arise because of one coder and languages. Data is 
coded on the basis of a single coder, although this can be alleviated by re-coding 
twice. Also there is a language problem especially in the interviews with Thais, 
Taiwanese, and Belgium, whose first language is not English. In this case, I was 
reliant relatively more on Japanese expatriates’ accounts than the local 
employees, because some of them did not express themselves well in English. 
Overall, however, the quasi-ethnography nature of the study with a deep 
understanding of the data combines with ‘thick description’ presentations in a 
way that should be sufficient to address the concerns regarding reliability 
(Silverman, 2006). 
 
9.4.3 An issue of at-home ethnography  
An issue of at-home ethnography may arise because of treating the researcher 
as the object of study. This may limit the researcher to the taken-for-granted idea 
at his home. Alvesson (2009, p166) posts a fair warning that “(b)eing personally 
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involved in the object of study (the context in which one is studying) also means 
that one may be less able to liberate oneself from some taken-for-granted ideas 
or to view things in an open-minded way”. Although any social research can 
never be entirely neutral (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), it is possible to be more 
sensitive to the ideas through careful reflection. Here, reflexivity is actively 
enhanced throughout the data collection and analysis process. 
 
9.4.4 Elaborating relations between logics and culture 
A potential future research concerns the relationships between logics and culture. 
This research clarifies the relationship between national culture and logics from 
the perspective of a Japanese MNC operating in Asia and the West. Thornton et 
al. (2012) briefly touch upon ‘cultural space’ from the institutional logics 
perspective. Värlander et al. (2016) elaborate different constellations in the US, 
India and China. Cultural space should really matter here, given the research in 
a non-Western region, such as Asia, as demonstrated in this research. This 
raises the possibility that there might be another version of institutional logics 
perspectives in non-Western society which manifests a national culture. In 
particular, ‘family’ and religion logics can be further elaborated, especially in 
other Asian countries and other regions, such as Africa and South America.  
 
9.4.5 Exploring agency in the constellations of logics 
Another potential research area is regarding agency in constellations of logics. 
In reference to Suddaby et al. (2012), this research shows the significance of 
actors’ profile in which they can play the role of organisational communities by 
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making relationships between logics either cooperative or competitive. There is 
literature which argues for the importance of agency in respect to two logics (e.g., 
Smets and Jarzabkowski 2013) but the importance of agency in constellations of 
logics has yet to be explored fully. Thornton et al. (2012) briefly raise the 
possibility of ‘partial autonomy’ of actors and agencies, and although there are 
already some institutionalists who have begun to argue for the importance of 
agencies (e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; 
Smets and Jarzabkowski 2013), studies mainly focus on the dynamics between 
two logics rather than constellations of logics.  
 
9.4.6 Focusing on non-Japanese management practices in multiple 
geographical locations  
Another potential research area might be contemporary Japanese MNCs across 
different geographical locations. So far, there is a body of literature which mainly 
discusses comparisons and contrasts between Japanese plants and local plants 
in a given location (e.g., Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005; Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1988; 1992). There is less literature, however, discussing complexity across 
geographical locations within a Japanese MNC. Abo (2015) strongly implies the 
relationality of how Japanese manufacturing practices are implemented across 
Asia and West. In Asia, they are relatively accepted in the same way as in Japan, 
but in the West, they are often rejected and resisted. These geographical 




9.4.7 Pursuing a quasi-ethnographic study 
The last potential research concerns methodological perspective. Many 
institutionalists focus on macro and meso level studies. These studies adopt 
mainly quantitative methods and or textual analysis, rather than participant 
observation. Their method goes along with identifying a reifying institutional 
tendency yet fails to pay attention to the meanings of actors. In line with the 
same argument, this tendency to focus on the macro and meso level is true for 
Japanese management scholars (e.g., Elger and Smith, 1994; 2005; Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1988; 1992) with some exceptions (Delbridge, 1998; Graham, 1994.). 
As Elger and Smith (2005) point out Western scholars lack ‘area knowledge’ of 
Japan, such as culture and languages. A quasi-ethnographic study needs to be 
pursued by scholars with area knowledge to provide nuanced, rich articulations 




Table 14: A list of interviews 





25 May 2012 Strategic planning 
directors 
- 90 
25 May 2012 Managers Expatriates 60 
25 May 2012 Managers Expatriates 90 
20 June 2012 Strategic planning 
directors 
- 60 
20 June 2012 Strategic planning 
directors 
- 60 
20 June 2012 Managers - 60 
28 December 2012 Strategic planning 
manager 
- 60 (via 
telephone) 
11 January 2013 Sales and marketing 
managers 
- 180 
16 January 2013 Strategic planning 
managers and directors 
- 120 
18 January 2013 Strategic planning 
managers and directors 
- 60 
JTHAI 
27 June 2012 Managing director Expatriate 30 
27 June 2012 Secretary Local 60 
27 June 2012 Senior sales manager Expatriate 120 
27 June 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
27 June 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
27 June 2012 Sales manager Expatriate 60 
28 June 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
28 June 2012 Sales engineering 
manager 
Expatriate 70 
2 July 2012 Sales assistant director Local 80 
2 July 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
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2 July 2012 HR manager Local 80 
2 July 2012 Sales director Local 70 
3 July 2012 Secretary Local 60 
3 July 2012 Senior sales manager Expatriate 80 
3 July 2012 Senior sales manager Local 60 
3 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 60 
3 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 30 
9 July 2012 Sales staff Local 60 
9 July 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
9 July 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
3 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 60 
4 December 2012 Senior sales manager Expatriate 180 
19 December 2012 Senior sales manager Expatriate 60 
23 December 2012 Senior sales manager Expatriate 180 
21 January 2013 Senior sales manager Expatriate 60 
21 January 2013 Sales assistant director Expatriate 60 
23 January 2013 Senior sales manager Expatriate 60 
23 January 2013 Senior sales manager Expatriate 60 
23 January 2013 Sales staff Local 60 
JTAIW 
16 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 200 
16 July 2012 Secretary Local 80 
16 July 2012 Sales director Local 80 
16 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 60 
17 July 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
17 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 60 
17 July 2012 Sales deputy director Local 70 
17 July 2012 Sales director Expatriate 80 
17 July 2012 Sales manager Expatriate 80 
18 July 2012 Sales staff Local 60 
18 July 2012 Sales manager Local 60 
18 July 2012 Sales director Local 60 
18 July 2012 Managing director Expatriate 60 




26 April 2013 Managing director Expatriate 60 (via 
telephone) 
6 May 2013 Managing director Expatriate 180 
7 May 2013 Managing director Expatriate 120 
7 May 2013 Corporate director Local 60 
7 May 2013 Secretary Local 60 
7 May 2013 HR manager Local 60 
7 May 2013 Managing director Expatriate 60 
8 May 2013 Managing director Expatriate 60 
8 May 2013 Sales manager Local 80 
8 May 2013 Sales staff Local 60 
8 May 2013 Sales staff Local 50 
8 May 2013 Logistic manager Local 60 
JUSA 
11 April 2013 Vice president (sales & 
marketing)  
Expatriate 60 (via 
telephone) 
9 August 2013 Vice president (sales & 
marketing)  
Expatriate 60 (via 
telephone) 
12 August 2013 Vice president (sales & 
marketing)  
Expatriate 180 
12 August 2013 Secretary Local 60 
12 August 2013 Vice president Expatriate 60 
13 August 2013 Assistant engineering 
manager 
Local 60 
13 August 2013 Engineering manager Expatriate 90 
13 August 2013 Outside sales manager Local 90 
13 August 2013 Outside sales manager Local 60 
13 August 2013 Vice president (sales & 
marketing)  
Expatriate 60 
14 August 2013 Vice president (operation) Local 90 
15 August 2013 Senior accountant Expatriate 50 
15 August 2013 Inside sales manager Local 70 
15 August 2013 Marketing director Local 70 
15 August 2013 Inside sales staff Local 60 
15 August 2013 Production staff Local 50 
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15 August 2013 President Local 90 (via 
telephone) 
15 August 2013 Senior manager Expatriate 80 
 
Table 15: A list of events 




JHQ (Tokyo, Japan) 
15 June 2012 Dinner 10 120 
Seminar house in Izu Shizuoka, Japan 
15 November 2014 Asian MD (Management 
directors) Meeting 
20 480 
15 November 2014 Lunch and dinner 20 180 
16 November 2014 Asian MD (Management 
directors) Meeting 
20 240 
JTHAI (Bangkok, Thailand) 
25 June 2012 Strategic communication 
seminar  
18 480 
25 June 2012 Lunch and dinner 6 200 
26 June 2012 Strategic communication 
seminar  
18 480 
26 June 2012 Lunch and dinner 5 200 
27 June 2012 Lunch and dinner 5 180 
28 June 2012 Lunch and dinner 5 180 
2 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 3 180 
9 July 2012 Management meeting 10 180 
4 December 2012 Lunch 2 60 
19 December 2012 Lunch 2 60 
21 January 2013 Lunch 2 60 
JTAIW (Taipei, Taiwan) 
16 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
16 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
17 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
18 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
19 July 2012 Quality meeting 10 180 
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20 July 2012 Lunch and dinner 3 180 
JEU (Brussel, Belgium)  
6 May 2013 Lunch and dinner 2 180 
7 May 2013 Lunch and dinner 2 180 
8 May 2013 Lunch and dinner 2 180 
JUSA (Santa Clara, California and Phoenix Arizona, the US) 
11 August 2013 Dinner Sales and 
marketing 
180 
12 August 2013 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
13 August 2013 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
14 August 2013 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
15 August 2013 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
16 August 2013 Weekly meeting 3 120 
16 August 2013 Lunch and dinner 4 180 
 
Table 16: A list of documents 




‘100 years of history of JapanCo’ 1 549 549 
Country presentation at each 
subsidiary (ppt slides)  
4 50 200 
Investor Relation (IR) report 
(Japanese) 
5 (years) 60 300 
Investor Relation (IR) report 
(English) 
5 (years) 60 300 
Investor Relation (IR) presentation 
(Japanese) 
4 per year 
(3years) 
10 120 
Investor Relation (IR) presentation 
(English) 
4 per year 
(3years) 
10 120 
JapanCo group PR magazine 
(Japanese) 
4 per year 
(3years) 
8 96 
JapanCo group PR magazine 
(English) 




management” (published book 





Table 17: The history of JTHAI 
Phases Year Events 
Initiation 1985 Started joint venture with ThaiCo  
1989 Established sales representative in AmericaCo Thailand 
1995 Incorporated JTHAI (JTHAI) 
1st Japanese president appointed 
Stagnation 1997 Asian financial crisis occurred 
The company operated at a loss 
2nd and 3rd Japanese presidents appointed 
Expansion 2002 The economy recovered and many Japanese 
manufacturers started to transfer their factories to 
Thailand 
The company generated profit  
4th and 5th Japanese presidents appointed 
2004 Reached more than 100 employees, hiring new 
graduates 
2006 Established the Valve Maintenance Service Center in 
Rayong 
Changed organisational structure from functional to 
divisional (Thai managers appointed for the first time) 
2007 Established a sales office branch in Amata 
2010 6th Japanese president (who was hired from another 
Japanese company) appointed.  
 









Table 18: The history of JTAIW 



























































































Initiation 1969 Established a representative office in AmericaCo 
1997 Asian financial crisis  
1999 Incorporated JapanCo Taiwan; first Japanese president 
appointed 
Expansion   2002 Started to generate profit by active sales to Japanese 
manufacturers in Taiwan; second Japanese president 
appointed 
2007 Third Taiwanese Japanese president appointed;  
expanded the business and recruited more than 10 
employees, resulting in around 50 employees; 
caused accounting scandal and withdrew from his 
position 
Stagnation 2009 Fourth Japanese president appointed (who had been 
the first president) 
2010 Fifth Japanese president appointed 








Figure 29: The organisational chart of BA division in JTAIW 
 
 
Table 19: The history of JUSA 
Phases Year Events 



































































1996 Established Control Valve USA and first Japanese 
president appointed 
1998 Acquired an American valve manufacturer  
2001 Established Sensing Control another company 




2003 End of strategic alliance with AmericaCo 
Cleared the acquired the American valve manufacturer 
2005 Third Japanese president appointed at JapanOldCo 
Control Valve USA 
2008 Financial crisis (Lehman Shock) 
2009 Consolidated all subsidiaries into JUSA 
2010 First Japanese president appointed at JUSA 
American Biological company acquired and merged with 
Expansion 2012 Second Japanese president appointed at JUSA 
American meter manufacturer acquired 
 













































Figure 31: The operations organisational chart in JUSA 
 
 
Table 20: The history of JEU 
Phases Year Events 
Initiation 1989 Sales representative of JapanCo established in 
AmericaCo Europe 
2001 JapanCo Europe established in Belgium  
First Japanese president appointed 
2003 Ended strategic alliance with AmericaCo 
Expansion 2004 Second Japanese president appointed 
Expanded up to 15 employees 
Stagnation 2008 Financial crisis occurred (Lehman Shock) 
2009 Third Japanese president appointed (hired in the middle 
of his career) 
JEU from restructured from 15 to 8 employees, resulting 






























2012 Fourth president appointed 
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